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Abstract 
This thesis examines state changes in interoceptive accuracy in situations 
characterised by negative affect and heightened self-focus. The experiments 
manipulate negative affect in social and non-social contexts, by evoking social 
and physical threat, respectively. State changes in interoceptive and exteroceptive 
somatosensory perception are simultaneously examined in several experiments 
comprising the present thesis, in order to establish whether potential changes in 
the interoceptive modality generalise to the exteroceptive somatosensory 
modality. The experiments in the current thesis measure interoceptive accuracy 
using a heartbeat tracking task and assess the perception of exteroceptive bodily 
signals using cutaneous electrical stimulation. Socially threatening contexts 
manipulated in the present thesis include ones which: evoke social anxiety 
(Experiment 1), heighten social awareness of the self (Experiment 2) and result in 
social rejection (Experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 5 additionally examines the 
effect of physical threat on interoception by employing a pain anticipation 
paradigm. The main findings of these experiments indicate that heartbeat tracking 
accuracy (HTA) increases in response to public speaking anticipation as well as in 
response to pain anticipation, while it decreases as a result of social exclusion. 
Social self-focus, manipulated using a video camera being turned on and off, does 
not affect HTA, nevertheless, increasing the sensitivity in detecting electrotactile 
stimuli. Overall, the results of the present thesis indicate that interoceptive 
accuracy functions as a state variable, which changes in response to negative 
affective contexts that manipulate social and physical threat. It is proposed that 
interoceptive accuracy changes as a function of affective and social self-focus in 
these contexts. The findings of the current thesis are important considering the 
role of interoception in cognitive-affective processing. Future research 
investigations should explore whether state changes in interoceptive accuracy are 
accompanied by simultaneous changes in neural activity in the interoceptive 
regions of the brain, such as the anterior insula.      
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 What is Interoception? 
“The term interoception was coined by Sherrington in 1906, who defined 
it as the perception of signals from the inner organs of the body (i.e., 
visceroception) that is distinct from exteroception—the perception of signals 
originating outside of the body—as well as from proprioception—the perception 
of joint angles and muscle tensions relating to movement, posture and balance 
(Cameron, 2001; Vaitl, 1996). Interoception has been recently redefined as the 
“sense of the physiological condition of the entire body” (Craig, 2002, p.655), 
which in addition to visceroception (e.g., perception of cardiovascular, 
respiratory, gastrointestinal and genitourinary signals), also includes the 
perception of signals from the skin (e.g., affective touch, pain) and from the 
chemoreceptors of the body (e.g., taste, smell) (Criag, 2002, 2009). There are 
multiple pathways of interoception. The body’s visceral afferents are conveyed 
through the lamina-I spinal-thalamo-cortical pathway, converging in the insular 
cortex. Light and slow stroking touch (i.e., pleasant touch) is interoceptively 
processed via C-Tactile afferents—slow-conducting unmyelinated afferent fibres, 
which also project to the insular cortex (Olausson, Wessberg, Morrison, McGlone, 
& Vallbo, 2010). The other interoceptive pathway involves skin afferents 
projecting to the somatosensory cortices (Couto et al., 2014; Khalsa, Rudrauf, 
Feinstein, & Tranel, 2009). In the insular and somatosensory cortices, 
interoceptive signals are integrated into a cortical representation of the 
homeostatic state of the body, giving rise to bodily sensations (Craig, 2002, 2009). 
The cortical representation of the interoceptive state of the body has been 
proposed to be the basis of consciousness, the sense of self and subjective feeling 
states (Craig, 2002, 2010; Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013). Converging evidence from 
imaging and behavioural studies emphasises the importance of interoceptive 
processes in cognitive (e.g., Dunn et al., 2010; Garfinkel, Barrett et al., 2013; 
Garfinkel, Tiley, O’Keeffe, & Critchley, 2013; Werner, Schweitzer et al., 2013; 
Werner, Peres, Duschek, & Schandry, 2010) and emotional experience (e.g., 
Wiens, 2005; Wiens, Mezzacappa, & Katkin, 2000). 
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1.2 How is Interoception Measured? 
Interoceptive accuracy, the accuracy in perceiving inner bodily signals, has 
been most frequently quantified by means of heartbeat perception tasks, including 
heartbeat tracking—where participants are asked to silently count, and later 
report, the number of heartbeats they feel within a given time interval (e.g., 
Schandry, 1981)—and heartbeat discrimination—where participants are asked to 
judge whether a string of auditory tones matches their own heart rhythm (e.g., 
Brener & Kluvitse, 1988; Katkin, Reed, & Deroo, 1983; Whitehead, Drescher, 
Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977). In both of the above heartbeat perception tasks, 
participants are connected to equipment monitoring their true heart rate; 
participants’ subjective reports are then are compared to their actual cardiac 
measurements to determine perception accuracy. Performance on heartbeat 
tracking and heartbeat discrimination tasks has been found to be correlated (e.g., 
Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015; Hart, McGowan, Minati, & 
Critchley, 2013; Knoll & Hodapp, 1992), however, a significant relationship is 
not always found (e.g., Phillips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1999; Schulz, Lass-
Hennenmann, Sutterlin, Schachinger, & Vogele, 2013). Garfinkel et al. (2015) 
note the fact that the studies in which the two measurements are not significantly 
correlated often have small sample sizes (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Additionally, 
Garfinkel et al. highlight that heartbeat tracking and heartbeat discrimination may 
be reliant on shared, but also on distinct underlying mechanisms, with heartbeat 
tracking relying primarily on internal monitoring of heartbeat sensations, and 
heartbeat discrimination additionally requiring a comparison of internal 
(heartbeat) and external (auditory tones) information to be made. Even though 
individuals tend to underreport the number of heartbeats on the heartbeat tracking 
task (e.g., Ehlers, Breuer, Dohn, & Fiegenbaum, 1995), measured accuracy tends 
to be higher on the heartbeat tracking task than on the heartbeat discrimination 
task (Schulz, Lass-Hennenmann et al., 2013). Also, factors such as stress might 
differentially affect the two measures (e.g., Schulz, Lass-Hennenmann et al., 
2013), further highlighting that the two tasks might be reliant on related, yet 
somewhat distinct processes.  
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1.3 Inter-Individual Differences in Interoception 
The ability to accurately perceive interoceptive signals (i.e., heartbeats) 
has been found to vary significantly across individuals (e.g., Blascovich et al., 
1992; Cameron, 2001; Schandry & Bestler, 1995) and shows high test-retest 
reliability (Mussgay, Klinkenberg & Ruddel, 1999), thus is considered to be stable 
trait variable (Cameron, 2001). The basis of inter-individual differences in the 
ability to accurately perceive interoceptive signals is not yet fully understood 
(Verdejo-Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012), however, it is likely that the relative 
strength of interoceptive signals arising in the body (determined by physiological 
parameters such stroke volume and cardiac output) plays a significant role in 
determining interoceptive accuracy (Craig, 2003; Cameron, 2002). Accuracy on 
the heartbeat discrimination task and on the heartbeat tracking task has been found 
to be inversely related to heart rate (e.g., Ainley, Tajadura-Jimenez, Fotopoulou, 
& Tsakiris, 2012; Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Knapp-Kline & Kline, 2005; 
Stevens et al., 2011), likely due to decreasing stroke volume of individual 
heartbeats with increasing heart rate (Schandry, Bestler, & Montoya, 1993). 
Factors that have been suggested to affect accuracy in perceiving interoceptive 
signals include sex, fitness, body composition and age (Cameron, 2001; Vaitl, 
1996). However, the exact nature of these effects is not entirely understood, with 
studies providing disparate results. Khalsa, Rudrauf and Tranel (2009) observed 
an inverse relationship between age and heartbeat discrimination accuracy. On the 
contrary, Eley, Stirling, Ehlers, Gregory and Clark (2004) found a lack of a 
significant relationship between age and heartbeat tracking accuracy, although, in 
a sample of children. Males have been found to be more accurate in heartbeat 
discrimination than females in some (Jones & Hollandsworth, 1981; Katkin, 
Blascovich, & Goldband, 1981; Whitehead et al., 1977), but not all studies (e.g., 
Eley et al., 2004; Herbert & Pollatos, 2014; Khalsa, Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009; 
Rouse, Jones, & Jones, 1988). While some studies have found individuals with a 
high body mass index to be significantly lower in heartbeat discrimination 
accuracy (e.g., Montgomery & Jones, 1984; Rouse et al., 1988) as well as in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy (e.g., Herbert & Pollatos, 2014), other studies failed to 
observe this relationship (e.g., Eley et al., 2004; Khalsa, Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009; 
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Koch & Pollatos, 2014; Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jimenez, & Costantini, 2011). Given 
the largely contradictory results, more research is necessary to understand the 
determinants of individuals’ ability to accurately perceive interoceptive signals. 
Researchers have categorized individuals into good and poor interoceptors 
by using cut-off points (e.g., Herbert, Muth, Pollatos, & Herbert, 2012; Herbert, 
Pollatos, & Schandry, 2007; Herbert, Ulbrich, & Schandry, 2007; Matthias, 
Schandry, Duschek, & Pollatos, 2009; Montoya, Schandry, & Mueller, 1993; 
Pollatos, Kirsch, & Schandry, 2005; Pollatos, Schandry, Auer, & Kaufmann, 
2007) and median splits on interoceptive accuracy scores (Ainley, Maister, 
Brokfeld, Farmer, & Tsakiris, 2013; Ainley et al., 2012; Garfinkel et al., 2015; 
Ferri, Ardizzi, Ambrosecchia, & Gallese, 2013; Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, & 
Seth, 2013; Tajadura-Jimenez & Tsakiris, 2014; Tsakiris et al., 2011). As 
randomly selected samples tend to be characterised by a small proportion of 
individuals with high interoceptive accuracy scores, median splits have been used 
as an alternative to cut-off points, consequently allowing for comparisons of 
individuals with lower and higher interoceptive accuracy. Even though there are 
disadvantages to dichotomising continuous variables and creating a situation 
where similar cases that are on opposite sides of the cut-point are considered to be 
different from one another, including potential loss of power to detect a difference 
and increased risk of identifying spurious effects (Altman & Royston, 2006), 
median splits can be useful in characterising data with an underlying dichotomy, 
as in the case of interoceptive accuracy. Good and poor interoceptors have been 
found to differ significantly on a number of variables pertaining to emotion 
processing (e.g., Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007), decision-making (e.g., Werner, 
Jung et al., 2009) and attention (Matthias et al., 2009), to name a few. Moreover, 
baseline level of interoceptive accuracy has been found to moderate the effect of 
self-focus on state interoceptive accuracy, the effect of interpersonal multisensory 
stimulation on self-recognition (Tajadura-Jimenez & Tsakiris, 2014) and the 
adaptive modulation of autonomic response in social setting (Ferri et al., 2013), to 
name a few. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of taking into 
account individuals’ baseline interoceptive accuracy when investigating the 
relationship between interoception and social, affective and cognitive processes. 
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1.4 Neural Correlates of Interoceptive Accuracy 
The anterior insula is the key brain region associated with interoception, 
and with individual accuracy in detecting interoceptive signals (e.g., Critchley, 
Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Pollatos, Schandry et al., 2007), 
although other areas, such as the anterior cingulate and somatosensory cortices, 
have also been implicated in interoceptive processing (Khalsa, Rudrauf et al., 
2009). Critchley and colleagues (2004) measured brain activity of individuals 
performing a heartbeat discrimination task and an auditory note discrimination 
task, observing that when individuals were performing the heartbeat 
discrimination task, relative to the auditory note discrimination task, there was 
increased activity in the anterior insula, and in the anterior cingulate and 
somatosensory cortices. Notably, individual heartbeat discrimination accuracy 
was predicted by the level of activity in the right anterior insula/opercular cortex, 
and was also correlated with the volume of gray matter in this region. Similar 
results were obtained by Pollatos, Schandry et al., (2007) using the heartbeat 
tracking task and an auditory tone tracking task; Pollatos, Schandry and 
colleagues found that heartbeat tracking accuracy scores predicted the level of 
activity in the anterior insula and medial frontal/dorsal cingulate gyrus, while also 
engaging the thalamus, inferior gyrus, and somatomotor cortex.  
Complimentary evidence implicating the insula in cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy comes from Ronchi et al. (2015), who observed that right insular 
resection decreased heartbeat tracking accuracy. Taken together, the results of 
empirical investigations of the neural correlates of interoceptive accuracy most 
consistently point to the anterior insula, and the co-activated anterior cingulate 
and somatosensory cortices. Critchley (2005) states that the anterior cingulate 
cortex likely integrates autonomic and visceral changes, which are then mapped 
and represented in the insula and the orbitofrontal cortices; the cortical 
representation of the interoceptive state of the body can be then accessed by 
conscious awareness and subsequently influence cognitive-affective processing. 
1.5 Interoceptive Accuracy, Awareness and Sensibility 
The link between interoception, emotion and cognition has been studied 
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by investigating the relationship between various aspects of cognitive and 
affective processing and objective, subjective and metacognitive dimensions of 
interoception: interoceptive accuracy, interoceptive sensibility and interoceptive 
awareness, respectively (see Garfinkel et al., 2015). It should be noted that in the 
past, interoceptive awareness and interoceptive sensitivity were used 
interchangeably to refer to interoceptive accuracy; however, recently, the 
theoretical issues implicated in conflating interoceptive accuracy and awareness, 
have been highlighted (see Ceunen, Van Diest, & Vlaeyen, 2013), which has 
resulted in a clarification and redefining of these constructs (Garfinkel & 
Critchely, 2013; then further redefined in Garfinkel et al., 2015). Garfinkel and 
colleagues (2015) define interoceptive accuracy as the “objective accuracy in 
detecting internal bodily sensations” (p. 67), which can be measured with 
objective body signal perception accuracy tasks, such as heartbeat perception 
tasks (e.g., Schandry, 1981; Brener & Kluvitse, 1988; Katkin et al., 1983; 
Whitehead et al., 1977). Interoceptive accuracy is distinct from interoceptive 
sensibility—the subjective, “self-perceived dispositional tendency to be internally 
self-focused and interoceptively cognisant”—and from interoceptive awareness—
the “metacognitive awareness of interoceptive accuracy” (Garfinkel et al., 2015, 
p. 67).  
1.6 Interoception across Modalities 
Interoceptive modalities include all categories of sensations that originate 
within the body, such as cardiac, respiratory, genital, urinary, gastric, intestinal 
sensations. A class of afferent fibres has been identified as monitoring the 
physiological state of all internal organs of the body (Craig, 2002, 2009). These 
fibres converge in the insular cortex, giving rise to the conscious and unconscious 
perception of interoceptive signals. Consequently, experiencing an array of 
visceral (e.g., cardiac, gastrointestinal) sensations has been found to activate the 
anterior insula (see Craig, 2009 for a review).  
Few experimental studies have investigated interoceptive perception 
across modalities. Herbert, Muth et al. (2012) point out that there is a lack of 
research on the topic because interoceptive perception accuracy measurement is 
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limited by existing methodological possibilities. Further, empirical assessment of 
interoceptive accuracy across modalities has been complicated by the fact that not 
all visceral signals are easily perceived—for example, heartbeats tend to be 
perceived more easily than other visceral sensations (Kollenbaum, Dame, & 
Kirchner, 1996)—as well as by the fact that physiological responses of different 
visceral systems (during emotional experience, for example) have been observed 
to be only modestly associated with one another (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, 
Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005).  
Two studies to date (Herbert, Muth et al., 2012; Whitehead, & Drescher, 
1980) have examined the association between visceral perception accuracy across 
modalities—focusing on the cardiac and gastrointestinal systems. Whitehead and 
Drescher (1980) found that heartbeat discrimination accuracy was significantly 
correlated with the ability to accurately detect stomach contractions. The results of 
Herbert, Muth et al. (2012) compliment the findings of Whitehead and Drescher, 
showing that heartbeat tracking accuracy is inversely related to the volume of 
ingested water during the Water Load Test—a widely used non-invasive method 
of assessing gastric sensation (Chen, Lin, Chen, & Huang, 2005; Jones, Hoffman, 
Sha, Patel, & Ebert, 2003; Koch, Hong, & Xu, 2000)—despite good and poor 
interoceptors not differing with respect to subjective reports of fullness or nausea 
after drinking. Herbert, Muth and colleagues (2012) concluded that these results 
are suggestive of individuals with higher cardiac perception accuracy requiring a 
lesser volume of ingested water, than individuals with lower cardiac perception 
accuracy, to experience the same level of fullness—likely due to stronger 
perception of the interoceptive cues signalling fullness. These results are 
supported by the findings of Herbert, Blechert, Hautzinger, Matthias and Herbert 
(2013), which show that, in comparison to individuals with lower heartbeat 
tracking accuracy, individuals highly accurate at tracking their heartbeats score 
higher on the intuitive eating scale (IES; Tylka, 2006), which assesses adaptive 
eating behaviour—eating behaviour that is guided by physiological signals of 
hunger and fullness, and one’s ability to recognize them, rather than by external 
and emotional cues. As decreased ability to perceive internal signals of hunger 
and fullness might contribute to unhealthy body mass index, it follows that 
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individuals suffering from disordered eating (specifically, anorexic, overweight, 
and obese individuals) have been observed to have lower interoceptive accuracy 
scores than individuals with a healthy body mass index (Herbert & Pollatos, 2014; 
Pollatos et al., 2008). Overall, it can be concluded that cardiac and gastrointestinal 
perception accuracy correspond to one another within individuals, which is in line 
with the evidence indicating that the anterior insula supports the perception of 
cardiac signals (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos, Schandry et al., 2007), as well as 
the perception of gastrointestinal signals arising in the rectum, stomach, and 
oesophagus (Aziz, Schnitzler, & Enck, 2000; Moisset et al., 2010; Craig, 2009). 
Overall, while it has been assumed that cardiac interoceptive accuracy is a valid 
measure of general interoceptive perception accuracy, there definitely is a need 
for a larger number of empirical studies that investigate perception accuracy of 
interoceptive signals across various modalities.  
1.7 Interoceptive and Exteroceptive Somatosensory Perception 
A distinction can be made between bodily signals that are interoceptive 
and arise within the body (e.g., cardiac, respiratory, gastrointestinal signals) and 
bodily signals that are exteroceptive and arise on or outside of the body (e.g., 
external tactile signals) (Cameron, 2002; Craig, 2003; Leder, 1990). Interoceptive 
and exteroceptive signals are processed separately in the brain (e.g., Farb, Segal, 
& Anderson, 2013; Hurliman, Nagode, & Padro, 2005); however, interoceptive 
and exteroceptive somatosensory systems are highly interconnected (Simmons et 
al., 2013), jointly bringing about body awareness (Craig, 2009).  
Tactile signals are generally perceived using the exteroceptive 
somatosensory system; however, affective touch has been identified as relying on 
the interoceptive system. Whereas sensory/discriminatory touch is processed 
exteroceptively via fast-conducting myelinated afferent fibres projecting to the 
somatosensory cortices, affective touch (slow and light stroking of the skin, which 
produces a pleasant subjective sensation) is processed interoceptively via slow-
conducting unmyelinated afferent fibres, which project to the insular cortex (see 
Olausson et al., 2010 for a review). Similarly, while visceral pain is an 
interoceptive sensation originating within the body, cutaneous pain, resulting from 
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painful tactile stimulation, is at least partially exteroceptively processed (e.g., 
Lenz, Ohara, Gracely, Dougherty, & Patel, 2004; Strigo, Duncan, Boivin, & 
Bushnell, 2003). The interoceptive affective-motivational component of painful 
tactile stimulation—measured with pain unpleasantness ratings—is processed in 
the insular and anterior cingulate cortices; the exteroceptive sensory-
discriminative aspect of painful tactile stimulation—measured with pain intensity 
ratings—is processed in the somatosensory cortices, which encode spatial, 
temporal, and intensive properties of noxious stimuli (see Rainville, 2002 for a 
review). The affective-motivational and sensory-discriminative dimensions of 
painful somatosensory experience (i.e., pain unpleasantness and pain intensity 
ratings) are usually correlated, but in some clinical contexts, such as myocardial 
infarction, they can be dissociated (Gaston-Johansson, Hofgren, Watson, & 
Herlitz, 1991).  
It is not currently entirely clear how interoceptive accuracy is related to 
exteroceptive somatosensory perception. Pennebaker and Lightner (1980) propose 
that there is a competition of internal and external cues, resulting in shifts of 
attention from one source of information to the other (internal-to-external and 
external-to-internal), depending on environmental demands. This model implies 
that attention to internal sources of information increases perception of internally-
originating signals, at the same time diminishing attention to external sources of 
information, consequently decreasing perception of externally-originating signals, 
and vice versa. However, Knapp, Ring, and Brener (1997) found that accuracy in 
detecting exteroceptive vibrotactile signals was correlated with heartbeat 
discrimination accuracy, suggesting that there might be a general sensitivity or 
sensory acuity to somatosensory stimuli that is not modality specific, and spans 
across the interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory modalities. 
Consequently, two opposite patterns of predictions can be made with regards to 
the potential relationship between interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory 
perception accuracy: accuracy in perceiving these two modes of somatosensory 
signals might be inversely related, which would be in line with the competition of 
cues model (Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980), or it might be positively correlated, 
reflecting general modality-nonspecific sensory acuity, in line with the results of 
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Knapp et al. (1997). As very few studies have examined the relationship between 
interoceptive accuracy and sensitivity to exteroceptive tactile stimuli (both, 
noxious and not), neither of the above hypotheses can be ascertained. Moreover, 
while research on multisensory integration has examined the way in which 
exteroceptive signals are integrated to shape body-awareness (e.g., vision and 
touch, or vision and audition; see Tsakiris, 2010 for a review), little is known 
about the way in which somatosensory signals are integrated across interoceptive 
and exteroceptive modalities. Recent empirical investigations demonstrate that 
combined interoceptive-exteroceptive signals can significantly alter ownership of 
a virtual hand (Suzuki et al., 2013), as well as the awareness of one’s body in 
space (Adler, Herbelin, Similowski, & Blanke, 2014; Aspell et al., 2013), 
highlighting the importance of investigating the mechanisms through which 
somatosensory signals are integrated across interoceptive and exteroceptive 
modalities. 
1.7.1 Interoception and Tactile Perception  
Little is known about the way in which interoceptive accuracy is related to 
the accuracy in perceiving exteroceptive somatosensory stimuli; however, it has 
been shown that directing individuals’ attention to interoceptive signals can 
significantly affect somatosensory decision-making. For example, Mirams, 
Poliakoff, Brown, and Lloyd (2012) investigated the effects of interoceptive 
versus exteroceptive attention on individuals’ performance on the Somatic Signal 
Detection Task (SSDT; Lloyd, Mason, Brown, & Poliakoff, 2008). Mirams and 
colleagues observed that engaging in an interoceptive attention task, during which 
participants focused their attention on pulse sensations in their fingertips, resulted 
in a more liberal response criterion on the task—individuals were more likely to 
report a tactile stimulus, regardless of whether it occurred or not. On the contrary, 
engaging in an exteroceptive attention task, during which participants focused 
their attention on the grating orientation of tactile stimuli, resulted in a more 
conservative response criterion—individuals were less likely to report feeling a 
tactile stimulus, regardless of its occurrence. Mirams et al. concluded that the 
observed increase in the propensity to report a tactile stimulus following the 
interoceptive attention task could be potentially explained by interoceptive 
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attention increasing the level of sensory noise and making it more difficult for an 
individual to distinguish between signal and noise (sensations originating outside 
and inside the body, respectively) when detecting a tactile stimulus. However, it 
should be noted that Mirams et al. utilised an atypical interoceptive attention task, 
in which participants were asked to focus their attention on pulse sensations in 
their fingertip. This methodology might account for an increased propensity to 
report a tactile stimulus on the fingertip, when completing the tactile perception 
afterwards. Additionally, Mirams et al. did not examine whether inter-individual 
variability in interoceptive accuracy was related to individuals’ sensitivity in 
detecting the tactile stimuli, or to individuals’ susceptibility to experience 
somatosensory distortion, as reflected by the number of false alarms made during 
the task. While the results of the study by Mirams et al. suggest that interoceptive 
attention might bias individuals toward reporting tactile sensations in their 
absence, these results do not provide direct support for the hypothesis that 
interoceptive attention contributes to individuals being less able to distinguish 
sensory noise from signal. Consequently, further research is necessary to establish 
the nature of the relationship between interoceptive and exteroceptive 
somatosensory perception.  
1.7.2 Interoception and Pain Perception  
Neuroimaging evidence suggests that painful somatosensory sensations 
are, at least partially, separately processed from interoceptive sensations (e.g., 
Lenz et al., 2004; Strigo et al., 2003). Only two studies to date have examined the 
relationship between interoceptive accuracy and sensitivity to pain. Werner, 
Duschek, Mattern and Schandry (2009b) investigated the relationship between 
heartbeat tracking accuracy and sensitivity to heat pain, failing to find an 
association. On the contrary, Pollatos, Füstös and Critchley (2012) observed that 
individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy displayed higher sensitivity 
and lower tolerance to cutaneous pressure pain than individuals with lower 
heartbeat tracking accuracy. Moreover, Pollatos and colleagues found that 
individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy exhibited more autonomic 
reactivity in response to pain, and rated the painful sensations as significantly 
more unpleasant than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. The 
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results of Pollatos et al. suggest that high interoceptive accuracy is associated with 
higher sensitivity to pain and an increased affective (as opposed to sensory) 
response to pain, which is in line with neuroimaging evidence linking the insular 
and anterior cingulate cortices to the affective-motivational dimension of pain 
(Rainville, 2002). Interoceptive processes might also be involved in pain 
anticipation, as suggested by activation of brain regions associated with 
interoception (i.e., insula, anterior cingulate) during the anticipation of pain 
(Chua, Krams, Toni, Passingham, & Dolan, 1999; Ploghaus et al., 1999). Because 
only two studies to date (Pollatos et al., 2012; Werner et al., 2009b) examined the 
relationship between interoceptive accuracy and pain perception, producing 
contradictory results, the relationship between these two types of somatosensory 
processing remains unclear.  
1.8 Interoception and Emotion 
Interoception is central to the experience of emotion (Damasio, 1999). The 
view that visceral activity and emotional experience are inherently linked is 
referred to as peripheralism and was first proposed by William James (1884) who 
defined emotion as the perception of bodily signals in response to emotion-
eliciting stimuli. This controversial peripheralist view that  “our feeling of . . . 
(autonomic) changes as they occur IS the emotion” (p.189-190) and that distinct 
patterns of bodily signals code for different emotions was also held by Carl Lange 
(1885)—a Dane who, independently of James, came up with similar ideas around 
the same time—and became known as the James-Lange theory of emotion. The 
James-Lange theory was challenged by Cannon (1927, 1931) who proposed an 
opposing account, claiming that physiological activity is largely too 
undifferentiated to constitute an emotion in itself and that the human body does 
not have a sufficient number of distinct afferents to generate distinct emotions 
solely on the basis of autonomic signals. Cannon presented supporting evidence 
for his theory showing that emotion-based behaviour in animals was not affected 
by complete separation of the viscera from the brain as well as that emotions 
could not be generated solely by artificial hormonal induction of physiological 
activity. Whereas, these claims have been undermined by future research (e.g., 
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Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983), at the time, Cannon’s claims could not be 
disputed and the role of bodily perception in emotional experience was not 
considered as essential to emotional experience. It was not until the work of 
Schachter and Singer (1962) that the role of physiological signals was 
reconsidered in the research literature on emotion. Schachter and Singer (1962) 
investigated cognitive evaluations of physiological feedback, finding that similar 
patterns of physiological activity could be experienced either as happiness or as 
anger, depending on the social and/or cognitive context. This result led them to 
redefine emotional experience as being situation-dependent and resultant from the 
interaction of autonomic arousal and environmental cues perceived as relevant at 
the time by the individual. The appraisal theory of Schachter and Singer, 
therefore, posits the perception of bodily changes as prerequisite, but not 
sufficient, for the experience of emotions.  
The peripheralist tradition of James and Lange has been continued by 
Damasio (1996) and the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, in which Damasio proposes 
that various somatic markers from the body influence emotions and, consequently, 
cognitive processes such as decision-making, or working memory formation and 
retrieval. Damasio hypothesises that a specific visceral event (e.g. rapid heart rate) 
gets represented with a particular ‘somatic marker’ within the emotional 
neurocircuitry of the brain (involving mainly the ventromedial prefrontal cortex); 
then, in situations of uncertainty, somatic markers associated with previously 
encountered events that are similar to the presently faced uncertain event get 
reactivated to allow for quicker information processing, decision making and 
consequent execution of adequate behaviour. It has to be noted that the existence 
of specific somatic markers associated with particular emotions has not been 
empirically supported (see Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann & Ito, 2000 
for a meta-analytic review), however, somatosensory information is of crucial 
importance as it constitutes a basic building block of emotion in that the 
somatovisceral state of the body signals core affect—feelings of 
pleasure/displeasure (i.e., valence) and activation/deactivation (i.e., arousal) (e.g., 
Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). 
In the last years, there has been growing support for the constructionist 
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model of emotion, which holds that emotions are situated conceptualisations of 
bodily changes (Barrett 2011, 2013; Lindquist, 2013). Barrett (2015) explains that 
while appraisal theories assume that ambiguous physiological arousal in a specific 
situation gets interpreted by the perceiver, which then results in an emotional 
response in a linear and recursive manner, in the psychological construction 
model, emotions emerge in a non-linear manner, when the whole array of bodily 
sensations is interpreted in light of the current context, using conceptual 
knowledge about specific emotions. Taken together, even though there is no one-
to-one correspondence between physiological activity and subjective emotional 
experience (as suggested by James and Lange), it is likely the interaction between 
the perception of bodily signals—interoception—and cognitive, social, and other 
contextual variables, that gives rise to subjective feeling states. Nevertheless, if 
the peripheralist account of emotion is considered, it follows that individuals who 
are more aware of, and better able to detect, physiological changes taking place in 
their bodies, would be more influenced by these in their emotional experience 
than those individuals who are less aware of, and less able to detect bodily signals. 
Indeed, several lines of investigation suggest that the experience of emotion is 
shaped by an individuals’ ability to accurately perceive internal body signals—
their interoceptive accuracy—including self-reported, physiological, 
neuroimaging, behavioural and clinical evidence. There is no one-to-one 
correspondence between physiological activity and subjective emotional 
experience (Mauss et al., 2005; Steptoe & Noll, 1997).  
1.8.1 Interoception and Subjective Reports of Emotion  
High interoceptive accuracy has been associated with an amplified 
subjective experience of emotions. Herbert, Pollatos and Schandry (2007) 
observed that individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy rated affective 
(both pleasant and unpleasant), but not neutral, visual stimuli as significantly 
more arousing than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. The 
positive correlation between heartbeat tracking accuracy and arousal ratings 
associated with affective images remained significant after controlling for valence 
ratings of the images. Additionally, no differences in valence ratings of the images 
were found between individuals with higher and lower heartbeat tracking 
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accuracy. Consequently, Herbert and colleagues concluded that cardiac 
interoceptive accuracy is likely related only to the intensity, and not valence of 
emotional experience. 
The association between cardiac interoceptive accuracy and increased 
intensity of subjective emotional experience has been ascertained by an array of 
studies using affective images (Dunn et al., 2010; Hantas, Katkin, & Blascovich, 
1982; Pollatos et al., 2005; Pollatos, Gramann, & Schandry, 2007; Pollatos, 
Herbert et al., 2007; cf. Eichler, Katkin, Blascovich, & Kelsey, 1987), and ones 
using emotion eliciting videos (Wiens et al., 2000), while assessing cardiac 
interoceptive accuracy with various measures. Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, 
and Aronson (2004) examined inter-individual variability in cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy as it relates to two aspects of expressing individual emotional 
experience: arousal and valence. They found that cardiac interoceptive accuracy, 
as assessed with a heartbeat discrimination task, is positively associated with an 
arousal focus—or the extent to which individuals emphasize activation and 
deactivation when describing their emotional states over time, but is unrelated to 
valence focus—the extent to which individuals use emotion adjectives to convey 
feelings of pleasure and displeasure when describing their emotional experiences 
over time (Feldman, 1995; Barrett, 1998). Pollatos, Traut-Mattausch, Schroeder 
and Schandry (2007) observed that cardiac interoceptive accuracy, as measured 
with heartbeat tracking, mediates the relationship between trait anxiety and 
arousal ratings of unpleasant affective pictures. Further, Dunn et al. (2010) found 
that cardiac interoceptive accuracy, also measured with heartbeat tracking, 
moderates the relationship between changes in heart rate and self-reports of 
arousal in response to affective stimuli. Taken together, these results suggest that 
accuracy in perceiving cardiac interoceptive signals is closely linked to subjective 
emotional experience, and particularly to the perceived intensity of emotional 
experience. Additionally, it seems that the stronger an individual’s perception of 
physiological changes taking place in his or her body, the more these changes 
influence how the individual feels.  
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1.8.2 Interoception and Physiological Reactivity to Emotion 
The relationship between interoceptive accuracy and emotion-evoked 
physiological reactivity is complex and not yet fully understood. One line of 
research suggests that high interoceptive accuracy might be associated with 
increased physiological reactivity in emotional situations. For example, Eichler 
and Katkin (1994) found that individuals who were higher in cardiovascular 
reactivity to mental arithmetic stress were more interoceptively accurate, as 
measured with a heartbeat discrimination task; Herbert, Pollatos, Flor, Enck and 
Schandry (2010) found that individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy 
displayed higher sympathetic reactivity to mental stress and more vagal reactivity 
during emotional picture presentation than individuals with lower heartbeat 
tracking accuracy. Moreover, individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy 
have been observed to exhibit amplified heart rate deceleration in response to 
affective images, which is suggestive of increased autonomic reactivity to emotive 
stimuli (Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007; Pollatos & Schandry, 2008).  
Whereas the above results suggest that interoceptive accuracy is associated 
with greater emotion-related autonomic reactivity, multiple other studies failed to 
observe significant differences in emotion-related physiological reactivity 
measures between individuals higher and lower in cardiac interoceptive accuracy 
(Schandry, 1981; Ferguson & Katkin, 1996; Wiens et al., 2000; Werner, Duschek, 
Mattern, & Schandry, 2009a; Werner, Kerschreiter, Kindermann, & Duschek, 
2013). Studies indicating a lack of differences in emotion-related autonomic 
reactivity in individuals with high and low interoceptive accuracy suggest that 
individuals who are more interoceptively accurate subjectively experience 
emotions as more intense not necessarily because of increased physiological 
arousal, but perhaps because of a more accurate perception of physiological 
changes associated with emotional reactions. Nevertheless, more research is 
necessary to determine the nature of the relationship between interoceptive 
accuracy and emotion-related physiological reactivity. 
1.8.3 Interoception and Emotion: Neuroimaging Evidence 
The same brain regions that have been linked to interoception—the insula, 
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the anterior cingulate and somatosensory cortices (e.g., Critchley et al., 2004)—
have also been associated with the subjective experience of emotion (e.g., 
Damasio et al., 2000). Zaki, Davis and Ochsner (2012) found overlapping activity 
in these interoception-related brain areas within individuals when they performed 
a heartbeat perception task and when they watched emotion eliciting videos, and 
rated their emotional responses to those videos. Zaki et al. further observed a 
strong positive correlation between brain activity and intensity of emotional 
experience—both at group-level and individual participant-level. The finding that 
interoceptive and emotion processing recruit a shared neural network is not 
surprising considering that somatosensory information is one of the basic 
components of emotion (e.g., Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 
2009). 
Studies measuring the brain’s event-related potentials (ERPs) in response 
to affective visual stimuli have found that cardiac interoceptive accuracy, 
measured via heartbeat tracking accuracy, was directly associated with the 
magnitude of the P300 and slow wave latency ERP components (Herbert, 
Pollatos, & Schandry, 2007; Pollatos et al., 2005). The P300 and slow wave ERP 
components index heightened and sustained attentional processing of salient 
stimuli (Keil et al., 2002); greater positivity in the P300 and late positive slow 
wave latencies are characteristic of arousal-related responses to emotionally 
salient stimuli (e.g., Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000). 
Herbert, Pollatos and Schandry (2007) observed that individuals with higher 
heartbeat tracking accuracy show greater amplitude of the P300, and greater slow 
wave positivity in response to emotional (both pleasant and unpleasant), but not 
neutral, visual stimuli than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. 
Consequently, the pattern of results obtained by Herbert and colleagues suggests 
that individuals with higher cardiac interoceptive accuracy show enhanced neural 
processing of emotional stimuli.  
1.8.4 Interoception and Affective Psychopathology 
Altered interoceptive processing has been implicated in affective 
psychopathology. Depression has been linked to low interoceptive accuracy 
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(Dunn, Dalgleish, Ogilvie, & Lawrence, 2007; Furman, Waugh, Bhattacharjee, 
Thompson, & Gotlib, 2013; Pollatos, Traut-Mattausch, & Schandry, 2009). 
Depressed individuals have been found to exhibit reductions in the amplitude of 
the heartbeat evoked potential (Terhaar, Viola, Bar, & Debener, 2012, reflective 
of cortical processing of cardiovasuclar signals (Pollatos & Schandry, 2004) as 
well as dampened insula activity when directing attention to interoceptive (i.e., 
cardiac, respiratory and gastrointestinal) signals (Avery et al., 2014). Harshaw 
(2015) proposes that altered integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive signals 
might be at the core of various depressive symptoms such as anhedonia and social 
deficits; although empirical evidence is required to directly test this theory. Taken 
together, studies investigating interoceptive accuracy in depression suggest that 
depression is associated with reduced accuracy at perceiving interoceptive signals.  
Anxiety psychopathology, on the contrary, has been linked to heightened 
interoceptive accuracy (see Domschke, Stevens, Pfleiderer, & Gerlach, 2010 for a 
comprehensive review). Cognitive theories of anxiety suggest that increased 
interoceptive accuracy might increase the likelihood of somatic sensations being 
misinterpreted as threatening and dangerous (Clark, 1986)—via somatosensory 
amplification (the experience of common bodily sensations as noxious and 
unpleasant (e.g., Bischoff, 1989; Brown, 2004)—contributing in that way to panic 
and health anxiety, for example. However, Mailloux and Brener (2002) failed to 
find a positive association between heartbeat discrimination accuracy and scores 
on the Somatosensory Amplification Scale (SSAS; Barsky, Wyshak, & Klerman, 
1990), instead observing that individuals with higher heartbeat discrimination 
accuracy tend to be low in somatosensory amplification. Moreover, low 
interoceptive accuracy has been observed in individuals affected by various 
anxiety conditions, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (Weiss & Pollatos, 
2014), health anxiety (Krautwurst, Gerlach, Gomille, Hiller, & Witthöft, 2014), 
and closely related to health anxiety—somatoform disorders (Schaefer, Egloff, & 
Witthoeft, 2012). Additionally, even though several studies found increased 
interoceptive accuracy in individuals with panic symptoms (Ehlers & Breuer, 
1992; Ehlers et al., 1995), not all studies found an association, with several studies 
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indicating an inverse relationship between the two (e.g., Asmundson, Sandler, 
Wilson, & Norton, 1993; Ehlers, Margaf, Roth, Taylor, & Birbaumer, 1988; 
Kroeze & van den Hout, 1998). Mailloux and Brener (2002) propose that 
individuals with low interoceptive accuracy might experience difficulty in 
perceiving a range of somatic sensations that result from normal physiological 
functioning, as a result misidentifying these sensations as being threatening or 
dangerous, which then could lead to anxiety. Overall, more research is necessary 
to establish whether anxiety conditions are associated with heightened or lowered 
interoceptive accuracy. 
The relationship between anxiety and interoceptive accuracy might be 
unclear due to several confounding factors such as use of medication, and 
comorbid conditions, which could be differentially associated with interoceptive 
accuracy—for example, depression (Dunn et al., 2007). Additionally, 
interoceptive accuracy has been found to be directly associated with traits such as 
anxiety sensitivity (Stewart, Buffett-Jerrott, & Kokaram, 2001), emotional lability 
(Schandry, 1981)—but also emotional intelligence (Schneider, Lyons, & 
Williams, 2005)—while being inversely related to variables such as alexithymia 
(Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011), and antisocial behaviour (Nentjes, Meijer, 
Bernstein, Arntz, & Medendorp, 2013). The simultaneous opposing associations 
between variables implicated in affective psychopathology and interoceptive 
accuracy undoubtedly contribute to contrasting results of studies investigating 
interoceptive accuracy in individuals affected by various anxiety conditions. 
Further research is necessary to delineate the mechanisms governing the complex 
interplay between interoceptive accuracy and affective psychopathology by taking 
into account moderating factors such medication use, presence of comorbid 
conditions, and interactions with various other inter-individual difference 
variables. 
1.9 Interoception and Cognitive-Affective Processing  
Interoceptive accuracy has been associated with aspects of cognitive 
processing. Enhanced interoceptive accuracy has been related to improved 
memory (Garfinkel, Barrett, et al., 2013; Garfinkel, Tiley et al., 2013; Werner et 
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al., 2010) as well as improved decision-making (Dunn et al., 2010; Werner, 
Schweitzer et al., 2013). It has been suggested that high interoceptive accuracy 
might be associated with by general enhancement in attentive ability. Pollatos, 
Matthias and Schandry (2007) observed that individuals with higher heartbeat 
tracking accuracy show increased attentional processing of visual stimuli, as 
reflected by higher P300 amplitudes in response to target stimuli in a visual 
oddball paradigm in comparison to individuals with lower heartbeat tracking 
accuracy. Further, Matthias et al. (2009) observed that individuals with higher 
heartbeat tracking accuracy performed significantly better on tasks assessing 
selective and divided attention than individuals with lower interoceptive accuracy 
(although, Ainley, Brass and Tsakiris, 2014 failed to replicate this relationship). It 
might be the case that interoceptive accuracy is reflective of a general ability to 
orient and direct their attention to various stimuli—both interoceptive and 
exteroceptive—although further research is necessary to ascertain this hypothesis. 
Because individuals with higher interoceptive accuracy have been found to 
subjectively experience emotions as more intense, it is not surprising that high 
interoceptive accuracy affects performance on a range of cognitive tasks, which 
involve emotion processing. Werner, Mannhart, Reyes Del Paso and Duschek 
(2014) found that individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy show 
increased interference of negative affective words on the Emotional Stroop Task 
than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. Individuals with higher 
heartbeat tracking accuracy have been shown to have better implicit memory for 
affective words, as assessed by means of primed and unprimed word stem 
completion (Werner et al., 2010), as well as better explicit memory of affective 
images (Pollatos & Schandry, 2008) than individuals with lower heartbeat 
tracking accuracy. Lastly, individuals with higher heartbeat discrimination 
accuracy have been found to show more pronounced facial expressiveness in 
response to affective images than individuals with lower heartbeat discrimination 
accuracy (Ferguson & Katkin, 1996). Taken together, these results show that 
individuals with higher cardiac interoceptive accuracy are more affected by 
emotion-related information during cognitive tasks than individuals with lower 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy. Unsurprisingly, interoception has also been 
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implicated in intuitive decision making, affective learning, and emotion 
regulation. 
1.9.1 Intuitive Decision-Making 
Interoceptive signal perception has been implicated in intuitive decision-
making. The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1996) suggests that intuition 
is, at least in part, influenced by emotion-related physiological signals. Indeed, 
Werner, Jung et al. (2009) found that individuals with higher heartbeat tracking 
accuracy showed superior intuitive decision making performance on an Iowa 
Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). Specifically, 
Werner et al. observed that individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy 
made a significantly more choices resulting in net gains (as opposed to losses) 
than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. Wölk, Sutterlin, Koch, 
Vogele and Schulz (2014) found that heartbeat tracking accuracy was positively 
related to performance on the Iowa Gambling Task in individuals without 
psychiatric conditions, but was inversely related to performance on the task in 
individuals with panic disorder. The results of the study by Wölk and colleagues 
suggest that higher interoceptive accuracy might not necessarily lead to improved 
intuitive decision-making. Dunn and colleagues (2010) found that individuals 
with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy are more reliant on anticipatory bodily 
signals, such as electrodermal activity and heart rate, when making decisions 
under uncertainty. As anticipatory bodily signals can favour choices that may or 
may not be advantageous, reliance on these signals during the task can result in 
either superior or poorer performance. 
1.9.2 Affective Learning 
The involvement of interoceptive processes in affective learning is 
evidenced by masked fear conditioning paradigms. During masked fear 
conditioning, individuals are classically conditioned to fear stimuli that they are 
not consciously aware of; once conditioned, individuals report significantly higher 
shock-expectancy ratings, and display significantly higher skin conductance 
responses when presented with the visual stimuli that were previously paired with 
electric shocks than when presented with visual stimuli which were not previously 
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paired with shocks (Parra, Esteves, Flykt, & Ohman, 1997; Ohman & Soares, 
1998). The conditioning occurs on a non-conscious level, as individuals cannot 
explicitly recognise the masked visual stimuli that were previously paired with 
electric shocks. It has been assumed that even though individuals do not 
consciously perceive the conditioned masked stimuli, the autonomic response to 
the shock is sufficient to facilitate fear conditioning. However, Katkin, Wiens and 
Ohman (2001) point out that in the studies by Parra et al. and by Ohman and 
Soares individuals who accurately predicted the upcoming shocks did not differ in 
the autonomic response to the shocks associated with the masked stimuli from 
individuals who did not accurately predict the upcoming shocks. Consequently, 
Katkin and colleagues suggest that autonomic arousal is not sufficient to enable 
accurate prediction of shocks during masked fear conditioning.  
Katkin and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that, during a masked fear 
conditioning task, individuals with higher discrimination accuracy were better at 
predicting upcoming shocks than individuals with lower heartbeat discrimination 
accuracy. Katkin et al.’s results suggest that it might be the ability to accurately 
perceive autonomic changes, associated with the unconditioned shock stimulus, 
that facilitate accurate prediction of upcoming shocks, rather than the autonomic 
changes per se. Interestingly, Raes and De Raedt (2011) observed that merely 
engaging in a heartbeat discrimination task prior to subliminal fear conditioning 
task facilitated fear conditioning. In interpreting their results, Raes and De Raedt 
propose that focusing attention on interoceptive autonomous signals might 
intensify the subsequent experience of aversive sensations associated with the 
unconditioned shock stimulus, as a result facilitating affective learning. Taken 
together, the results of the above studies implicate interoceptive accuracy in fear 
conditioning, demonstrating that it is the perception of bodily responses to 
threatening stimuli that facilitates this form of affective learning, rather than the 
bodily response alone.  
1.9.3 Emotion Regulation 
Barrett, Gross, Christensen and Benvenuto (2001) observed that the level 
of emotion differentiation, as assessed with experience-sampling data (daily diary 
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entries that were entered throughout a two-week period), was directly associated 
with self-reported emotion regulation. As interoceptive bodily changes are an 
integral part of emotional experience (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Barrett & Bliss-
Moreau, 2009), higher accuracy in perceiving interoceptive signals could 
contribute to more differentiated emotional experience, consequently influencing 
emotion regulation (Barrett et al., 2001). Using an affective picture reappraisal 
paradigm, Füstös, Gramann, Herbert and Pollatos (2013) observed that heartbeat 
tracking accuracy scores were correlated with reappraisal-related reductions in P3 
and slow wave amplitudes. The findings of Füstös et al. suggest that a more 
accurate perception of interoceptive signals associated with emotional reactions to 
affective stimuli might facilitate effective emotion regulation. Indeed, individuals 
with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy have been observed to report less anxiety 
before and after public speaking (Werner, Duschek et al., 2009a), and less 
negative affect after being socially excluded (Werner, Kerschreiter et al., 2013) 
than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy, potentially reflecting 
increased ability to regulate emotions in stressful situations.  
However, individuals high in interoceptive accuracy do not always show 
behaviour consistent with the assumption that interoceptive accuracy is associated 
with increased ability to effectively regulate negative emotions in stressful 
situations. For example, in a study by Kindermann and Werner (2014), individuals 
with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy reported more negative affect in response 
to a mental stress task than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. 
The results of Kindermann and Werner are in line with research showing that, in 
comparison to individuals with low interoceptive accuracy, highly interoceptively 
accurate individuals report more intense responses to emotive stimuli (Dunn et al., 
2010; Pollatos et al., 2005; Pollatos, Gramann, & Schandry, 2007; Pollatos, 
Herbert et al., 2007; Wiens et al., 2000). Dunn, Evans, Makarova, White and 
Clark (2012) investigated the relationship between heartbeat tracking accuracy 
and emotion-related behaviour during the Ultimatum Game. It should be noted 
that the Ultimatum Game was developed to study economic decision-making 
(Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). During the task, two players must 
agree on dividing a sum of money between them. Player 1 suggests how the 
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money should be divided, and Player 2 can either accept this offer (money is 
divided between two players according to Player 1’s suggestion) or reject this 
offer (neither player receives any money). Negative emotions, such as anger and 
sadness, have been associated with rejections of unfair offers (Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1996; Harle & Sanfey, 2007). As it is (financially) disadvantageous 
for the participant to reject an offer, even when it is low or unfair (because no 
subsequent offers can be made), offer rejections during the game can be 
interpreted as indicative of unsuccessful emotion regulation (Van ’t Wout, Faught, 
& Menino, 2013). Dunn et al. (2012) observed that heartbeat tracking accuracy 
was directly associated with anger reported in response to unfair offers, and 
inversely related to judgments about fairness of the unfair offers. Further, 
heartbeat tracking accuracy was associated with larger differences in 
electrodermal activity associated with rejected, as compared to accepted, offers. 
This difference in psychophysiological arousal was associated with higher 
rejection rates in individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy, but was not 
related to rejection rates in individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. 
Taken together, the results of the study by Dunn et al. suggest that individuals 
with higher interoceptive accuracy might be less able to regulate negative 
emotions in face of unfair offers, which are accompanied by strong physiological 
responses.  
It might be the case that the relationship between interoceptive accuracy 
and emotion regulation is context-dependent. Van ’t Wout et al. (2013) examined 
the effect of explicit emotion regulation, in the form of reappraisal, on behaviour 
during Ultimatum Game. The results of the study by Van ’t Wout et al. indicated 
that individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy reported feeling less 
emotionally involved while engaging in reappraisal during the Ultimatum Game 
and accepted more unfair offers following reappraisal in comparison to 
individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. These findings suggest that 
interoceptive accuracy can facilitate emotion regulation, which is contrary to the 
results of Dunn et al., but in line with the results of Füstös et al. (2012). Differing 
results of studies examining the relationship between interoceptive accuracy and 
emotion regulation imply that the relationship between the two might be context-
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dependent, varying according to factors such as the mode of emotion regulation—
for example, rejection of unfair offers during an Ultimatum Game is an implicit 
index of emotion regulation, whereas cued reappraisal constitutes explicit emotion 
regulation. Overall, future research is necessary to directly examine which factors 
might moderate the relationship between interoceptive accuracy and various facets 
of emotion regulation. 
1.10 Interoception, Body Representation and Social Cognition 
Interoception has been proposed to be the basis of the bodily sense of self 
(Craig, 2002, 2010). However, only a few studies to date have investigated the 
relationship between interoceptive accuracy and malleability of body 
representation and body ownership. Tsakiris et al. (2011) observed that 
individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy were less susceptible to the 
rubber hand illusion, experiencing a lower sense of ownership of a rubber hand, 
following synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, than individuals with lower 
heartbeat tracking accuracy. Individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy 
have also been shown to experience the enfacement illusion to a lower extent than 
individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy, displaying a smaller 
impairment in distinguishing between self and other (in a photograph recognition 
task) following multisensory stimulation involving the other’s face (Tajadura- 
Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2014). Taken together, these findings suggest that self-other 
boundaries of individuals with higher interoceptive accuracy are less malleable 
and less influenced by manipulations such as interpersonal multisensory 
stimulation than those of individuals with lower interoceptive accuracy. 
Consequently, accurate perception of interoceptive signals might foster 
individuals’ sense of self, strengthening the boundaries between self and other.  
The relationship between interoceptive accuracy and self-other distinction 
might be context-dependent. Ainley et al. (2014) observed that individuals with 
higher heartbeat tracking accuracy have greater difficulty inhibiting the tendency 
to automatically imitate, which has been assumed to reflect individual ability to 
distinguish between self and other (Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009). 
Ainley and colleagues (2014) propose that highly interoceptively accurate 
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individuals may be highly sensitive to social influences and have a strong 
interoceptive representation of the consequences of others’ actions, which can 
then result in an increased difficulty inhibiting the tendency to automatically 
imitate. Indeed, it has been shown that, in comparison to individuals with lower 
heartbeat tracking accuracy, individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy 
show a higher autonomic response to social stimuli, suggestive of increased 
sensitivity to social factors (Ferri et al., 2013). Specifically, Ferri and colleagues 
(2013) found that heartbeat tracking was positively associated with RSA 
(respiratory sinus arrhythmia) response in a social, but not in a non-social, 
context. RSA has been suggested to be indicative of cardiac vagal tone, which is 
generally considered to be a measure of the activity of the parasympathetic 
nervous system. In psychological research, higher RSA amplitude has been 
associated with increased self-regulation and a greater social disposition (e.g. 
Porges, 2001, 2003, 2007). Consequently, Ferri et al. concluded that individuals 
with higher interoceptive accuracy might have greater social disposition, as 
reflected by increased RSA responses in social contexts. The link between 
interoception and social disposition is supported by neuroimaging evidence, 
which shows that directing individuals’ attention to interoceptive signals is 
associated with an enhancement in subsequent empathy-related neural activity 
(Ernst, Northoff, Boker, Seifritz, & Grimm, 2013), further implicating the 
involvement of interoceptive processes in social functioning. Consequently, the 
relationship between interoceptive accuracy and the ability to control mental 
representations of self and of the other may be modulated by contextual factors 
and by inter-individual differences in affiliative motivation. Individuals high in 
interoceptive accuracy might selectively strengthen or attenuate representations of 
self and of the other, depending on environmental demands, selectively inhibiting 
mental representations of the self, while amplifying mental representations of the 
other in order to enable empathy and understanding as well as to facilitate 
affiliation and cooperation.  
Recently, research has begun to use interoceptive information to 
manipulate individuals’ body representation and body ownership. Suzuki et al., 
(2013) manipulated cardio-visual feedback projected on a virtual hand (in a 
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virtual reality environment) to be either synchronous or asynchronous with the 
participants’ concurrent heart rate. Suzuki and colleagues observed that 
participants’ subjective experience of ownership of the virtual hand was enhanced 
only in the synchronous cardiac feedback condition and not in the asynchronous 
feedback condition. Also using virtual reality, Aspell et al. (2013) found that 
synchronous cardio-visual feedback projected on a virtual body increased 
individuals’ experience of ownership of the virtual body, enhancing self-
identification with the virtual body as well as affecting individuals’ estimates of 
their location in space (shifting it towards the virtual body). The same effect of 
synchronicity of combined interoceptive-exteroceptive bodily information on self-
identification with a virtual body was observed using respiratory interoceptive 
signals (Adler et al., 2014). Adler and colleagues found that individuals self-
identified with virtual projections of their bodies when the virtual bodies flashed 
in synchrony, rather than asynchrony, with their concurrent breathing rate. Taken 
together, the results of the above studies suggest that interoceptive signals 
contribute to the subjective experience of body ownership and that multisensory 
integration of body-related information across the interoceptive and exteroceptive 
modalities shapes bodily self-consciousness. 
1.11 Interoceptive Accuracy as a State Variable  
The majority of research examining the relationship between interoception 
and social, cognitive and affective functioning focused on the way in which inter-
individual variability in interoceptive accuracy predicts various aspects of 
cognitive and affective processing, with very few studies investigating state-
dependent fluctuations in interoceptive accuracy. This gap in the research 
literature is likely due to the fact that, traditionally, interoceptive accuracy has 
been considered to be a trait, rather than a state, variable (Cameron, 2001; 
Schandry, 1981). This view of interoceptive accuracy as being stable over time 
and not subject to change has been largely based on studies that investigated 
interoceptive accuracy in clinical anxiety groups and in relation to variables such 
as anxiety sensitivity. Studies investigating interoceptive accuracy in clinical 
groups were largely based on the premise that heightened interoceptive accuracy 
 
 
42 
 
is a maintaining factor in anxiety conditions—especially panic—and aimed to 
examine potential changes in interoceptive accuracy before and after 
psychological treatment, failing to find significant differences (Ehlers & Breuer, 
1992; Ehlers et al., 1995; Antony, Meadows, Brown, & Barlow, 1994; Ehlers & 
Breuer, 1996; Mussgay et al., 1999). However, these studies have not considered 
that potential fluctuations in interoceptive accuracy might be short-lived and 
context-specific, rather than constituting long-term permanent changes in baseline 
levels of interoceptive accuracy.  
There is ample evidence for cognitive, affective, and social processes 
modulating body perception and body representation. For example, visual 
attention has been found to modulate tactile perception (e.g., Tipper et al., 1998), 
pain (e.g., Longo, Betti, Aglioti, & Haggard, 2009) and body representation (e.g., 
Rubber Hand Illusion; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Emotion, on the other hand, 
has been found to modulate pain (e.g., Roy, Piche, Chen, Peretz, & Rainville, 
2009), while social factors, such as presence of other individuals, have been found 
to modulate pain (e.g., Krahé, Springer, Weinman, & Fotopoulou, 2013) as well 
as body representation (e.g., peripersonal space; Teneggi, Canzoneri, di 
Pellegrino, & Serino, 2013). Nevertheless, almost all of the research on factors 
affecting body perception has focused on exteroceptive body perception, leaving 
the effects of cognitive and affective states and social contexts on interoceptive 
perception under-examined. To date, studies that investigated context-specific 
changes in interoceptive accuracy suggest that interoceptive accuracy can be 
potentially affected by physiological states (e.g., increased cardiovascular activity, 
hunger), by affective states (e.g., experience of anxiety) and by cognitive states 
(e.g., degree of focus on one’s self). 
1.11.1 Effect of Physiological State on Interoceptive Accuracy 
Jones and Hollandsworth (1981) and Schandry and Specht (1981) found 
that exercise evoked physiological arousal increases cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy, as measured with heartbeat discrimination, in individuals of varying 
levels of physical fitness. This research question was further examined using 
clinical samples by Antony et al. (1995), who tested whether panic patients’ 
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heartbeat tracking accuracy would increase due to heightened cardiovascular 
activity, as manipulated by engaging in brief physical exercise. In order to 
establish whether potential changes in heartbeat tracking accuracy would be 
unique to panic disorder patients, Antony et al. investigated three groups: 
individuals diagnosed with panic disorder, individuals diagnosed with social 
phobia, and healthy controls. While no differences based on group were observed, 
neither at baseline nor following physical exercise, all participants increased in 
mean heartbeat tracking accuracy immediately following physical exercise. The 
results of the study by Antony et al. suggest that small, short-lived fluctuations in 
interoceptive accuracy might occur in response to contextual factors and that these 
fluctuations might be generally observed rather than being present only in clinical 
samples.  
More recently, Herbert, Herbert et al. (2012) investigated whether short-
term food deprivation would affect the stability of interoceptive accuracy, as 
measured with the Schandry task. The results of the study indicated that heartbeat 
tracking accuracy increased in response to food-deprivation and that the increase 
in accuracy was directly associated with self-reports of experienced hunger, 
consequently providing evidence that interoceptive accuracy can fluctuate in a 
state-dependent manner. As short-term food deprivation increases the strength of 
interoceptive signals of hunger, a simultaneous increase in individuals’ accuracy 
in perceiving cardiac signals might be indicative of a concurrent increased 
strength of cardiac interoceptive signals. However, there might be an alternative 
mechanism at work, and the increase in heartbeat tracking accuracy in response to 
food-deprivation might be reflective of increased general attention to, and 
consequently, more accurate perception of, interoceptive signals rather than due to 
an increase in the strength of the signals themselves. Overall, further research is 
needed to delineate the mechanisms of interoceptive accuracy fluctuations across 
the interoceptive modalities in response to various changes to the physiological 
condition of the body.  
1.11.2 Effect of Cognitive State on Interoceptive Accuracy 
Studies investigating the effects of cognitive state on interoceptive 
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accuracy have examined the way in which various modes and degrees of self-
focus affect the stability of interoceptive accuracy. Weisz, Balazs and Adam 
(1988) found that, in a female sample, heartbeat discrimination accuracy was 
enhanced when individuals faced a mirror, as compared to baseline, although 
heartbeat tracking accuracy was not affected. Using a similar design, but 
including baseline heartbeat perception accuracy as a moderating variable, Ainley 
et al. (2012) found that, in a sample of males and females, only individuals with 
low baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy increased in heartbeat tracking accuracy 
during mirror self-observation. The results of Ainley et al. suggest that 
fluctuations in state interoceptive accuracy might be dependent on baseline level 
of interoceptive accuracy. In a follow-up study, Ainley et al. (2013) used 
photographs and self-referential words to further investigate the effect of self-
focus on interoceptive accuracy, again revealing an increase in heartbeat tracking 
accuracy in response to heightened self-focus (when looking at photographs of 
self and when self-referential words). However, in the 2013 study by Ainley and 
colleagues, the enhancement in state heartbeat tracking accuracy was present in all 
participants, regardless of their baseline level of heartbeat tracking accuracy (it 
should be noted that the sample in the 2013 study was characterized by a slightly 
higher median heartbeat tracking accuracy, than the sample in the 2012 study, 
which might account for this difference). Taken together, these results suggest 
that cognitive states characterized by increased attention to the self can increase 
interoceptive accuracy. Further research is needed to determine what other 
cognitive states might also impact the accuracy in perceiving bodily signals of 
various interoceptive modalities.  
1.11.3 Effect of Affective State on Interoceptive Accuracy 
State changes in interoceptive accuracy in response to affective contexts 
have been investigated using stress-inducing manipulations, which increase 
negative affect. Stress affects the central representation of bodily perception 
(Craig, 2002). The stress hormone, cortisol has been found to amplify heartbeat 
evoked potentials (Schulz, Strelzyk et al., 2013), which reflect increased cortical 
processing of cardiovasuclar signals and have been directly associated with 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy (Pollatos et al., 2005; Pollatos & Schandry, 2004). 
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Acute stress is associated peripheral sympathetic activation and a cortisol release, 
with together with noradrenergic structures can influence the perception of 
interoceptive bodily signals (Schulz, 2015). Consequently, it can be hypothesised 
that stressful negative affective situations might be accompanied by an 
enhancement in perception accuracy of cardiovascular signals, such as heartbeats. 
This hypothesis is in line with evidence from neuroimaging studies, which 
indicate increased activation of the insula in stressful contexts (e.g., Fechir et al., 
2010). Such increases in insula activity further suggest that interoceptive accuracy 
might be affected in emotional contexts, which elicit negative affective reactions 
and bring about heightened physiological arousal associated with stress. Overall, 
both sympathetic effects of stress-evoking manipulations on the cardiovascular 
system (e.g., increased stimulation of arterial baroreceptors and enhanced 
conduction of cardiac afferent signals) as well as the effects of stress challenges 
on the attentional system (e.g., increased attention to visceral signals) are likely to 
impact the accuracy with which individuals perceive interoceptive signals 
(Schulz, 2015). Stressful situations are typically associated with increases in 
physiological arousal and negative affect; however, stressful contexts differ from 
one another in character (for example, a mental arithmetic challenge differs from a 
respiratory challenge, which both differ from a social stress challenge). Socially 
stressful situations might involve the threat of negative social evaluation (e.g., 
public speaking challenge) or might be accompanied by negative social evaluation 
resulting in social rejection (e.g., social exclusion manipulation). Given the 
significance of interoception in cognitive-affective processes (e.g., Dunn et al., 
2010; Garfinkel, Barrett, et al., 2013; Garfinkel, Tiley et al., 2013; Werner, 
Schweitzer et al., 2013; Werner et al., 2010; Wiens, 2005; Wiens et al., 2000), 
potential changes in interoceptive accuracy in stressful negative affective 
situations might influence emotional experience, emotion regulation, and decision 
making in these contexts. Only a few studies investigated state changes in 
interoceptive accuracy during stressful negative affective situations, focusing on 
clinical populations and related variables. 
Increased interoceptive accuracy, as measured with heartbeat 
discimiantion accuracy, has been found in individuals after inducing emotion-
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related physiological arousal with visual affective stimuli (Katkin, 1985; Katkin, 
Blascovich, Reed, Adamec, Jones, & Taublieb, 1982). Schandry and Specht 
(1981) observed an increase in heartbeat tracking accuracy after participants 
engaged in a public speaking challenge. Stevens et al. (2011) investigated whether 
highly socially anxious individuals show a larger enhancement in heartbeat 
tracking accuracy as a result of a public speaking manipulation, as compared to 
individuals low in social anxiety. Even though Stevens and colleagues failed to 
find changes in mean heartbeat tracking accuracy as a result of their manipulation, 
a marginal increase in heartbeat tracking accuracy following the speech was 
observed in the first post-manipulation trial for all individuals. Even though 
Stevens et al. concluded that their results show a lack of state-like changes in 
interoceptive accuracy, the results of the study, like the results of Antony et al. 
(1995), can be interpreted as suggestive of small, short-lived changes in state 
interoceptive accuracy that are likely not limited to clinical populations.  
Sturges and Goetsch (1996) examined the effects of mental arithmetic 
stress on interoceptive accuracy in a sample of females high and low in anxiety 
sensitivity, observing that females high in anxiety sensitivity improved in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy during mental arithmetic stress, while females low in 
anxiety sensitivity did not. Interestingly, Fairclough and Goodwin (2007) found 
that females decreased in interoceptive accuracy, as measured with the heartbeat 
discrimination task in response to mental arithmetic stress, suggesting that the 
way in which stressful negative affective experiences affect interoceptive 
accuracy might depend on the measurement method. The importance of 
methodological aspects of research investigating the effect of stressful negative 
affective experiences on interoceptive accuracy is highlighted by Schulz, Lass-
Hennemann et al. (2013), who observed that cold pressor task-induced stress 
increased individuals’ heartbeat tracking accuracy, as measured with the Schandry 
task, but decreased heartbeat discrimination accuracy, as measured with the 
Whitehead task. Schulz, Lass-Hennemann and colleagues emphasise that the two 
cardiac perception tasks require different types of attention: while the Schandry 
task demands attention to visceral sensation, the Whitehead task demands focus 
on visceral sensations as well as on exteroceptive stimuli, additionally requiring a 
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comparison of the two to be made. Consequently, a heartbeat discrimination task 
might be more difficult for participants and performance on this task might be 
more susceptible to effects of distraction, especially in situations of increased 
stress. 
 Another line of research investigating changes in interoceptive accuracy 
in stressful negative affective situations focused on respiratory symptom 
perception. These studies (Van den Bergh et al., 2004; Bogaerts et al., 2005) 
measured respiratory symptom perception accuracy by calculating intra-individual 
correlations between the magnitude of the respiratory response and the subjective 
rating of the respiratory response, indicating that individuals high in negative 
affectivity were less accurate in judging the strength of the respiratory response 
during a carbon dioxide challenge (especially when the challenge is negatively 
framed) than individuals low in negative affectivity. Further, Bogaerts et al. 
(2008) observed that individuals who reported a high number of medically 
unexplained symptoms (high symptom reporters) became less accurate at judging 
the intensity of their respiratory responses to a carbon dioxide challenge than 
individuals who reported a low number of medically unexplained symptoms (low 
symptom reporters). Bogaerts et al. suggest that the observed effect might be due 
to high symptom reporters experiencing negative affective reactions in response to 
the manipulation, which in turn, can then decrease their respiratory interoceptive 
accuracy. It should be noted, however, that the method of assessing respiratory 
signal perception accuracy employed in the experiments outlined above might not 
necessarily gauge respiratory interoceptive accuracy, as it involves making 
subjective ratings of the strength of respiratory signals, not directly testing the 
accuracy of perception through objective standardized performance tests. While it 
is possible that respiratory and cardiac interoceptive accuracy are differentially 
affected in stressful negative affective situations, the results on respiratory 
symptom perception in stressful affective contexts should be interpreted with 
caution, serving as a platform for future research rather than constituting a basis 
for definite conclusion to be drawn.  
Overall, research studies investigating changes in interoceptive accuracy 
due to stressful negative affective situations have utilised varying methods of 
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assessing interoceptive accuracy (i.e., monitoring interoceptive sensations, 
comparing interoceptive and exteroceptive sensations, subjectively rating 
interoceptive sensations), which rely on, at least partially, distinct mechanisms, 
complicating the interpretation of these experimental studies. In addition to using 
different methods of interoceptive accuracy assessment, the experimental studies 
investigating the effects of stressful negative affective contexts on state 
interoceptive accuracy also used different manipulations, which may tap into 
distinct types and aspects of stress (e.g., cognitive stress versus physical threat 
versus social threat). Lastly, the studies outlined above have investigated both 
clinical and healthy samples, which may differ in their responding to stress and 
negative affective situations. Consequently, the use of consistent standardized 
methods of assessment that increase procedural comparability, and enable cross-
study comparisons is needed in future investigations of the effects of stressful 
negative affective manipulations on state interoceptive accuracy. 
1.11.4 Gaps in Research on State Interoceptive Accuracy 
Because of the critical importance of interoceptive somatosensory 
perception to consciousness, sense of self and emotional experience (Craig, 2002, 
2010; Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013), the way in which social, cognitive and 
affective contexts modulate interoceptive accuracy constitutes an important topic 
requiring empirical investigation. The few studies to date, which have examined 
state changes in interoceptive accuracy, do not allow firm conclusions to be drawn 
with regards to the nature of state-dependent changes in interoceptive accuracy; 
they do, nevertheless, provide a clear indication that, in addition to being a trait-
like variable, interoceptive accuracy might also function as a state variable, which 
can fluctuate in response to various cognitive and affective triggers. Presently, 
research suggests that state interoceptive accuracy might increase during 
heightened self-focus (Ainley et al., 2012; Ainley et al., 2013) and change in 
response to stressful negative affective situations (e.g., Schulz, Lass-Hennenmann 
et al., 2013; Sturges & Goetsch, 1996). The exact direction of the effect of 
stressful negative affective contexts on interoceptive accuracy is not clear, with 
some studies finding an increase in interoceptive accuracy in response to stress 
(e.g., Sturges & Goetsch, 1996) and others observing a decrease in interoceptive 
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accuracy in stressful negative affective situations (e.g., Van den Bergh et al., 
2004; Bogaerts et al., 2005). Discrepancies in methodological aspects across 
studies investigating the effects of stressful negative affective states on 
interoceptive accuracy complicate interpretation of their results.  
Overall, further research is needed to investigate state changes in 
interoceptive accuracy in relation to emotional experience. Interoception has been 
implicated in emotional experience (e.g., Wiens, 2005) and inter-individual 
differences in interoceptive accuracy have been correlated with trait measures of 
anxiety and depression, indicating direct and inverse relationships, respectively 
(e.g., Pollatos et al., 2009). Additionally, baseline level of interoceptive accuracy 
has been found to moderate emotional experience in response to emotive stimuli 
(e.g., Dunn et al., 2010; Pollatos, Traut-Mattausch et al., 2007), also affecting 
levels of negative affect in response to stressful situations such as social exclusion 
(Werner, Kerschreiter et al., 2013) and public speaking anticipation (Werner, 
Duschek et al., 2009b). State interoceptive accuracy might change in response to 
emotion-eliciting situations, as a function of physiological arousal, negative affect 
or increased self-focus. Additionally, changes in perception accuracy might be 
limited to the interoceptive modality, but they might also concurrently occur in 
exteroceptive somatosensory modalities, consequently affecting the perception of 
touch and/or painful exteroceptive somatosensory stimuli. While attention to, and 
perception of, bodily signals might be correlated across the interoceptive and 
exteroceptive modalities (Knapp et al., 1997), it is also possible that measures of 
interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory signal perception might be at 
competition with one another and consequently be inversely related (e.g., 
Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980). As it is not presently clear how interoceptive and 
exteroceptive somatosensory perception are related, research studies investigating 
context-dependent changes in both of these modalities are needed to establish the 
nature of the relationship between these two aspects of body perception: both at 
baseline and as modulated by environmental demands such as stressful negative 
affective contexts. Investigations of state changes in interoceptive and 
exteroceptive somatosensory signal perception accuracy can pave the way for 
empirical examinations of the way in which these bodily signals are integrated to 
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jointly influence bodily self-consciousness as well as emotion, cognition and 
behaviour. 
1.12 Present Thesis  
To date, the significance of interoceptive processing in emotional 
experience has been examined in an inter-individual differences context. The 
present thesis answers the need for further investigation of state changes in 
interoceptive accuracy by examining the way in which interoceptive accuracy is 
modulated by affective and social contexts. As studies investigating trait 
interoceptive accuracy and emotional experience focused on emotional states 
characterized by negative affect and increased self-focus, the present thesis 
examines the stability of interoceptive accuracy under emotional influence by 
utilizing stress-induction procedures which manipulate negative affect and self-
focus. In order to establish whether potential changes in the interoceptive 
somatosensory modality generalise to the exteroceptive somatosensory modality, 
several studies comprising the present thesis investigate changes in both of these 
body perception modalities.  
The studies in this thesis manipulate social anxiety (Experiment 1), social 
awareness of the self (Experiment 2), social inclusion/exclusion (Experiments 3 
and 4) and pain anticipation (Experiment 5), examining the effects of these 
contexts on cardiac interoceptive accuracy (all experiments) as well as on 
exteroceptive tactile perception that is painful (Experiment 4) or not (Experiment 
2). Additionally, the relationship between cardiac interoceptive accuracy and 
tactile processing that is painful (Experiments 4 and 5) and not (Experiment 2) is 
examined.  
Throughout the thesis, interoceptive accuracy is indexed with heartbeat 
tracking accuracy, measured according to the Schandry Mental Tracking Method 
(1981), in which individuals silently count, and later report, the number of 
heartbeats they feel within a given time interval. As outlined at the beginning of 
the introductory chapter, this procedure is a widely-used method used to assess 
interoceptive accuracy (e.g., Herbert & Pollatos, 2014; Ferri et al., 2013; Furman 
et al., 2013; Füstös et al., 2013; Koch & Pollatos, 2014; Krautwurst et al., 2014; 
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Michal et al., 2014; Penton, Thierry, & Davis, 2014; Pollatos, et al., 2008; 
Pollatos et al., 2012; Schaefer, Egloff, Gerlach, & Witthoft, 2014). In the present 
thesis, the heartbeat tracking method was chosen over the heartbeat discrimination 
accuracy method (e.g., Brener & Kluvitse, 1988; Katkin et al., 1983; Whitehead et 
al., 1977), as the heartbeat discrimination task requires individuals to judge 
whether a heartbeat stimulus (tone) they are presented with matches their own 
heart rhythm, which, it can be argued, engages not only interoceptive, but also 
exteroceptive processing, requiring simultaneous processing of both types of 
information and their comparison. Heartbeat tracking and heartbeat discrimination 
may be reliant on shared, but largely distinct underlying mechanisms, in that 
heartbeat tracking is reliant on internal monitoring, whereas heartbeat 
discrimination also requires internal and external information to be 
simultaneously integrated. Consequently, as proposed at the beginning of the 
introductory chapter, the mental tracking method likely constitutes a more pure 
measure of interoceptive processing. The Schandry method of assessing 
interoceptive accuracy was used in all experiments in the thesis. Exteroceptive 
somatosensory perception was assessed via perception of electrical tactile stimuli. 
The aspect of tactile processing measured (e.g., detection of threshold stimuli or 
pain thresholds) differed across experiments. Experiment 2 employed the 
Somatosensory Signal Detection Task (Lloyd et al., 2008), in which signal 
detection analysis is used to index the accuracy in perceiving exteroceptive tactile 
stimuli of threshold intensity. Experiments 4 and Experiment 5 measured pain 
thresholds and pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings.  
To summarise, Experiment 1 investigated the effect of public speaking 
anticipation on heartbeat tracking accuracy; Experiment 2 investigated the effect 
of enhanced public self-focus on heartbeat tracking accuracy, and on threshold-
tactile stimulus perception accuracy. Experiment 2 also investigated the 
relationship between heartbeat tracking accuracy and tactile perception accuracy. 
Experiment 3 investigated the effect of social exclusion on heartbeat tracking 
accuracy, while Experiment 4 investigated the effect of social exclusion on both 
heartbeat tracking accuracy and on exteroceptive tactile pain thresholds and pain 
intensity and pain unpleasantness ratings. Experiment 5 investigated the effect of 
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pain anticipation on heartbeat tracking accuracy, also examining the relationship 
between heartbeat tracking accuracy and pain perception.  
Overall, the studies comprising this thesis aim to further the current 
understanding of the way in which cardiac interoceptive perception functions as a 
state variable that is subject to modulation by social and affective contexts. This 
investigation will provide novel evidence as for the existence of a bi-directional 
relationship between interoception and emotion, in which in addition to 
interoceptive accuracy influencing emotional experience in a trait-like manner, 
emotional experience also influences interoceptive accuracy as a state-variable. 
Additionally, the studies aim to further the current understanding of the way in 
which cardiac interoceptive perception accuracy is related to other modes of body 
perception, such as noxious and neutral tactile perception. Consequently, the 
approach employed in the current theses allows for an investigation of:  
1) Which aspects of stress might affect state interoceptive accuracy (e.g., 
physiological arousal, negative affect, self-focus)? 
2) What kind of stress affects state interoceptive accuracy (e.g., social 
threat, physical threat)? 
3) How general/specific is the effect of stress on state interoceptive 
accuracy? Does it extend to exteroceptive somatosensory perception 
accuracy or is it restricted to interoceptive bodily signal processing? 
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Chapter 2: Stability of Interoceptive Accuracy During 
Public Speaking Anticipation1 
2.1 Introduction 
Interoceptive information constitutes a basic building block of emotion 
(Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Barrett & Lindquist, 2008) and interoceptive 
perception is central to emotional experience (Damasio, 2010). Several lines of 
investigation, including behavioural and neuroimaging studies, suggest that 
emotional experience is mediated by the accuracy with which interoceptive bodily 
signals, involved in emotion responses, are perceived (Critchley et al., 2004; Gray 
et al., 2012; Katkin et al., 2001; Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007; e.g., Pollatos, 
Gramann, & Schandry, 2007). Not surprisingly, emotional experiences engage the 
insula (e.g., Zaki et al., 2012)—the central brain region associated with 
interoception (e.g., Critchley et al., 2004). Moreover, interoceptive accuracy has 
been found to directly relate to the perceived intensity of emotional experience, as 
measured with subjective ratings of arousal (e.g., Barrett et al., 2004; Dunn et al., 
2010; Pollatos, Traut-Mattausch et al., 2007). Interoceptive accuracy has been 
observed to positively correlate with anxiety (Schandry, 1981; Critchley et al., 
2004; Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007), anxiety sensitivity (i.e., fear of anxiety-
related autonomic arousal (Reiss, 1991)) (Stewart et al., 2001) and emotional 
lability (i.e., emotional instability) (Schandry, 1981). Because interoceptive 
accuracy has been directly associated with anxiety and because interoceptive 
signals are inherently linked to the physiological experience of anxiety (e.g., 
McLeod, Hoehn-Saric, & Stefan, 1986), it might be the case that interoceptive 
accuracy increases when an individual experiences heightened state anxiety via 
heightened self-focus. Self-focus or “objective self-awareness” (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972) involves the individual taking an observer’s perspective and 
considering one’s self an object of own and others’ thoughts. According to Silvia 
                                                
 
1 Experiment 1 has been published as Durlik, C., Brown, G., & Tsakiris, M. (2014). Enhanced 
interoceptive awareness during anticipation of public speaking is associated with fear of negative 
evaluation. Cognition & Emotion, 28(3), 530-540. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2013.832654 
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and Gendolla’s (2001) “perceptual accuracy hypothesis”, focusing the attention on 
one’s self increases the accuracy of self-related judgments, however, further 
research is needed to ascertain this hypothesis. Until now, the link between body 
awareness and self-focus has been only studied using self-report measures 
(Mehling et al., 2009) and the relationship between interoceptive accuracy and 
self-focus has not been examined, with the exception of Ainley et al. (2012?), who 
found that increasing self-focus via mirror self-observation increases interoceptive 
accuracy. Consequently, further investigation of the relationship between self-
focus and interoceptive accuracy is required. The hypothesis that interoceptive 
accuracy would increase due to anticipatory anxiety is supported by evidence 
indicating that anxiety is associated with increased self-focus (Mor & Winquist, 
2002), whereas heightened self-focus has been found to increase state 
interoceptive accuracy (Ainley et al., 2011, 2012). As state anxiety has been 
effectively elicited in experimental settings using public speaking anticipation 
manipulations (e.g., Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Moscovitch, Suvak, & Hofmann, 
2010; Stevens et al., 2011), Experiment 1 investigated the stability of 
interoceptive accuracy under emotional influence by examining the effect of 
public speaking anticipation on heartbeat tracking accuracy.  
One study to date has examined the effect of public speaking anticipation 
on heartbeat tracking accuracy. Stevens et al. (2011) measured heartbeat tracking 
accuracy before and during public speaking anticipation in individuals high and 
low in social anxiety. Contrary to their predictions, Stevens and colleagues failed 
to find significant differences in heartbeat tracking accuracy from baseline to 
anticipation in either group; although they did observe an increase in accuracy 
from baseline to the first heartbeat tracking trial of the anticipation phase in both 
groups. Because this result was not observed when analysing all heartbeat 
tracking trials of the anticipation phase and because a control condition was not 
used in the study, it is not clear whether the enhancement in heartbeat tracking 
accuracy observed by Stevens et al. in the first heartbeat tracking trial of the 
anticipation phase represented a statistical artefact or a meaningful difference 
reflecting a very short-lived change in state interoceptive accuracy brought about 
by the manipulation. Importantly, because the focus of Stevens et al.’s 
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investigation was solely on individuals high and low in social anxiety—those who 
either feared negative evaluation significantly more, or significantly less than an 
average individual—the results cannot be generalised to the normal population of 
individuals falling on a continuum with regard to their social fears. 
Stevens et al. investigated the effect of public speaking anticipation on 
heartbeat tracking accuracy without taking into consideration individual 
differences in baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy, leaving unexamined the 
possibility of heartbeat tracking accuracy increasing during speech anticipation 
only in participants with low baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy and not in 
participants with high baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy. A moderating effect 
of baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy on state changes in heartbeat tracking 
accuracy was observed by Ainley and colleagues (2012). Ainley and colleagues 
investigated state changes in heartbeat tracking accuracy due to enhanced self-
focus, as manipulated by mirror self-observation, observing that only individuals 
with low baseline heartbeat perception accuracy showed a change (an increase) in 
heartbeat perception accuracy during mirror self-observation. Tsakiris et al. 
(2011) suggest that individuals with high interoceptive accuracy might show 
lower malleability of body representation than individuals with lower 
interoceptive accuracy. This lower malleability of body representation might, in 
turn, result in individuals with high interoceptive accuracy being less susceptible 
to state changes in their perception of bodily signals.  
In line with neuroimagining evidence of increased insula activation during 
anticipation of emotionally aversive stimuli (Simmons, Matthews, Stein, & 
Paulus, 2004; Simmons et al., 2011; Simmons, Strigo, Matthews, Paulus, & Stein, 
2006) and findings of Stevens et al., indicating heightened heartbeat tracking 
accuracy in the first trial of speech anticipation, it was hypothesised that speech 
anticipation would enhance state heartbeat tracking accuracy. More specifically, it 
was predicted that participants in the experimental group only would show higher 
accuracy on the heartbeat tracking task during speech anticipation, as compared to 
baseline and that this enhancement would be stronger for participants with higher 
fear of negative evaluation, who are likely to be more affected by the speech 
anticipation manipulation. In line with findings of Ainley et al. (2012), it was 
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further hypothesised that the speech anticipation manipulation would enhance 
heartbeat tracking accuracy more, if not only, in individuals with low baseline 
heartbeat tracking accuracy. The heartbeat tracking task was performed in the 
absence of mirrors, video-cameras and any other tools that may increase self-
focus and consequently enhance heartbeat tracking accuracy (e.g., Ainley et al., 
2012), in order to ensure any effect on heartbeat tracking accuracy observed 
would be due to the speech anticipation manipulation and not due to otherwise 
increased self-focus. A between-subjects design was employed to ensure that any 
observed change in heartbeat tracking accuracy would be due to the experimental 
manipulation and not due to another factor such as training. Self-report measures 
of trait and state anxiety, anxiety sensitivity and depression were administered 
before the experiment to ensure that the experimental and control groups did not 
differ on variables that could potentially affect their interoceptive accuracy. As 
Werner, Duschek et al. (2009a) observed that individuals with higher heartbeat 
tracking accuracy experienced less anxiety before and after a public speaking 
challenge, Experiment 1 examined for potential differences in anxiety evoked by 
the public speaking manipulation based on individuals’ level of baseline heartbeat 
tracking accuracy. Lastly, as sex differences have been observed in interoceptive 
accuracy, with males being more accurate than females (Cameron, 2001), sex was 
included as a between-subjects factor in the analyses of heartbeat tracking 
accuracy.  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Experimental Design 
The study employed a mixed design with a within-subjects factor of Time 
(baseline, anticipation) and between-subjects factor of Condition (experimental, 
control). Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the 
experimental condition, participants prepared a short speech about the pros and 
cons of animal use in research, and anticipated presenting the speech it in front of 
a small audience. In the control condition, participants prepared by reading a list 
of pros and cons of animal use in research (see Appendix 7.1), and anticipated 
sharing their general impressions of the arguments they had read. The dependent 
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measures of heartbeat tracking accuracy (HTA) and mood were taken at baseline 
and during the anticipation phase (following the preparation phase) in each 
condition. 
2.2.2 Measures 
2.2.2.1 Self-Reported Measures 
Participants provided demographic information, and completed a range of 
self-reported questionnaires the State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic 
Anxiety Scale (STICSA; Ree, French, MacLeod, & Locke, 2008), Anxiety 
Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al., 2007). Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation-Straightforward Items (BFNE-S; Rodebaugh et al., 2004), Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987), and Depression Anxiety and 
Stress Scale-Depression subscale (DASS-Depression; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995). Participants reported their momentary anxiety and calmness levels on a 
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) ranging from 0 (not at all anxious, not at all calm) 
to 100 (extremely anxious, extremely calm). 
2.2.2.2 Behavioural Measures: Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy  
HTA was assessed at baseline and during the period of anticipation via 
heartbeat perception, using the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981). 
Participants were instructed to mentally count their heartbeats from the moment 
they received an audiovisual computer-generated cue: “Go!” until they received 
an otherwise identical cue: “Stop!” and then to type the number of heartbeats they 
had counted into the computer program. The heartbeat counting task consisted of 
a four-trial block: 25-second, 35-second, 45-second, and 100-second trials, 
presented in a random order. The single four-trial block was administered at 
baseline, and during anticipation. In the baseline HTA assessment, a 10-second 
training trial was also administered prior to the four trials constituting the 
heartbeat counting task in order to familiarise participants with the task. Heartbeat 
signals were acquired with a piezo-electric pulse transducer, fitted to the 
participant's left index finger and connected to a physiological data unit (26T 
PowerLab, AD Instruments), sampling at 1 kHz, which recorded the derived 
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electrical signal onto a second PC running LabChart 6 software (AD Instruments). 
Throughout the assessment, participants were not permitted to take their pulse, 
nor was information regarding the length of individual trials or feedback 
regarding participants’ performance given. The task was programmed using 
Presentation software (Neurobehavioural Systems: www.neurobs.com). 
2.2.3 Procedure 
Prior to in-lab participation, participants provided online their 
demographic information, STICSA-Trait, BFNE-S, LSAS, and DASS-
Depression. Before the questionnaire commenced, participants were given basic 
information about the study that was essential to provide informed consent to 
participate, yet that did not disclose any details that could affect the effectiveness 
of the main manipulation itself. All participants were informed they will have to 
“engage in a brief behavioural task” once in-lab, but they will be free to withdraw 
at any point in time, if they wish to, without penalty. Further, participants were 
informed that they did not have to answer any questions that they felt 
uncomfortable with, and that the information they would provide will be kept 
completely confidential and anonymous. Participants in both conditions were 
given the exact same information, and instructions. 
Upon arrival to the lab, participants were given a hard copy of the 
information sheet, and have signed the informed consent form. In-lab, each 
participant completed STICSA-State, and ASI followed by the first HTA 
assessment, counterbalanced with Time 1 VAS mood ratings. Then, by way of a 
distracter, participants answered five questions about Britain in the context of 
European Union, afterwards providing Time 2 VAS mood ratings (aimed at 
verifying that no change took place in mood prior to the main manipulation). Up 
until this point, the all details of the procedure were exactly the same for 
participants in both experimental and control conditions. Subsequently, in the 
experimental group, the experimenter told participants that they would be given 
three minutes to prepare a 10-minute speech on the pros and cons of animal use in 
research, to present in front of a small audience and videocamera in a nearby room 
right after completion of remaining computer-administered tasks. Participants 
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were then given scrap paper and a pen in order to prepare the speech. Instead, in 
the control group, the experimenter gave participants a list of arguments for and 
against the use of animals in research, and instructed them to read the arguments 
for three minutes, without worrying about getting through all of the points (see 
Appendix for a list of arguments that was provided to the control group). The 
control participants were told that they would share their general impressions of 
the arguments with the experimenter, after having completed the remaining 
computer-administered tasks. After the manipulation, each participant was asked 
to perform one more HTA assessment, counterbalanced with Time 3 VAS mood 
ratings. It is important to note that the two HTA assessments were administered in 
a counterbalanced order with the VAS mood ratings in order to account for 
possible short-lived effect of the manipulation on HTA, at the same time ensuring 
that the measure of mood change due to the manipulation was not confounded by 
the administration of the HTA task before the VAS ratings. See Figure 2-1 for a 
graphical depiction of the procedure. After the experiment, each participant was 
informed that the study had come to an end, and the deception was explained to 
each participant. Participants were then asked to reiterate their consent for their 
data to be retained and used in the study. 
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2.2.4 Data Analysis 
2.2.4.1 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy Scores  
Heartbeat tracking accuracy scores were calculated according to the 
following formula:  
1/4 Σ (1 - (| actual heartbeats – reported heartbeats |) / actual heartbeats). 
The resulting scores varied between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating better 
heartbeat tracking accuracy, reflecting a smaller difference between perceived and 
actual heartbeats. Individuals were categorized as high or low in HTA using a 
median split on the baseline HTA score (Mdn = .637). The sample consisted of 28 
low HTA individuals (mean HTA = .515, SD = .089), and 28 high HTA 
individuals (mean HTA = .754, SD = .101). HTA scores were normally 
distributed, as indicated by a Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (W = .987, p = .816). 
 
Figure 2-1. Experimental procedure. 
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See Figure 2-2 for a frequency distribution plot.  
 
Figure 2-2. Frequency distribution of HTA baseline scores in Experiment 1. 
2.2.4.2 Average Heart Rate 
Average heart rate was calculated according to the following formula: 
 1/4 Σ ((actual heartbeats / length of time interval in seconds) * 60 
seconds) 
2.2.4.3 Self-Reported Data 
Self-reported anxiety and calmness VAS scores were stable between Time 
1 and 2 and so were averaged, yielding baseline anxiety score and baseline 
calmness score. VAS scores at Time 3 were used as the post-manipulation scores. 
Baseline and post-manipulation anxiety and (reverse-scored) calmness scores 
were averaged into overall baseline and post-manipulation mood scores, with 
higher values indicating a more anxious mood. Difference scores for the 
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dependent variables were calculated by subtracting the baseline scores for HTA, 
heart rate (HR), and self-rated anxious mood from the post-manipulation scores 
for the same variables. Where the assumption of compound symmetry was 
violated, degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction. Also, where variables were found to be non-normally distributed, 
transformations were used to normalize the data. 
2.2.4.4 Data Analysis Overview 
Effects of the experimental manipulation on the dependent variables were 
compared using mixed analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with Time (baseline and 
anticipation) as the within-subject factor and Condition (experimental vs. control), 
Counterbalancing Order (HTA before VAS vs. HTA after VAS), HTA group 
(low, high) and Sex (male, female) as between-subject factors. Then, hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses were conducted to test for predictors of change in 
dependent variables and for potential moderation of the observed effects.  
2.2.5 Participants 
Sixty-two (42 females; mean age = 20.35, SD = 2.34) undergraduate 
students took part in the experiment voluntarily, provided informed consent to 
participate in this study, and in compensation, received first year psychology 
course credit or entered a cash prize draw. The study was approved by the 
Departmental Ethics Committee at Royal Holloway, University of London. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental (N = 32) or control 
condition (N = 30).  
2.2.5.1 Outliers 
Outliers were excluded if the z-score for the dependent variable (change 
in: HTA, HR, and self-rated anxious mood) by condition was > ±2.58. Six outliers 
were excluded on this basis, leaving a final sample of 28 in the experimental 
condition (8 males, and 20 females) and 28 in the control condition (10 males and 
18 females).  
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2.2.5.2 Sample Characteristics Between Groups 
The groups did not differ significantly on variables such as age, gender, 
body mass index, baseline HTA, HR, and self-report measures of anxiety and 
depression (see Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1. Sample characteristics: means (with standard deviations) and t-test 
statistics (with degrees of freedom) for group comparisons. 
 
Experimental 
(N=28) 
Mean (SD) 
Control 
(N=28) 
Mean (SD) 
t (df)* 
Age 20.04 (2.07) 20.64 (2.58) -0.958 (53) 
BMIa 21.51 (2.89) 22.73 (2.93) -1.505 (50) 
HR baseline 79.29 (10.35) 79.10 (13.89) -.059 (54) 
HTA baseline 0.62 (0.15) 0.65 (0.15) -0.883 (54) 
Mood baseline 31.43 (16.73) 35.44 (16.68) 0.898 (54) 
BFNE-Sb 11.36 (8.12) 12.93 (7.04) 0.774 (54) 
DASS-Dc 3.86 (3.69) 4.64 (3.86) 0.779 (54) 
ASId 16.52 (10.15) 21.96 (12.00) -1.814 (53) 
LSASe 35.79 (19.19) 42.07 (23.39) -1.099 (54) 
STICSA-Sf 33.59 (8.41) 38.96 (11.62) -1.970 (49.22) 
STICSA-Tg 36.61 (8.05) 36.50 (10.93) 0.042 (54) 
*None of the t-test statistics were significant at α = .05 level (2-tailed) 
a Body Mass Index; b Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation-Straightforward Items; c  
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale-Depression subscale; d  Anxiety Sensitivity 
Index; e Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale; f State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and 
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Somatic Anxiety Scale- State subscale; f State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and 
Somatic Anxiety Scale-Trait subscale 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Self-Reported Anxious Mood  
As average self-rated anxious mood was normally distributed both pre- 
and post-manipulation (W = .981, p = .504; W = .977, p = .368, respectively) and 
all of the assumptions for normality tests were met, average self-rated anxious 
mood was analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Time (baseline and 
anticipation) as the within-subjects factor, and Condition (experimental or 
control), Counterbalancing order (HTA task before VAS versus HTA task after 
VAS), HTA group (lower HTA, higher HTA) and Sex (male, female) as between-
subjects factors. As there were no main effects of Counterbalancing order (F (1, 
41) < .000, p = .991), of HTA group (F (1, 41) = 1.031, p = .316), or of Sex (F (1, 
41) = .320, p = .575) on mood, and no interaction effects of Counterbalancing 
order and Condition (F (1, 41) = .951, p = .335), of HTA group and Condition (F 
(1, 41) = .106, p = .747), or of Sex and Condition (F (1, 41) = .054, p = .818) on 
mood, the between-subjects factors of Counterbalancing order, HTA group, and 
Sex were removed from the analysis. 
The 2 x 2 ANOVA with the within-subjects factor of Time (baseline and 
anticipation) and between-subjects factor of Condition (experimental or control), 
revealed no main effect of Condition (F (1, 54) = 3.321, p = .074, ηp2 = .058) on 
mood. There was a main effect of Time (F (1, 54) = 27.827, p < .001, ηp2 = .340) 
and an interaction effect of Condition and Time (F (1, 54) = 54.145, p < .001, ηp2 
= .501) on mood. Pairwise t-tests revealed a significant increase in self-rated 
anxious mood from baseline to speech anticipation found only in the experimental 
(t (27) = -1.854, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -.714) but not in the control condition (t 
(27) = 1.647, p = .111), confirming that the manipulation was successful in 
inducing anxiety. See Figure 2-3 for a graphical depiction of these results and 
Table 2-2 for anxious mood means and standard deviations at baseline and during 
anticipation in the two groups.  
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In order to investigate predictors of change in mood in the experimental 
group, a moderated regression model (see Table 2-2) predicted mood during 
anticipation from HTA at baseline, Fear of negative evaluation and their product 
(along with mood at baseline as a covariate). The overall model predicted 65% of 
the variance in anxious mood during anticipation (F (4, 23) = 10.676, p < .0001, 
R2 = .6500). Multicollinearity diagnostics were assessed and were within an 
acceptable range. In the first step, baseline mood, Fear of negative evaluation, and 
baseline HTA values were included. These variables accounted for a significant 
amount of variance in mood scores during anticipation (R2 = .650, F (3, 24) = 
14.840, p < .001). Fear of negative evaluation was a significant predictor of 
anxious mood scores during anticipation (β = .311, t (27) = 2.345, p = .028). 
Baseline HTA was not a significant predictor of anxious mood at anticipation (β = 
.182, t (27) = 1.359, p = .187). The interaction term of Fear of negative evaluation 
and baseline HTA was entered in the second step to test for moderation, but did 
not significantly add to the amount of variance accounted for (ΔR2 < .001, ΔF (1, 
23) = .015, p = .905, β = -.019) indicating that the association between Fear of 
 
Figure 2-3. Self-rated anxious mood at baseline and during anticipation in 
control and experimental groups. Error bars represent standard errors of mean. 
Note: ***: p < .001. 
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negative evaluation and anxious mood during the anticipation in the experimental 
condition was not dependent on baseline HTA. 
Table 2-2. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting anxious mood 
during anticipation in the experimental group from Fear of Negative Evaluation, 
baseline HTA and interaction of Fear of Negative Evaluation and baseline HTA, 
while controlling for anxious mood at baseline. 
   Correlations 
Predictor                   ΔR2 β 
Zero-
order 
Partial Part 
Step 1 
 
.650***     
 Mood 1  .738*** .752 .771 .717 
 BFNE-S  .311* .365 .432 .283 
 HTA 1  .182 -.102 .267 .164 
Step 2 
 
 <.001     
 
BFNE-S 
* HTA 1 
 -.121 -.253 -.025 -.015 
Total R2 
 
.650***     
Note: N = 28. Mood 1: anxious mood at baseline, HTA 1: baseline heartbeat 
perception accuracy, BFNE-S: Fear of negative evaluation; †p < .1,*p < .05, ***p 
< .001. 
2.3.2 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy 
As HTA scores were normally distributed both pre- and post-manipulation 
(W = .987, p = .816; W = .974, p = .265, respectively) and all of the assumptions 
for normality tests were met, they were analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA 
with the within-subjects factor of Time (baseline, anticipation) and between-
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subjects factors of Condition (experimental or control), Counterbalancing order 
(HTA before VAS versus HTA after VAS), HTA group (lower baseline HTA, 
higher baseline HTA) and Sex (male, female). As there was no main effect of 
Counterbalancing order on HTA (F (1, 41) = .183, p = .671), and no interaction of 
Counterbalancing order and Condition on HTA (F (1, 41) = .812, p = .373), as 
well as no main effect of Sex on HTA (F (1, 41) = .364, p = .550) and no 
interaction effect of Sex and Condition on HTA (F (1, 41) = .879, p = .354) the 
between-subjects factors of Counterbalancing order and Sex were removed from 
the analysis. The resulting 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA consisted of the within-subjects 
factor of Time (baseline, anticipation) and between-subjects factors of Condition 
(experimental or control) and HTA group (lower baseline HTA, higher baseline 
HTA). This analysis revealed a main effect of Time on HTA (F (1, 52) = 4.496, p 
= .039, ηp2 = .080), with individuals increasing in HTA from baseline to 
anticipation, and interaction effect of Time and Condition on HTA (F (1, 52) = 
9.9119, p = .004, ηp2 = .149). There was no interaction effect of Baseline HTA 
group with Time and Condition on HTA (F (1, 52) = 1.939, p = .170). Pairwise t-
tests revealed that HTA changed significantly from baseline to anticipation only 
in the experimental group (t (27) = 4.536, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -0.856) and not in 
the control group (t (27) = .461, p = .649). See Figure 2-4 for a graphical depiction 
of these results and Table 2-2 for HTA means and standard deviations at baseline 
and during anticipation in the two groups. 
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To ensure the increase in HTA from baseline to anticipation in the 
experimental, and not control, group was not due to change in heart rate (HR), HR 
was investigated in a 2 x 2 ANOVA with Time (baseline and anticipation) as the 
within-subjects factor and Condition (experimental or control) as the between-
subjects factor. There was no main effect of Time (F (1, 54) = .892, p = .349) on 
HR, nor interaction effect between the Condition and Time (F (1, 54) = .990, p = 
.326) on HR. See Table 2-3 for HR means and standard deviations at baseline and 
during anticipation in the two groups. 
 
Figure 2-4. Heartbeat tracking accuracy at baseline and during anticipation in 
control and experimental groups. Error bars represent standard errors of mean. 
Note: ***: p < .001. 
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Table 2-3. Changes in dependent measures from baseline to anticipation in 
experimental (N = 28) and control (N = 28) conditions  
 
Experimental Control 
Baseline Anticipation Baseline Anticipation 
HR 79.29 (10.35) 80.13 (9.34) 79.10 (13.89) 79.07 (13.16) 
HTA 0.62 (0.15) 0.69 (.15) 0.65 (0.15) .64 (.15) 
Anxious Mood 31.43 (16.73) 53.25 (21.47) 35.44 (16.68) 31.84 (20.61) 
 
Potential moderation of the effect of Condition on HTA during 
anticipation by Fear of negative evaluation was investigated using a hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis. The model (see Table 2-4) predicted HTA during 
anticipation from Condition, Fear of negative evaluation and their product (along 
with HTA at baseline as a covariate). The overall model was significant and 
predicted 73.8% of the variance in HTA during anticipation (F (4, 51) = 35.844, p 
< .0001, R2 = .7376). Multicollinearity diagnostics were assessed and were within 
an acceptable range. In the first step, baseline HTA, Condition, and Fear of 
negative evaluation values were included. These variables accounted for a 
significant amount of variance in anticipation HTA scores (R2 = .736, F (3, 52) = 
48.268, p < .001). Fear of negative evaluation marginally predicted HTA scores 
during anticipation (β = .311, t (54) = 1.896, p = .064). The interaction term of 
Condition and Fear of negative evaluation was entered in the second step to test 
for moderation, but did not significantly add to the amount of variance accounted 
for (ΔR2 = .0018, ΔF (1, 51) = .359, p = .552, β = .044) indicating that the effect 
of Condition on HTA during anticipation was not dependent on level of Fear of 
negative evaluation.  
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Table 2-4. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting HTA during 
anticipation from Condition, Fear of negative evaluation and interaction of 
Condition and Fear of negative evaluation, while controlling for baseline HTA. 
    Correlations 
Predictor 
 
ΔR2 β 
Zero-
order 
Partial Part 
Step 1 
 
.736***     
 HTA 1  .866*** .814 .855 .847 
 Condition  .255*** .137 .439 .251 
 BFNE-S  .138† -.027 .254 .135 
Step 2 
 
.002     
 
Condition * 
BFNE-S 
 .044 -.152 .084 .043 
Total R2 
 
.738***     
Note: N =56. HTA 1: baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy, BFNE-S: Fear of 
negative evaluation; †p < .1, ***p < .001. 
2.4 Discussion 
The current study investigated changes in heartbeat tracking accuracy in 
response to an anxiety-provoking situation, using a public speaking anticipation 
paradigm. As hypothesised, participants in the experimental condition who 
completed a second heartbeat tracking task while anticipating giving a speech 
were significantly more accurate during anticipation than individuals in the 
control condition. This result supports the prediction that a state anxiety 
manipulation would bring about heightened cardiac interoceptive accuracy. Even 
though heart rate did not significantly differ from baseline to anticipation, it can 
be assumed the manipulation did not fail, as indicated by self-rated mood of 
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participants in the experimental condition. Moreover, there is evidence from 
research showing the possibility of a lack of correspondence between objective 
and subjective measures of arousal (Miers, Blote, Sumter, Kallen, & Westenberg, 
2011) or anxiety (Bacow, May, Choate-Summers, Pincus, & Mattis, 2010). 
Perhaps individuals in the current study were more anxious cognitively, as 
indicated by self-rated mood, rather than physiologically, as reflected by lack of 
heart rate response. Since the present manipulation had an effect on self-rated 
anxious mood, and on the dependent variable of heartbeat tracking accuracy, the 
lack of change in heart rate was not assumed to be an index of manipulation 
failure. The increase in anxious mood and increase in heartbeat tracking accuracy 
in the experimental condition were both positively correlated with the fear of 
negative evaluation scores. There were no moderating effects of sex and baseline 
heartbeat tracking accuracy present in the data.  Fear of negative evaluation did 
not moderate the effect of condition on heartbeat tracking accuracy and 
individuals with differing levels of fear of negative evaluation experienced change 
in heartbeat tracking accuracy to the same degree as the result of the experimental 
manipulation. Fear of negative evaluation predicted self-rated anxiety during 
speech anticipation in individuals of differing baseline heartbeat tracking 
accuracy.  
Overall, the results of the current study indicate that cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy, although a stable individual difference variable is subject to state-
dependent fluctuations in response to emotional states, such as anticipatory 
anxiety. These findings extend on the results of the study by Stevens et al. (2011), 
which found an increase in heartbeat tracking accuracy in the first trial of speech 
anticipation. Unlike in the study by Stevens et al., in the present study a 
significant difference in heartbeat tracking accuracy was observed when all trials 
of the anticipation phase were analysed. This discrepancy might perhaps be due to 
differences in sample characteristics of Stevens et al. and the current study. While 
Stevens et al. sampled only two groups: high social anxiety (high fear of negative 
evaluation) and low social anxiety (low fear of negative evaluation), the current 
study sampled a non-anxious population (as indicated by LSAS scores) falling on 
a continuum of fear of negative evaluation. Therefore, it is possible that the very 
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high in anxiety and very low in anxiety participants in the study by Stevens et al. 
were, respectively, more and less affected by the manipulation than an average 
individual. Secondly, the speech manipulation procedure was slightly different in 
the current study. Participants in Stevens et al. were asked to rate how they 
thought they would appear during the speech in order to elicit anxiety, while 
participants in the present study were not asked to provide such ratings, instead 
just being given three minutes to prepare the content of the speech prior to the 
second heartbeat counting task. Further, unlike the study by Stevens et al., in the 
current study the order of the post-manipulation heartbeat tracking task and 
momentary mood ratings was counterbalanced in order to account for the 
potentially short-lived effect of enhanced cardiac interoceptive accuracy 
immediately after the manipulation, as reported by Antony et al. (1995) in the 
context of interoception and physical exercise, and as suggested by Stevens et al. 
(2011) in their interpretation of their results.  
Even though no moderation of the manipulation effect on heartbeat 
tracking accuracy by fear of negative evaluation was observed in the present 
study, the results of the current study suggest that the higher the fear of negative 
evaluation, the higher heartbeat tracking accuracy during speech anticipation. This 
would explain why Stevens et al. failed to find a significant difference in heartbeat 
tracking accuracy from baseline to anticipation in the low social anxiety group 
with low fear of negative evaluation group (as a smaller increase in heartbeat 
tracking accuracy would be expected in these participants). Further, as the present 
study sampled non-anxious individuals, the relationship that was found between 
fear of negative evaluation and heartbeat tracking accuracy change might not hold 
for individuals on the upper extreme of fear of negative evaluation (the other 
group investigated by Stevens et al.), for whom perhaps it might be more difficult 
to deploy required attentional resources to the heartbeat counting task in the 
stressful situation of speech anticipation, or who, alternatively, might be already 
quite high in cardiac interoceptive accuracy (as suggested by Stevens et al., and 
the literature on cardiac interoceptive accuracy and anxiety (see Domschke et al., 
2010 for a review)), and thus might face a ceiling effect with regards to 
enhancement in state cardiac interoceptive accuracy (as suggested by results of 
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Ainley et al., 2012). Overall, it is important to note that the results of the present 
study may not generalise to the clinical population of individuals with social 
anxiety.  
Taken together, the results of the current study show that the speech 
anticipation manipulation brought about heightened cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy and participants became more accurate at tracking their heartbeats when 
in the anxiety provoking situation. The fact that higher fear of negative evaluation 
was associated with a larger increase in heartbeat tracking accuracy in the anxiety-
provoking situation could be explained by a number of factors, one being 
increased self-focused attention, as suggested by cognitive theories of social 
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995). The present speech anticipation manipulation 
likely increased self-focused attention, which then, independently, increased 
anxiety (see Jakymin & Harris, 2012 for review) and heartbeat tracking accuracy 
(as suggested by Ainley et al., 2012) in the individuals anticipating the speech, 
with the degree of the increase in self-focused attention being directly related to 
the degree of fear of negative evaluation.  
At first glance, the relationship between fear of negative evaluation and 
heartbeat tracking accuracy during speech anticipation provides support for 
cognitive models of social anxiety (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995), which suggest that 
higher fear of negative evaluation is associated with increased self-focus when 
entering a social situation. These theories imply that better detection of heartbeats 
might lead to their misinterpretation as symptoms of anxiety and arousal, visible 
to external observers, consequently, bringing about an increase in anxiety (e.g. 
Wild et al., 2008). However, the results of the current study did not indicate a 
significant association between enhancement in heartbeat tracking accuracy and 
increase in anxious mood, contradicting the above model. Moreover, the fact that 
heartbeat tracking accuracy increased in all participants, including those with low 
fear of negative evaluation suggests that the observed enhancement in heartbeat 
tracking accuracy might be reflective of a general strategy of the organism to deal 
with uncertainty (such as experience of anxiety). Indeed, the somatic marker 
hypothesis (Damasio, 1994, 1999) proposes that more accurate perception of 
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somatic signals under uncertainty might enable more efficient information 
processing, in this way guiding emotional, behavioural and cognitive processes, 
optimising the individual’s responses in effectively dealing with the faced 
situation. For example, increased interoceptive accuracy during speech 
anticipation might help the individual downregulate anxious mood when later 
giving the speech (Werner et al., 2009). It should be kept in mind though that the 
current design does not allow conclusions to be drawn pertaining to whether the 
observed enhancement in heartbeat tracking accuracy would indeed be associated 
with altered information processing and cognitive and behavioural responses in 
the anxiety-provoking situation.  
To conclude, the evidence from Experiment 1 indicates that individual 
level of cardiac interoceptive accuracy can change as a function of the emotional 
state of an individual, increasing during the experience of social anxiety, perhaps 
by means of heightened self-focused attention. However, as the current study 
focused only on anticipatory social anxiety, it remains to be ascertained how 
specific and/or how general this effect is. Even though fear of negative evaluation 
scores were directly associated with interoceptive accuracy scores during 
anticipation (suggesting that interoceptive accuracy increased due to higher social 
anxiety in the situation), it is a possibility that interoceptive accuracy is increased 
by the experience of anxiety, in general, rather than by the experience of social 
anxiety, specifically. The experiments to follow manipulate emotional experiences 
other than anticipatory social anxiety and also measure exteroceptive 
somatosensory perception accuracy, consequently, exploring whether emotions 
other than anticipatory social anxiety can also affect cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy, and whether the experience of anxiety (and potentially other emotions) 
can also influence modes of body perception other than cardiac interoceptive 
signals. First, testing the hypothesis that self-focused attention in a social context 
increases interoceptive accuracy, Experiment 2 investigated the effect of social 
self-focus, without an anxiety manipulation, on cardiac interoceptive accuracy, as 
well as on tactile body perception. 
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Chapter 3: Stability of Interoceptive and Exteroceptive 
Somatosensory Perception Accuracy During Heightened 
Social Self-Focus2  
3.1 Introduction 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the experience of social anxiety 
increases cardiac interoceptive accuracy. Specifically, in Experiment 1, heartbeat 
tracking accuracy increased from baseline to anticipation in individuals who were 
anticipating giving a public speech. The enhancement in heartbeat tracking 
accuracy in the experimental group was directly associated with fear of negative 
evaluation. Heartbeat tracking accuracy might increase in situations that evoke 
social anxiety due to increased social self-focus in these contexts. This hypothesis 
is in line with cognitive theories of anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995), which suggest 
that higher fear of negative evaluation is associated with increased self-focus in 
social situations. Heartbeat tracking accuracy has been found to increase due to 
self-focus evoked by mirror self-observation (Ainley et al., 2012; Weisz et al., 
1988), however, the effect self-focus that is more social in nature (as elicited by 
public speaking anticipation) on heartbeat tracking accuracy has not been 
examined.  
Distinct modes of self-focus enhance aspects of the self-relevant to the 
given focus-mode—for example, mirrors have been found to elicit private self-
focus, by directing individuals’ attention to inner aspects of the self, whereas 
video cameras have been found to elicit social self-focus, by drawing individuals’ 
attention to the external, observable to others aspects of the self (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981; Davies, 2005). Private self-focus has been found to enhance 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy, as reflected by higher heartbeat tracking accuracy 
                                                
 
2 Experiment 2 has been published as Durlik, C., Cardini, F., & Tsakiris, M. (2014). Being 
watched: The effect of social self-focus on interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory 
perception. Consciousness & Cognition, 25, 42-50. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.010 
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when attending to pictures of self, self-referential words (Ainley et al., 2013) or to 
the reflection of one’s self in a mirror (Ainley et al., 2012; Weisz et al., 1988). 
Baltazar et al. (2014) found that social self-focus (manipulated using a photograph 
of a face with a direct gaze) increased the correspondence between skin 
conductance responses and individuals’ ratings of the intensity of their emotional 
responses to affective visual stimuli. It might be the case that in the study by 
Baltazar et al. social self-focus increased correspondence between objective and 
subjective measures of emotional arousal by increasing interoceptive accuracy. 
However, the effect of social self-focus on interoceptive accuracy remains to be 
empirically investigated. As there is evidence that private self-focus and social 
self-focus can have distinct cognitive effects (Davies, 2005), it is possible that 
social self-focus might impact body perception accuracy in a different manner 
than private self-focus. 
Interoceptive and exteroceptive signals are integrated to jointly shape body 
awareness and perception (Neisser, 1993). Combined interoceptive-exteroceptive 
somatosensory signals can significantly alter ownership of a virtual hand (Suzuki 
et al., 2013), as well as awareness of one’s body in space (Adler et al., 2014; 
Aspell et al., 2013). Because online integration of sensory signals across the 
interoceptive and exteroceptive modalities is a dynamic process that is strongly 
modulated by attention (e.g., Talsma & Woldorff, 2005), state-dependent 
fluctuations in both interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory perception as a 
function of various modes of attention to the self could be expected. The effect of 
bodily self-focus on exteroceptive somatosensory perception was examined by 
Mirams et al. (2012), who found that interoceptive attention to the body (as 
opposed to exteroceptive bodily attention) was followed by a higher propensity to 
report feeling a tactile stimulus regardless of whether it has occurred or not. In a 
follow-up study, Mirams, Poliakoff, Brown and Lloyd (2013) observed that 
bodily self-focus in the form of body-scan meditation practice (in which 
participants were trained to attend to selective areas of the body, one at a time, 
while taking the time to notice any somatic sensations in a non-evaluative 
manner) increased sensitivity and decreased false alarm rates on a tactile 
perception task. Mirams and colleagues (2013) concluded that bodily self-focus 
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might have differential effects on exteroceptive somatosensory processing 
depending on the mode of attention to the body. 
Despite several studies having investigated the effects of various modes of 
self-focus on somatosensory perception accuracy, no study to date has directly 
examined the way in which interoceptive accuracy and exteroceptive perception 
accuracy are affected by social self-focus. Social self-focus has been successfully 
elicited in experimental settings with a turned on video camera facing the 
participant, as if s/he is being filmed (e.g., Burgio, Merluzzi, & Pryor, 1986; 
Duval & Lalwani, 1999). The aim of the present study (Experiment 2) was to 
investigate whether social self-focus evoked by a turned on video camera (self-
focus condition: camera turned on and facing the participant; non self-focus 
condition: camera turned off and facing away from the participant) would affect 
interoceptive and/or exteroceptive somatosensory processing, as measured with 
heartbeat tracking accuracy and tactile perception accuracy. Heartbeat tracking 
accuracy was measured using the Mental Tracking Task (Schandry, 1981), while 
tactile perception accuracy was measured using a modified Somatic Signal 
Detection Task (SSDT; Lloyd et al., 2008). The SSDT has been used by Mirams 
et al. (2012, 2013) to examine the effects of bodily self-focus on exteroceptive 
somatosensory perception accuracy. The SSDT involves detecting the presence of 
a near-threshold tactile stimulus presented on 50% of the trials, while a 
simultaneous visual stimulus, such as an LED, also flashes on 50% of the trials, 
resulting in an increase in participants’ hit rate and false alarm rate due to the 
flashing LED (Lloyd et al., 2008). A signal detection analysis is used to establish 
whether any observed change in responses is due to an effect of the manipulation 
on tactile sensitivity (i.e., ability to tell apart signal from noise), response criterion 
(i.e., propensity to report feeling a tactile stimulus), or both. Overall, higher 
sensitivity, higher hit rate, and lower false alarm rate suggest a more accurate 
exteroceptive/tactile perception of the body.  
It was hypothesised that, in Experiment 2, social self-focus would enhance 
somatosensory processing in both, interoceptive and exteroceptive, modalities: 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy would be higher in the self-focus condition, as 
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opposed to the non-self-focus condition, as reflected by better heartbeat tracking 
accuracy in the ‘‘camera on’’ as opposed to ‘‘camera off’’ condition; the ‘‘camera 
on’’ condition would also be associated with improved tactile perception, as 
reflected by increased hit rate and decreased false alarm rate (i.e., higher 
sensitivity) on the SSDT in the ‘‘camera on’’ as opposed to the ‘‘camera off’’ 
condition. As significant differences in emotional and cognitive processing based 
on individuals’ interoceptive accuracy level have been found—for example, in 
regards to emotional experience (e.g., Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007), decision-
making (e.g., Werner, Jung et al., 2009), and memory performance (e.g., Werner 
et al., 2010)—the potential modulation of SSDT performance by general cardiac 
interoceptive accuracy level was investigated. It was hypothesised that individuals 
with high heartbeat tracking accuracy are highly aware of their bodies, and hence, 
would display accurate tactile perception. This hypothesis is in line with the 
results of Knapp et al., (1997), which indicated a positive correlation between 
heartbeat discrimination accuracy and vibrotactile perception accuracy, suggesting 
that general somatosensory perception acuity might span across the interoceptive 
and exteroceptive modalities. Consequently, it was hypothesised that in the 
current study (Experiment 2) individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy 
would display higher sensitivity, higher hit rate, and lower false alarm rate on the 
SSDT than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. Lastly, general 
interoceptive ability was examined as a potential moderator of the effect of social 
self-focus on interoceptive and/or exteroceptive somatosensory processing; as sex 
differences have been observed in interoceptive accuracy, with males being more 
accurate than females (Cameron, 2001), sex was included as a between-subjects 
factor in the analyses of heartbeat tracking accuracy. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Experimental Design 
 The experiment was a fully counterbalanced within-subject design. 
Participants completed the heartbeat tracking accuracy (HTA) task and the 
Somatic Signal Detection Task (SSDT) two times each—one time with the video 
camera turned on and facing the participant (i.e., social self-focus condition), and 
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one time with the video camera turned off and facing away from the participant 
(i.e., non-self-focus condition). The order of ‘‘camera on’’/‘‘camera off’’ 
conditions was counterbalanced across participants. The order of HTA task and 
SSDT within each condition (‘‘camera on’’, and ‘‘camera off’’) was also 
counterbalanced across participants. Together, there were 8 possible orders. The 
order in which a given participant completed the tasks was randomised. 
3.2.2 Measures 
3.2.2.1 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy  
HTA was assessed using the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981) 
outlined in Chapter 2. In this experiment, the assessment consisted of a three-trial 
block: 25-second, 35-second, and 45-second, trials, presented in a random order. 
Four trials of HTA assessment (as used in Experiment 1) were no longer used; the 
100-second trial was excluded in order to minimise potential measurement error, 
as participants might potentially find it difficult to focus their attention on 
continuously tracking their heartbeats over a long 100-second trial.  Even though 
numerous experiments have used a four-trial version of the task (Pollatos et al., 
2008; Tsakiris et al., 2011; Tajadura-Jimenez, Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris, 
2012), a three-trial version of the task is also used (e.g., Ainley et al., 2012; 
Furman et al., 2013; Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007; Werner, Schweitzer et al., 
2013). Inter-trial reliability was increased by using a three-trial version of the task. 
In Experiment 1, Cronbach’s α = .87 for Time 1, and α = .90 for Time 2; in the 
present study, Cronbach’s α = .94 for the no camera condition, and α = .95 for the 
camera condition. Prior to the first HTA assessment, a 10-second training trial 
was administered in order to familiarise participants with the task.  
3.2.2.2 Somatic Signal Detection Task 
The Somatic Signal Detection Task (SSDT; Lloyd et al., 2008) measures 
somatic sensitivity and response bias in detecting whether a tactile stimulus at 
threshold intensity is present or absent, while an irrelevant LED flashes (at the 
same time as the occurrence of tactile stimulation) or not. The dependent variable 
is the participant’s response: ‘‘definitely yes,’’ ‘‘maybe yes,’’ ‘‘maybe no,’’ 
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‘‘definitely no’’. It should be noted that in order to adapt the SSDT paradigm to 
the present investigation, some aspects of the procedure were modified in the 
present study. Specifically, tactile stimuli were delivered to the cheek, and not to 
the hand, as in the original paradigm. This adjustment was made to ensure that 
tactile stimulation occurred at a body-site that is the focus of attention during the 
video-camera manipulation—the face—as opposed to the hand, which is 
peripheral to the focus of attention during the manipulation. As the site of tactile 
stimulation was moved, the location of the LED also needed to be adjusted 
accordingly. The light was positioned on eye-level, a meter away from the 
participant, in his or her central visual field, and slightly behind the video-camera 
to ensure that the light remained close enough to be salient, yet not too close as to 
interfere with the salience of the camera manipulation. 
Tactile stimuli were delivered through a constant current electrical 
stimulator (DS7A, Digitimer). One couple of surface electrodes, placed on the 
participants’ right cheek approximately 1 cm apart, delivered a single constant 
current rectangular monophasic pulse. The beginning of each trial was signalled 
by two brief audio tones. Then, a stimulus period of 1020 ms followed. In the 
tactile-present trials a 0.05 ms tactile stimulus was presented after 500 ms. In 
tactile-absent trials an empty 1020 ms period took place. A single audio tone 
signaled the end of the trial, at which point participants were asked to report 
whether they perceived a tactile stimulus on their cheek or not. First, a staircase 
procedure was used to establish a threshold for each participant—the point at 
which participant reported feeling the tactile stimulus on 40–60% of the tactile-
present trials. The threshold protocol consisted of 5 tactile-present and 5 tactile-
absent trials, and the participant was asked to give a verbal response of ‘‘yes’’ or 
‘‘no’’ to each trial. The thresholding procedure was repeated as many times as 
needed in order to establish the threshold, before the main experimental trials 
could take place. 
The main experiment consisted of 2 blocks of 80 trials, with 20 trials for 
each of the four conditions (tactile present-light present, tactile present-light 
absent, tactile absent-light present, tactile absent-light absent) presented per block 
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in a random order. In the light-present trials the LED was illuminated for 20 ms 
with a delay of 500 ms on either side. The light was either simultaneous with the 
tactile pulse (in the tactile present-light present trials) or occurred on its own (in 
the tactile absent-light present trials). Participants had to report whether they felt 
the tactile stimulus during the trial period by pressing one of four buttons on the 
response pad: ‘definitely yes,’ ‘maybe yes,’ ‘maybe no,’ ‘definitely no’ (the order 
of the response buttons was also reversed and random half of the participants 
responded in the above order, while the other half responded in the reverse order 
of: ‘definitely no,’ ‘maybe no,’ ‘maybe yes,’ ‘definitely yes’). Participants were 
unaware of the significance of the light stimulus and were asked to report solely 
whether they felt a tactile stimulus. The stimuli were controlled via a PC running 
NI LabVIEW 2011 software, which was also used to record the responses. In 
between the two blocks, the thresholding procedure was repeated in order to re-
establish the threshold before the second experimental block. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Upon arrival to the lab participants were given information about the study 
that was essential to provide informed consent, but that did not reveal the real 
objectives of the experiment. Participants were told that part of the task was going 
to be video-recorded for procedure monitoring purposes. After participants signed 
the informed consent form the experiment begun. Each participant was seated at a 
desk-chair about 1 m away from the wall. A black screen with a 10 mm red LED 
in the middle was attached directly to the wall. The LED was at eye-level of the 
seated participant and directly in front of him or her. A video camera was 
mounted on a tripod and placed about 75 cm directly in front of the participant. 
The LED was about 25 cm behind the video camera. The camera was slightly 
below eye-level of the participant in order not to interfere with the participant’s 
vision of the LED. However, when turned on and facing the participant, the 
camera lens was turned slightly upwards in order to capture participant’s face. 
When the camera was turned off and the lens was facing away from the 
participant, the tripod and the camera remained in the same position in front of the 
participant. See Figure 3-1 for an illustration of the experimental set up.  
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During the experiment, the lab was dark; a spotlight placed above the 
participant illuminated the area in which the participant was seated. The spotlight 
did not directly illuminate the wall on which the LED was situated in order not to 
reduce visibility of the flashing light during the SSDT. Two electrodes were 
attached to participant’s right cheek with the use of surgical tape, and a piezo-
electric pulse transducer was attached to participant’s right index finger. 
Participants then completed the HTA task and the SSDT in the ‘‘camera on’’ and 
‘‘camera off’’ conditions (see ‘Experimental design’ section for information on 
counterbalancing of task order). Upon completion of the experiment participants 
were fully debriefed and informed about the real purpose of the study. See Figure 
3-2 for a graphical depiction of the procedure.  
 
Figure 3-1. Experimental set-up. 
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3.2.4 Data Analysis 
3.2.4.1 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy Scores 
HTA scores were calculated according to the following formula: 
1/3 Σ (1-(| actual heartbeats – reported heartbeats |) / actual heartbeats). 
Individuals were categorized as high or low in HTA using a median split on the 
“camera off” HTA score (Mdn = .590). The sample consisted of 29 low HTA 
individuals (mean HTA = .487, SD = .078), and 28 high HPA individuals (mean 
HTA = .794, SD = .125). HTA was not normally distributed, as indicated by a 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (W = .952, p = .023). See Figure 3-3 for a 
frequency distribution plot.  
 
Figure 3-2. Experimental procedure. 
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Figure 3-3. Frequency distribution of HTA scores in the "camera off" condition in 
Experiment 2. 
3.2.4.2 Average Heart Rate 
Average heart rate was calculated according to the following formula: 
 1/3 Σ ((actual heartbeats / length of time interval in seconds) * 60 
seconds) 
3.2.4.3 Somatic Signal Detection Task Data 
In accordance with the original SSDT paradigm (Lloyd et al., 2008), 
responses “definitely” and “maybe” were combined, and grouped into ‘yes’ and 
‘no’ responses, which were then categorized as hits, misses, false alarms and 
correct rejections. Hit rate and false alarm rate were calculated using the following 
formulas: 
Hit rate = hits / (hits + misses) 
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False alarm rate = false alarms / (false alarms + correct rejections) 
Sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (c) statistics were calculated using Statilite 
software (Version 1.05 developed by Chris Rorden: 
http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/stats/index.html). Where false alarms 
were equal to zero, 1 was added to both false alarms and to correct rejections to 
calculate d’ and c values. This correction was applied as it was necessary for the 
Statilite software to accurately perform the associated calculations. For a closer 
analysis of the statistical issues surrounding extreme signal detection values and 
multiple ways of resolving them, refer to Stanislaw and Todorov (1999). 
3.2.4.4 Data Analysis Overview 
Correlation analyses were conducted to test for association between HTA 
and SSDT outcome measures. The effects of experimental manipulation on HTA 
and HR were examined using a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test and a mixed 
ANOVA with Condition (“camera on”, “camera off”) as the within-subjects factor 
and HTA group (low, high) and Sex (male, female) as between subjects-factors, 
respectively. The effect of the experimental manipulation on SSDT outcome 
measures was investigated using a mixed ANOVA with within-subject factors of 
Light (present or absent) and Camera (on or off) and between subjects factors of 
Camera order (camera first or camera second), Task order (4 possible orders) and 
HTA group (higher HTA, lower HTA) and with Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests in 
the case of non-normal distribution of data.  
3.2.5 Participants 
Seventy-nine (64 females; mean age = 18.73, SD = .90) undergraduate 
psychology students at Royal Holloway, University of London took part in the 
experiment in compensation for course credit. Table 3-1 lists demographic 
characteristics of the sample.  
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Table 3-1. Experiment 2 sample characteristics: means (with standard deviations). 
 Mean (SD) 
Age 18.73 (.90) 
BMIa 21.84 (3.84) 
HR camera offb 81.90 (10.04) 
HTA camera offc .64 (.18) 
BFNE-Sd 26.96 (7.72) 
STICSA-Se 34.95 (8.82) 
STICSA-Tf 44.10 (9.21) 
a Body Mass Index; b Heart rate in the “camera off” condition; c  Heartbeat 
tracking accuracy in the “camera off” condition; d Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation-Straightforward Items; e State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and 
Somatic Anxiety Scale- State subscale; f State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and 
Somatic Anxiety Scale-Trait subscale 
3.2.5.1 Data Exclusion 
On the SSDT, participants who completed 16 or less trials out of 20 trials 
of each condition per block on, or who displayed a hit rate, and/or false alarm rate 
over or under 1.5 standard deviations from the mean (means were calculated for 
all participants, separately for all 4 conditions, light (present or absent)/camera 
(present or absent)), respectively, due to measurement error were excluded from 
the sample. This exclusion criterion ensured that the hit rate remained between 40 
and 60% and that the tactile stimulus was indeed of the intensity corresponding to 
the perceptual threshold. Eighteen participants were excluded from the sample 
based on these criteria. Four more participants were excluded from the sample due 
to heartbeat data measurement error. The final sample consisted of 57 participants 
(48 female; mean age = 18.67; SD = .93).  
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Association Between Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy and Somatic Signal 
Detection Task Measures 
Correlational analyses were performed for HTA scores (across all 
participants) and SSDT outcome variables of hit rate, false alarm rate, sensitivity, 
and response criterion for the non-self-focus condition. As HTA scores in this 
condition were not normally distributed, Spearman’s rho (rs) correlation 
coefficients were computed. HTA scores were positively correlated with overall 
false alarm rate in the “camera off” condition (rs = .299, p = .024, 95% CI [.042, 
.519]). Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons resulted in this correlation 
being significant at α = .1, but not at α = .05 level. HTA scores were not 
significantly correlated with hit rate (rs = .075, p = .578, 95% CI [-.189, .329]), 
sensitivity (d’) (rs = -.060, p = .659, 95% CI [-.315, .203]) or response criterion (c) 
(rs = -.146, p = .277, 95% CI [-.391, .119]) in the “camera off” condition.  
3.3.2 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy 
As HTA scores in the non-self-focus condition were not normally 
distributed, non-parametric test statistics were used to investigate whether the 
camera manipulation had an effect on HTA. A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
revealed that HTA scores did not differ between self-focus (“camera on”; Mdn = 
.63, range = .77) and non-self-focus (“camera off”; Mdn = .59, range = .72) 
conditions (Z = -1.148, p = .251). No effect of camera remained when separately 
examining the low HTA group (Z = -.876, p = .381) and the high HTA group (Z = 
-.638, p = .524), and when separately examining males (Z = -.533, p = .652) and 
females (Z = -.985, p = .330). 
Average heart rate was analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with a within-
subjects factor of Condition (“camera on”, “camera off”) and between-subjects 
factors of HTA group (lower HTA, higher HTA), and Sex (male, female). There 
was no main effect of Condition (F (1, 53) = .167, p = .685), no interaction effect 
of Condition and HTA group on heart rate (F (1, 53) = .048, p = .828), and no 
interaction effect of Condition and Sex on heart rate (F (1, 53) = .320, p = .574).  
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3.3.3 Somatic Signal Detection Task  
Sensitivity (d’), hit rate, and response criterion (c) were each submitted to 
a 2 x 2 x 2 x 4 x 2 ANOVA with within subject factors of Light (present or 
absent) and Camera (on or off), and between subjects factors of Camera order 
(camera first or camera second), Task order (4 possible orders) and HTA group 
(higher HTA, lower HTA). As there were no main effects of Camera order on 
sensitivity (F (1, 41) = .095, p = .760), hit rate (F (1, 41) = .012, p = .913), or 
response criterion (F (1, 41) = .004, p = .950), and of Task order on sensitivity (F 
(3, 41) = .990, p = .407), hit rate (F (3, 41) = .678, p = .571), or response criterion 
(F (3, 41) = .286, p = .835) these factors were removed from final analyses, and 
the dependent variables were analysed in 2 (Light) x 2 (Camera) x 2 (HTA group) 
ANOVAs. As false alarms were not normally distributed, non-parametric test 
statistics were used to test for differences between groups and within conditions 
based on factors of Camera order and Task order. A series of Mann-Whitney U 
tests and Kruskal-Wallis H tests revealed no group differences in any of the false 
alarm measures based on Camera order and Task order, respectively—all values 
were above the significance level of α = .05. Table 3-2 contains descriptive 
statistics for each outcome measure in each Light condition.  
 
 
89 
 
Table 3-2. Means of hit rates, false alarm rates, d’, and c in each camera and light 
condition. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
  Camera condition 
Variable Light condition Camera off (NSF) Camera on (SF) 
Hits (%) No light 49.46 (17.65) 56.14 (16.18) 
 Light 62.71 (14.59) 64.73 (15.30) 
 Overall 56.09 (15.00) 60.43 (14.56) 
False Alarms 
(%) No light 2.56 (3.72) 2.50 (4.72) 
 Light 4.08 (5.08) 3.60 (5.47) 
 Overall 3.34 (3.93) 3.05 (4.22) 
d' No light 1.72 (.51) 2.01 (.50) 
 Light 1.91 (.50) 2.13 (.52) 
 Overall 1.86 (.46) 2.02 (.47) 
c No light .87 (.28) .66 (.26) 
 Light .78 (.26) .65 (.27) 
 Overall .77 (.24) .72 (.24) 
Note: NSF = non self-focus; SF = self-focus; d’ = sensitivity, c = response 
criterion.  
Sensitivity (d’) was higher in the self-focus condition than in the non-self-
focus condition (F (1, 55) = 5.866 p = .019, ηp2 = .096). There was a significant 
main effect of Light on sensitivity (F (1, 55) = 34.430 p < .001, ηp2 = .385) with 
d’ being significantly higher in light-present trials than in light-absent trials. There 
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was no interaction effect of Camera and Light on d’ (F (1, 55) = 1.036, p = .313). 
There was no main effect of HTA group on d’ (F (1, 55) = .878, p = .353), nor 
interaction of HTA group with Camera (F (1, 55) = .717, p = .401) or Light (F (1, 
55) = .277, p = .601) on d’. In order to investigate the components of the increase 
in sensitivity, hit rate and false alarms across conditions were examined next.  
Hit rate was significantly affected by Light (F (1, 55) = 87.801, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .615) — being higher in light-present than in light-absent trials—and by 
Camera (F (1, 55) = 4.276, p = .043, ηp2 = .072)—being significantly higher in 
camera-present trials than in camera-absent trials. There was a significant 
interaction of Light and Camera on hit rate (F (1, 55) = 4.304, p = .043, ηp2 = 
.073). In order to probe the interaction, pairwise t-tests comparing hit rate in both 
Camera conditions were conducted for each of the Light conditions separately. 
Bonferroni corrections were applied throughout, adjusting the alpha level to .025 
(.05/2) in order to correct for multiple comparisons. The results revealed that the 
effect of Camera on hit rate was driven by the difference in hit rate across Camera 
conditions in light-absent trials (t (56) = -2.816, p = .007, Cohen’s d = -.753), as 
there was no difference in hit rate across Camera conditions in light-present trials 
(t (56) = 2.096, p = .400). To see whether Light had a smaller effect on hit rate in 
the self-focus condition—when the camera was on—than in the non-self-focus 
condition—when the camera was off—difference scores (hit rate light-present – 
hit rate light-absent) in each condition were compared in a single pairwise t-test. 
Light had a significantly smaller effect on hit rate in the self-focus condition 
(mean difference = 8.59 (SD = 12.01)) than in the non-self-focus condition (mean 
difference = 13.25 (SD = 12.21)), t (56) = 2.096, p = .041, Cohen’s d = .56. Figure 
3-4 illustrates the effect of Light and Camera on hit rate. There was no main effect 
of HTA group on hit rate (F (1, 55) = .020, p = .887), nor interaction of HTA 
group with Camera (F (1, 55) = .278, p = .600) or Light (F (1, 55) = .004, p = 
.947) on hit rate.  
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As false alarms were not normally distributed, non-parametric test 
statistics were used to examine for significant differences in false alarms between 
conditions. A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test showed a main effect of Light on false 
alarm rates (Z = -2.739, p = .006) with false alarm rates being higher in light-
present than in light-absent trials, but no main effect of Camera on false alarm 
rates (Z = -1.001, p = .317)—Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
applied and alpha level adjusted to .025 (.05/2). The main effect of Light on false 
alarms was driven by the “camera off” condition where false alarms were higher 
in light-present trials (Z = -2.557, p = .011), as opposed to the “camera on” 
condition where false alarms did not significantly differ between light-present and 
light-absent trials (Z = -1.699, p = .089)—Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons applied and alpha level adjusted to .025 (.05/2). However, the effect 
of Light on false alarm rate in each condition, as compared using a single pairwise 
comparison on mean difference scores (false alarm rate light-present – false alarm 
rate light-absent) was not significant (Z = -.436, p = .663). Figure 3-5 illustrates 
the effect of Light and Camera on false alarm rate. Although the number of false 
alarms was higher in the high HTA group than in the low HTA group, the effect 
 
Figure 3-4. The effect of camera and light on hit rate. Note: * p < .05. 
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of HTA group on false alarm rate was not statistically significant indicated by 
significance level values above .05 on a series of Mann-Whitney U tests 
investigating group differences in false alarm rates based on the between-subjects 
factor of HTA group. 
 
Figure 3-5. The effect of camera and light on false alarm rate. Note: * p < .05. 
Response criterion (c) was not affected by Camera (F (1, 55) = 2.076, p = 
.155), and there was only a main effect of Light (F (1, 55) = 87.990 p < .001, ηp2 = 
.615), with a significantly more liberal response criterion in light-present trials as 
opposed to light-absent trials. There was no interaction effect of Camera and 
Light on the response criterion (F (1, 55) = 3.2634, p = .078). There was no main 
effect of HTA group (F (1, 55) = .372, p = .544), nor interaction of HTA group 
with Camera (F (1, 55) = .000, p = .996) or Light (F (1, 55) = .271, p = .605) on 
the response criterion. 
3.4 Discussion 
Experiment 2 investigated interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory 
perception accuracy in two conditions: self-focus and non-self-focus, as 
manipulated with a video camera being turned on or turned off, respectively. 
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Contrary to the predictions made at the beginning of the experiment, interoceptive 
somatosensation, as measured with a heartbeat tracking accuracy task, was not 
significantly affected by the self-focus manipulation. However, exteroceptive 
somatosensation, measured with the Somatic Signal Detection Task (SSDT), 
differed significantly between the two self-focus conditions. It should be noted 
that certain aspects of the SSDT paradigm were modified for purposes of 
investigating this research question—namely, the site of tactile stimulation, and 
respective position of the light in relation to the stimulated body part. Due to 
strong automatic integration of visual and tactile sensory modalities, the light in 
this modified version of the SSDT, which, importantly, was in the central visual 
field of the participant, retained its salience, and as expected, and in accordance 
with the SSDT paradigm, in both conditions the light’s occurrence enhanced 
tactile perception, as reflected by increased sensitivity and hit rate in light-present 
trials. Light presence also increased false alarm rate in the ‘‘camera off’’ 
condition, increasing the likelihood of participants reporting feeling a stimulus (as 
reflected by a more liberal response criterion in light-present as opposed to light-
absent trials). Importantly, the presence of a switched on camera also enhanced 
tactile perception, as reflected by increased sensitivity and higher hit rate in the 
‘‘camera on’’, as opposed to ‘‘camera off’’ condition. Further, in the ‘‘camera 
on’’ condition, the light did not have an effect on false alarm rate as it did in the 
‘‘camera off’’ condition, nor did the light increase hit rate as much in the ‘‘camera 
on’’ condition as it did in the ‘‘camera off’’ condition. Heartbeat tracking 
accuracy was not a significant moderator of SSDT performance. The only 
significant association between heartbeat tracking accuracy and SSDT measures 
was observed between heartbeat tracking accuracy and false alarm rate in the 
‘‘camera off’’, non-self-focus condition. 
To summarise, when the video camera was turned on, tactile perception 
was enhanced, as reflected by increased sensitivity and hit rate. Moreover, when it 
was turned on and recording, there was a lesser impact of light presence on hit 
rate and no effect of light on false alarm rate. The fact that the presence of the 
light improved hit rate to a larger degree when the camera was off than when the 
camera was on, as well as significantly increased false alarm rate only when the 
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camera was off and not when it was on, suggests that the self-focus condition 
during which the camera was on was powerful enough to override the effect of 
light on tactile perception. Importantly, the self-focus condition with the camera 
turned on did not affect the response criterion, consequently eliminating the 
possibility of differences in SSDT performance being due to mere change in 
tendency to report feeling a tactile stimulus, instead likely reflecting an actual 
change in sensitivity due to the camera manipulation. It should be noted that the 
‘‘camera on’’ condition might have diminished the effect of the light more easily 
as a result of an already weakened link between the visual and tactile sensory 
modalities (as compared to the original SSDT paradigm) brought about by a 
greater spatial distance between the sources of tactile and visual stimulation. As 
false alarm rates were lower in the present study than in the original SSDT 
paradigm, it is indeed likely that the magnitude of the light effect on tactile 
perception was smaller in the present study than in the original SSDT study by 
Lloyd et al. (2008). Nevertheless, it should be noted that multisensory integration 
is not narrowly constrained by spatial correspondence and there is a large body of 
research demonstrating cross-modal integration also when the sensory stimulation 
from the two modalities occurs in distinct locations (see Spence, 2013 for a 
review). Overall, the light in the current manipulation elicited the expected effect 
on tactile perception and the fact that this effect was diminished in the presence of 
the camera can be explained by the increase in tactile sensitivity due to heightened 
self-focus brought about by the turned on video camera. In interpreting these 
results, it can be suggested that the ‘‘camera on’’ condition evoked a cognitive 
shift from first to third person perspective in participants who, as a result of the 
‘‘camera on’’ manipulation, were primed with a third person representation of the 
self as if one sees oneself from the outside, and particularly their face (which was 
the focus of the camera), which, consequently, might have contributed to the 
enhancement of tactile perception on the face. The visual enhancement of touch 
(VET) effect is a well-studied phenomenon, which demonstrates that viewing a 
given body region improves tactile perception in that skin region (e.g., Kennett, 
Taylor-Clarke, & Haggard, 2001), by influencing processing in the early 
somatosensory cortex (e.g., Fiorio & Haggard, 2005). While participants in the 
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present study did not actually view their face, the video-camera being turned on 
might have primed thoughts of the face being viewed from the third person 
perspective (being previously told that the video recording of them performing the 
task could be watched by a third party), consequently, increasing sensitivity in 
detecting tactile stimuli in the “camera on”, but not the ‘‘camera off’’ condition 
through a mental imagery effect analogous to the VET.  
Contrary to the predictions made at the beginning of the study, the video-
camera manipulation did not affect interoceptive accuracy, as there was no 
difference in heartbeat tracking accuracy between the “camera on” and “camera 
off” conditions. As past research experiments by Ainley et al. (2012, 2013) found 
an increase in heartbeat tracking accuracy during mirror and still photograph self-
observation—also used to increase self-focus—the finding that camera induced 
self-focus did not affect heartbeat perception accuracy is surprising. It could be 
argued that the lack of an observed effect of the camera manipulation on heartbeat 
tracking accuracy could be due to the mode of self-focus elicited by the 
manipulation, which was social rather than private in nature. While mirror 
presence has been found to direct individual’s attention to inner aspects of the 
self, video camera manipulations have been found to draw attention to external, or 
social aspects of one’s self that are observable to others (Carver & Scheier, 1981). 
Accordingly, while mirror presence can enhance an individual’s perception of his 
or her inner body—a very private aspect of the self—a turned on video camera, on 
the other hand, might more selectively enhance tactile perception, which is the 
sensory modality through which individuals interact with the external world, 
hence, a sensory modality that is given a stronger weighting in the context of the 
social self-focus manipulation, thereby enhancing information processing 
associated with that modality. Even though the results of Baltazar et al. (2014) 
could be taken to suggest that social self-focus might increase correspondence 
between physiological arousal and subjective emotional experience by increasing 
interoceptive accuracy, it should be noted that the study by Baltazar et al. did not 
directly measure interoceptive accuracy, and consequently does not provide 
evidence for social self-focus increasing interoceptive accuracy. Of course, it is 
possible that cardiac interoceptive accuracy was affected by mere presence of the 
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video camera, which automatically enhanced self-focus, without much further 
difference between “camera on” and “camera off” conditions. The design of the 
present study, however, limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the data, as 
there was no third condition present in the design, in which the camera would be 
absent, or an independent baseline measure, which would allow such a 
comparison to be made. Another possibility might be that the video camera 
manipulation did not elicit self-focus sufficiently to increase cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy. A limitation of the current experiment is that the actual extent to which 
the camera manipulation increased self-focus was not explicitly measured. 
Individuals were not asked to report on whether they felt more focused on 
themselves, because the aim of the experiment was not necessarily to evoke a 
conscious increase in self-focus, and because the video camera is likely to 
increase self-focus in a way that the individual is not explicitly conscious of. 
Nevertheless, as cameras have been successfully used to elicit self-focus in past 
research (e.g., Burgio et al., 1986; Duval & Lalwani, 1999) and because the 
current manipulation did have a significant effect on tactile perception, as 
anticipated, it can be assumed that the manipulation was successful. In addition to 
investigating the effects of social self-focus on body perception, Experiment 2 
also examined the relationship between interoceptive and exteroceptive 
somatosensory perception. The data was analysed for potential moderating effects 
of heartbeat tracking accuracy on SSDT performance, after splitting the 
participants into two groups: higher and lower heartbeat tracking accuracy groups 
based on the sample median in the ‘‘camera off’’ condition. While there was no 
modulation of tactile perceptual performance present based on heartbeat tracking 
accuracy being higher or lower, it should be noted that the sample median was 
rather low, hence the two groups did not represent individuals truly high and low 
in cardiac interoceptive accuracy. Interestingly, a positive correlation between 
heartbeat tracking accuracy and false alarm rates in the ‘‘camera off ’’ condition 
was observed. This relationship was not reflected in the independent sample 
comparison results—most likely due to the heavily skewed distribution of false 
alarms, which included many values of zero, necessitating the use of non-
parametric statistical tests, which likely lacked in power to detect the difference. 
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As Knapp et al. (1997) found a direct association between heartbeat 
discrimination accuracy and vibrotactile perception accuracy, the hypotheses set 
out at the beginning of this chapter predicted a positive relationship between 
heartbeat tracking accuracy and tactile perception accuracy. It was hypothesised 
that individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy would display higher 
sensitivity, higher hit rate, and lower false alarm rate on the SSDT than 
individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. However, heartbeat tracking 
accuracy was not related to sensitivity in detecting threshold tactile stimuli or to 
hit rate. Instead, heartbeat tracking accuracy was inversely related to the rate of 
false alarms on the SSDT. It has been proposed that increased attention to 
interoceptive stimuli might contribute to the occurrence of false alarms by 
increasing sensory noise, thereby making it more difficult for an individual to 
distinguish between signal and noise (sensations originating outside and inside the 
body, respectively) when detecting a tactile stimulus (Mirams et al., 2013; Silvia 
& Gendolla, 2001). Mirams et al. (2012) found that directing individuals’ 
attention to pulse sensations in the fingertip increased individual propensity to 
report feeling a threshold tactile stimulus, nevertheless did not significantly affect 
sensitivity measures. Consequently, the results of that study suggest that 
interoceptive attention might bias individuals toward reporting tactile sensations 
in their absence, but do not entirely support the hypothesis that interoceptive 
attention contributes to individuals being less able to distinguish sensory noise 
from signal. It should be considered that in their experiment, Mirams et al. utilized 
an untypical interoceptive attention task in which they asked participants to focus 
their attention on pulse sensations in their fingertip. This methodology might 
account for an increased propensity to report having felt a tactile stimulus on the 
fingertip when completing the SSDT afterwards. Notably, in the present study, 
where a classic version of the task was employed, there was no effect of engaging 
in the heartbeat tracking task on SSDT performance, as indicated by a lack of task 
order effects in the data. Importantly, while Mirams et al. investigated overall 
effects of interoceptive attention on SSDT performance, they left unexamined the 
question of whether inter-individual variability in baseline interoceptive accuracy 
was related to tactile perception. While the results of the current study show that 
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individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy made more false alarms on the 
SSDT during the “camera off’’ condition, there was no association present 
between heartbeat tracking accuracy and sensitivity measures which would be 
more directly indicative of diminished ability to tell apart sensory signal from 
sensory noise.  
Even though false alarms on the SSDT have been associated with activity 
in the right insula and the anterior cingulate cortex (Poliakoff et al., in preparation, 
as cited in Mirams et al., 2013)—regions central to bodily attention and 
interoception (Craig, 2003; Critchley et al., 2004)—more empirical evidence is 
needed to test whether increased interoceptive accuracy interferes with 
exteroceptive processing of bodily signals—especially, given the evidence for the 
contrary, where individuals with higher cardiac interoceptive accuracy have been 
shown to be less susceptible to the Rubber Hand Illusion (Tsakiris et al., 2011). 
The Tsakiris et al. study suggests that individuals with higher cardiac 
interoceptive accuracy are less susceptible to interference from exteroceptive 
signals in their perceptual experience. Nevertheless, individuals with higher 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy would then be expected to show enhanced 
exteroceptive somatosensory perception, and more specifically, increased 
sensitivity on the SSDT, which is also not supported by the current study’s data 
inasmuch as there was no relationship observed between heartbeat tracking 
accuracy and tactile sensitivity measures. Consequently, further research is needed 
to establish the exact nature of the relationship between interoceptive and 
exteroceptive somatosensory processing, especially under various top-down 
influences—an empirical question that will be addressed in the studies that will be 
described in the following chapters of this thesis.  
To conclude, Experiment 2 investigated the effect of social self-focus on 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy, as measured with a heartbeat tracking accuracy 
task, and on exteroceptive somatosensory processing, as measured with the 
Somatic Signal Detection Task. The results show that heartbeat tracking accuracy 
was not affected by the video camera being turned on, relative to the ‘‘camera 
off’’ condition, which enhanced only tactile perception. Essentially, it can be 
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concluded that social self-focus, as manipulated with a video camera being turned 
on or turned off, enhanced bodily perception in the exteroceptive tactile modality. 
Unlike mirrors, which have been found to evoke private self-focus by directing 
attention to private aspects of the self, video cameras have been found to direct 
attention to social aspects of the self that are external and observable to others 
(Davies, 2005). Therefore, the effect of social self-focus on tactile perception, and 
not on heartbeat perception, could be perhaps attributed to the inherently social 
aspect of tactile processing. Even though the effect of the switched on video 
camera on exteroceptive somatosensory processing was not modulated by cardiac 
interoceptive accuracy, heartbeat tracking accuracy was positively correlated with 
false alarms in the ‘‘camera off’’ condition. This finding is consistent with recent 
research showing that false alarm responses on the SSDT are associated with 
activity in the interoceptive centres of the brain—the right insula and the ACC 
(Poliakoff, in preparation, as cited in Mirams et al., 2013), nevertheless, these 
results do not shed further light on the nature of the relationship between cardiac 
interoceptive accuracy and exteroceptive somatosensory processing such as tactile 
processing, as there were no significant correlations between heartbeat perception 
accuracy and any of the other SSDT outcome measures present in the data. 
Consequently, further research is necessary to determine the nature of the 
relationship between interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory perception 
accuracy. Chapter 4 describes two studies: Experiment 3, investigating the effect 
of social exclusion on heartbeat tracking accuracy and Experiment 4 examining 
both non-painful and painful tactile perception after social exclusion, as it related 
to heartbeat tracking accuracy. Chapter 4 investigates stability of heartbeat 
tracking accuracy under another negative affect-inducing social evaluative 
experience—one in which an individual experiences social exclusion. Experiment 
3 thereby examines an emotional context that is different from anticipatory social 
anxiety, but at the same time retains the negative affective quality as well as a 
social evaluative component.  
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Chapter 4: Stability of Interoceptive Accuracy After Social 
Exclusion—the Relationship Between Social and Physical 
Pain3 
4.1 Introduction 
The need for social affiliation is one of the most important and 
fundamental human needs. Evolutionarily, belonging to social groups carried 
several advantages in terms of survival and reproductive opportunities and success 
(Brewer, 2004). Consequently, it is not surprising that humans display strong 
negative reactions to social exclusion and rejection. Long-term social isolation 
and loneliness have been associated with depression and other negative health 
outcomes such as increased mortality (e.g., Steptoe, Shankar, Demakakos, & 
Wardle, 2013) and enhanced risk of immune dysregulation (e.g., Jaremka et al., 
2013). Even small-scale social rejection in a computerised ball-tossing game, 
Cyberball (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000; Williams & Jarvis, 2006)—a 
paradigm developed to study social ostracism in an experimental setting—can 
impact individual’s psychological and physiological state. A few minutes of being 
Cyber-ostracised can significantly increase negative affect and lower one’s sense 
of belonging, control, meaningful existence and self-esteem (see Williams, 2009 
for a review)—independently of factors such as monetary gains and costs 
associated with ball possession (Van Beest & Williams, 2006) or the desirability 
of the ostracisers (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). Social exclusion has also 
been found to bring about a significant drop in skin temperature (IJzerman et al., 
2012), while both, heart rate deceleration (Gunther Moor, Crone, & Van der 
Molen, 2010) and acceleration (Iffland, Sansen, Catani, & Neuner, 2014) have 
been observed in response to exclusion. 
The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the anterior insula (see 
                                                
 
3 Experiment 3 has been published as Durlik, C. & Tsakiris, M. (2015). Decreased interoceptive 
accuracy following social exclusion. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 96, 57-63. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2015.02.020. 
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Eisenberger, 2012a, 2012b)—brain regions associated with interoception (Craig, 
2009) and with the affectively distressing component of physical pain (Rainville, 
2002)—have been shown to be activated in individuals experiencing Cyberball 
exclusion. The fact that insula activity has been linked to the affective component 
of physical pain as well as to emotional pain evoked by social rejection (see 
Eisenberger, 2012a, 2012b for a review) suggests that interoceptive processes 
might be crucial in linking physical and emotional pain systems. Pollatos, Füstös 
and Critchley (2012) observed that individuals with higher heartbeat tracking 
accuracy displayed higher sensitivity and lower tolerance to cutaneous pressure 
pain than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy (cf. Werner, Duschek 
et al., 2009b). Moreover, Pollatos and colleagues found that individuals with 
higher heartbeat tracking accuracy exhibited more autonomic reactivity in 
response to pain, and rated the painful sensations as significantly more unpleasant 
than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking accuracy. The results of Pollatos et 
al. suggest that high interoceptive accuracy is associated with higher sensitivity to 
pain and an increased affective (as opposed to sensory) response to pain, which is 
in line with neuroimaging evidence linking the insular and anterior cingulate 
cortices to the affective-motivational dimension of pain (Rainville, 2002). 
Importantly, sensitivity to physical pain has been observed to predict self-
reports of distress in response to social exclusion, while social exclusion has been 
found to predict unpleasantness ratings of subsequently delivered physically 
painful stimuli (Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman, & Naliboff, 2006). DeWall and 
colleagues (2010) found that the impact of social rejection can be reduced by 
acetaminophen—a chemical agent used to alleviate physical pain—as reflected by 
reduced dACC and anterior insula activation in response to Cyberball rejection in 
individuals taking the analgesic. However, social exclusion has also been 
associated with a numbing response where there is a decrease in physical pain. 
DeWall and Baumeister (2006) observed that anticipated aloneness can bring 
about decreased sensitivity to physical pain, as reflected by higher pain thresholds 
and higher pain tolerance in the experimental condition (Experiment 1-4). The 
body typically undergoes changes in response to a physical threat, which enable 
the body to carry out an appropriate action—for example, when faced with severe 
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physical threat the body might release analgesics numbing the body, aiding in 
flight from attack despite any sustained injuries (MacDonald, Kingsbury, & Shaw, 
2005). Considering the significant overlap of neural networks involved in social 
and physical pain, it seems likely that a system capable of detecting and 
responding to social pain evolved by piggybacking onto the pre-existing physical 
pain system, utilising the pain signal to mark the threat of social disconnection 
and to prompt social reconnection (Panksepp, 1998). 
4.2 Experiment 3 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Because Experiment 1 observed that heartbeat tracking accuracy increased 
in response to a stressful negative affective experience of public speaking 
anticipation, Experiment 3 investigated whether heartbeat tracking accuracy 
would be affected by the stressful negative affective experience of social 
exclusion. Because social exclusion has been found to bring about increased 
activity in the anterior insula (Cacioppo et al., 2013; Eisenberger 2012a, 2012b), 
which, in turn, has been associated with enhanced interoceptive accuracy (e.g., 
Critchley et al., 2004) and because previous research has found interoceptive 
accuracy to be directly associated with the intensity of emotional experience (e.g., 
Pollatos, Traut-Mattausch et al., 2007), it was hypothesised that social exclusion 
during the Cyberball game would bring about increased interoceptive accuracy—
as reflected by an increase in heartbeat perception accuracy from pre- to post-
Cyberball in excluded, but not in included individuals. It was hypothesised that 
the increase in heartbeat tracking accuracy from pre- to post-Cyberball in 
excluded individuals would be positively correlated with self-reported distress 
following the exclusion. Previous research has found that individuals with lower 
baseline heartbeat perception accuracy, categorised with median splits, 
experienced greater subjective reactions to social exclusion (Werner, Kerschreiter 
et al., 2013), consequently, HTA group was included as a potential moderator 
when analysing the results. Additionally, as males and females have been 
sometimes observed to display reactions to Cyberball exclusion that were of 
differing magnitudes (e.g., Benenson et al., 2013; Bolling, Pelphrey, & Vander 
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Wyk, 2012; Iffland et al., 2014), the potential moderating effect of sex was 
examined. 
4.2.2 Methods 
4.2.2.1 Experimental Design 
The study utilised a mixed design with a within-subjects factor of Time 
(baseline, post-Cyberball) and between-subjects factor of Condition (excluded, 
included). Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Cyberball 
inclusion or Cyberball exclusion (see below description of Cyberball for details 
regarding the excluded and included conditions). The dependent measure of 
heartbeat tracking accuracy (HTA) was taken at baseline and post-Cyberball. The 
post-Cyberball Questionnaire, assessing the effectiveness of the manipulation, 
was administered after the Cyberball game.  
4.2.2.1.1 Cyberball 
The computerised ball tossing game (Williams et al., 2000) consisted of 30 
ball tosses in total, between the participant and 2 computerised players. 
Participants were asked to pose for a photograph to be taken. They were told the 
photograph would be displayed in a box beside their avatar, while they played the 
game, for the other participants to see. Photographs of the computerised players: 
Player 1 and Player 3 were taken from The Center for Vital Longevity Face 
Database (Minear & Park, 2004; obtained from: 
http://agingmind.utdallas.edu/stimuli/facedb/). Player 2 was the participant and 
the photograph of the participant was not visible on the screen during the game in 
order not to increase self-focus, which has been found to enhance heartbeat 
perception accuracy (Ainley et al., 2012, 2013).  In the included condition the 
tosses were distributed equally among the three players, with the participant 
receiving the ball on one third of the tosses (10 tosses in total), while in the 
excluded condition the participant received the ball 2 times, at the very beginning 
of the game (once from Player 1 and once from Player 3), after which the 
participant was excluded from the game while the ball was passed only between 
Player 1 and Player 3 for the remainder of tosses (28 tosses). Cyberball 4.0 
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(Williams, Yeager, Cheung, & Choi, 2012) was administered through the online 
survey software Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com), using the script obtained on 
www.cyberball.wikispaces.com 
4.2.2.2 Measures 
4.2.2.2.1 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy 
HTA was assessed using the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981), 
as outlined in Chapter 2. As in Experiment 2 the HTA assessment consisted of a 
three-trial block: 25-second, 35-second and 45-second trials. In the current 
experiment (Experiment 3), the POLAR RS800CX heart rate monitor was used 
(Polar Electro Oy, Kempele, Finland; sampling rate of 1000 Hz). Signals were 
analysed by the Polar ProTrainer 5 software (version 5.40.172), which relies on 
the HRV analysis software of the University of Kuopio, Finland (Niskanen, 
Tarvainen, Ranta-aho, & Karjalainen, 2004). POLAR products have excellent 
construct validity and instrument reliability, measuring heart rate and R-R interval 
data on par with electrocardiogram recorded data (e.g., Kingsley, Lewis, & 
Marson, 2005; Nunan et al., 2008; Quintana, Heathers, & Kemp, 2012; Weippert 
et al., 2010). Participants were instructed to lightly place the heels of their hands 
on the heart rate sensor that was attached to the desk in front of them and mentally 
count their heartbeats from the moment they received an audio cue signalling the 
start of the trial until they received an otherwise identical cue signalling the end of 
the trial and then to verbally report to the experimenter the number of heartbeats 
they have counted. Every participant was first presented with a 10-second training 
trial (during the first assessment only) and then with a pseudo-randomized block 
of 35-second, 25-second, and 45-second trials, with 20-second pauses in between 
the trials. During the whole duration of the task, participants’ true heart rate was 
monitored using the POLAR RS800CX. Throughout the task, participants were 
not permitted to take their pulse or to use any other strategy such as holding their 
breath. No information regarding the length of the individual trials or feedback 
regarding participants’ performance was given. All participants performed the 
heartbeat tracking task twice: at baseline and after the Cyberball game. 
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4.2.2.2.2 Post-Cyberball Questionnaire  
The post-Cyberball questionnaire was based on previous studies utilising 
the Cyberball paradigm (e.g., Williams et al., 2002; Zadro, Boland, & Richardson, 
2006) and assessed four fundamental needs (with five items per need): Belonging 
(e.g., “I felt like an outsider during the game”, reverse scored), Control (e.g., “I 
felt I had control over the course of the game”), Meaningful existence (e.g., “I felt 
meaningless”, reverse scored) and Self-esteem (e.g., ““I felt good about myself”). 
Eight items, retrospectively, assessed positive affect during the game: feeling 
“good,” “friendly,” “pleasant” and “happy”, and negative affect during the game: 
feeling “bad,” “unfriendly,” “angry” and “sad”. Additionally, three manipulation 
check questions were asked: participants reported how “ignored” and “excluded” 
they felt during the game, as well as estimated the percentage of total throws they 
think they have received during the game. All items, except for the last one, were 
rated on a continuous 5-point scale ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’. 
Additionally, at the end of the experiment participants were asked two debriefing 
questions about whether they thought, and felt like, they were playing against the 
computer or against real players. 
4.2.2.3 Procedure 
Upon arrival to the lab, participants were given information about the 
study that was essential to provide informed consent, but that did not disclose the 
real objectives of the experiment. After the participants signed an informed 
consent form the experiment begun. Participants were seated at a desk in front of 
a computer with an attached web-camera (the web-camera was used to take a 
photograph of the participant and was facing away from the participants during 
the remainder of the experiment) and begun by providing basic demographic 
information. Then, participants completed the first heartbeat tracking accuracy 
task (approximately 3 minutes prior to playing Cyberball), which served as a 
baseline interoceptive accuracy measure. Afterwards, participants were asked if 
they agree for the experimenter to take a photograph of them, which they were 
told would be displayed to other players with whom they would be playing a 
computerised ball-throwing game (Cyberball). After a photograph of the 
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participant was taken using a web-camera connected to the computer, participants 
read the standard Cyberball instructions (see Williams & Jarvis, 2006). 
Participants were told that they would be playing the game with other students 
currently online on the University of London network. Participants then played 
the game for about 2-3 minutes, during which they were either included or 
excluded by the other two players. Once the game came to an end, participants 
started the heartbeat tracking accuracy task for the second time (within 1 minute 
after finishing the Cyberball game). Then, participants completed the post-
Cyberball questionnaire and answered 2 questions assessing whether they 
believed they were playing against real players. The heartbeat tracking accuracy 
task was administered before the post-Cyberball questionnaire, due to a 
potentially short-lived fluctuation in heartbeat perception accuracy (e.g., Antony 
et al., 1995). The entire experiment was administered using the online survey 
software Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Upon completion of the experiment, 
participants were fully debriefed and informed about the real purpose of the study, 
and provided second-informed consent agreeing to let their data be used in the 
experiment after they have found out about the deception. See Figure 4-1 for a 
graphical depiction of the procedure. 
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4.2.2.4 Data Analysis 
4.2.2.4.1 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy Scores 
Heartbeat tracking accuracy (HTA) scores were calculated according to 
the standard formula: 
1/3 Σ (1-(| actual heartbeats – reported heartbeats |) / actual heartbeats).  
In the present study, Cronbach's α for the HTA task (based on the tracking 
accuracy scores of the three intervals) was α = .94 for the first assessment 
and α = .93 for the second assessment. Participants were categorised into two 
HTA groups, consisting of 30 persons with lower baseline HTA (M = .44, SD = 
.09) and 29 persons with higher baseline HTA (M = .76, SD = .12), using a 
 
Figure 4-1. Experimental procedure. 
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median split on the baseline HTA score (Mdn = .57). HTA scores were normally 
distributed, as indicated by a Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (W = .962, p = .066). 
See Figure 4-2 for a frequency distribution plot.  
 
 
Figure 4-2. Frequency distribution of pre-Cyberball HTA scores in Experiment 3. 
4.2.2.4.2 Average Heart Rate 
Average heart rate was calculated according to the following formula: 
 1/3 Σ ((actual heartbeats / length of time interval in seconds) * 60 
seconds) 
4.2.2.4.3 Post-Cyberball Questionnaire 
Items belonging to each of the four need subscales were summed (negative 
items were first reverse scored) to create four total scores of Belonging, Control, 
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Meaningful existence, and Self-esteem. Items assessing positive affect and items 
assessing negative affect were summed to create total positive affect and negative 
affect scores, respectively. The two items assessing how ignored and how 
excluded the participants felt were summed.  
4.2.2.4.4 Data Analysis Overview 
Manipulation check analyses tested for differences in post-Cyberball 
questionnaire scores between the included and excluded groups. Where the scores 
were normally distributed, independent samples t-tests were computed and where 
the scores were not normally distributed, Mann–Whitney U tests were computed. 
The effect of social exclusion versus inclusion on HTA scores and on HR was 
examined using two mixed ANOVAs, each with a within-subjects factor of Time 
(baseline, post-Cyberball) and between-subjects factors of Condition (excluded or 
included), Sex (male, female) and HTA group (lower HTA, higher HTA). 
Pearson's r (where both variables were normally distributed) and Spearman's rho 
(where one or both variables were not normally distributed) correlation 
coefficients were computed to examine the associations between changes in HTA, 
changes in HR and post-Cyberball questionnaire subscales. 
4.2.2.5 Participants 
Sixty-four (43 females; Mean age = 21.31; SD = 2.86) students at Royal 
Holloway, University of London took part in the experiment in compensation for 
£5. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions so that half of 
the participants were in the experimental condition (N = 32) where they were 
excluded while playing Cyberball and the other half of the participants were in the 
control condition (N = 32) where they were included while playing Cyberball. All 
participants were non-psychology students who were naïve to the Cyberball 
paradigm.  
4.2.2.5.1 Data Exclusion 
In order to ensure that individuals experienced the manipulation as 
intended, an outlier analysis was performed on manipulation check scores—i.e., 
retrospective reports of exclusion and mood (positive and negative affect) during 
 
 
110 
 
the game. Cases with scores 2 standard deviations above/below group mean on 
either exclusion or total mood scores were excluded from the main analysis, as 
they reported experiencing the game in an atypical manner in comparison to the 
vast majority of the sample (for example, reporting feeling highly included in the 
excluded condition, or reporting feeling highly excluded in the included 
condition). Three cases were excluded from the excluded group (reports of 
exclusion 2 standard deviations below the condition mean) and 2 cases were 
excluded from the included group (negative mood 2 standard deviations above the 
condition mean) with 59 cases remaining in total (29 in the excluded condition 
and 30 in the included condition).  
4.2.3 Results 
4.2.3.1 Post-Cyberball Questionnaire 
Average need subscale scores (Belonging, Control, Meaningful Excistence 
and Self-esteem) were significantly lower in the excluded group (mean = 10.81, 
SD = 2.83) than in the included group (mean = 17.32, SD = 2.33) (t (57) = -9.656, 
p < .001). Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to test for differences in the 
specific post-Cyberball questrionnaire subscales, as they were not normally 
distributed across all participants (with the exception of the Self-esteem and 
positive affect subscales, which were normally distributed across all participants, 
allowing for the use of independent samples t-tests). Bonferroni corrections for 
multiple comparisons were applied throughout the analysis. Participants in the 
exclusion condition reported significantly lower sense of Belonging (U = 39.000, 
Z = -6.018, p < .001), Control (U = 109.000, Z = -4.956, p < .001), Meaningful 
existence (U = 76.000, Z = -5.462, p < .001) and Self-esteem (t (57) = -5.403, p < 
.001) after the Cyberball game than participants in the inclusion condition. 
Moreover, participants in the exclusion condition reported feeling significantly 
more negative affect (U = 100.500, Z = -5.103, p < .001) and significantly less 
positive affect (t (57) = -6.053, p < .001) during the game than participants in the 
inclusion condition. Lastly, participants in the exclusion condition reported 
feeling significantly more excluded during the game (U = 10.500, Z = -6.549, p < 
.001) than participants in the inclusion condition, and estimated that they received 
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a significantly lower percentage of total throws during the game (U = .000, Z = - 
6.639, p < .001) than participants in the inclusion condition. Overall, the included 
and excluded groups differed significantly on all of the self-reported measures 
(see Table 4-1), confirming that the Cyberball manipulation was successful. Note 
that there were no significant differences between excluded male and female 
individuals, and between excluded individuals who had lower baseline HTA and 
higher baseline HTA, as indicated by p-values above .05 on a series of Mann-
Whitney U tests, and independent sample t-tests. 
Table 4-1. Means (and standard deviations) and medians (and ranges) of the post-
Cyberball questionnaire scores in the two conditions. 
 Excluded group (N = 29) Included group (N = 30) 
 Mean (SD) 
Median 
(range) 
Mean (SD) 
Median 
(range) 
Belonging 9.86 (3.56) 9.00 (14.00) 18.93 (3.44) 20.00 (12.00) 
Control 8.76 (3.23) 13.00 (13.00) 14.30 (3.40) 17.00 (12.00) 
Meaningful 
existence 
12.10 (4.03) 13.00 (17.00) 19.17 (2.82) 20.00 (10.00) 
Self-esteem 12.52 (3.16) 8.00 (10.00) 16.87 (3.03) 14.50 (14.00) 
Negative affect 10.86 (3.50) 9.00 (12.00) 5.93 (2.05) 13.50 (10.00) 
Positive affect 9.17 (3.02) 11.00 (12.00) 13.50 (2.45) 6.00 (8.00) 
Feeling 
excluded  
8.28 (1.60) 8.00 (6.00) 3.1 (1.16) 3.00 (4.00) 
Percentage of 
throws  
7.62 (3.5) 8.00 (13.00) 31.10 (6.49) 30.00 (26.00) 
Note: The two groups differed significantly on all scores at α = .001 (2-tailed). 
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4.2.3.2 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy 
HTA scores at baseline were not significantly different in the included and 
excluded groups (t (57) = 1.235, p = .222). Baseline and post-Cyberball HTA 
scores were both normally distributed and were analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed 
ANOVA with a within-subjects factor of Time (pre-Cyberball, post-Cyberball) 
and between-subjects factors of Condition (excluded or included), Sex (male, 
female) and HTA group (lower HTA, higher HTA). The results revealed a 
significant interaction effect of Time and Condition on HTA scores (F (1, 51) = 
7.017, p = .011, η2p = .121). Pairwise t-tests revealed a significant difference in 
HTA from pre- to post-Cyberball only in the excluded group, where HTA 
decreased significantly from pre- to post-Cyberball (t (28) = 2.468, p = .020, 
Cohen’s d = .203) and no significant difference in HTA from pre- to post-
Cyberball in the included group (t (29) = -.466, p = .644). The effect of Time on 
HTA in the excluded group remained significant after applying the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons (p = .05/2 = .025).  See Figure 4-3 for a 
graphical depiction of the interaction effect of Time and Condition on HTA.  
There was no main effect of Sex on HTA (F (1, 51) = .018, p = .895) and 
Sex did not moderate the interaction effect of Time and Condition on HTA (F (1, 
51) = 1.475, p = .230). HTA group also did not moderate the interaction effect of 
Time and Condition on HTA (F (1, 51) = .987, p = .325).  
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In order to ensure that the decrease in HTA from pre- to post-Cyberball 
observed in the excluded group was not due to change in average heart rate (HR), 
HR was analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with a within-subjects factor 
of Time (pre-Cyberball, post-Cyberball) and between-subjects factors of 
Condition (excluded or included), Sex (male, female) and HTA group (lower 
HTA, higher HTA). The results revealed a significant effect of Time on HR (F (1, 
51) = 7.049, p = .011, η2p = .121), as participants decreased in HR from baseline 
to post-Cyberball. Importantly, there was no significant interaction effect of Time 
and Condition on HR (F (1, 51) = 2.067, p = .157), indicating that all participants’ 
HR decreased by a comparable degree, suggesting that HR decrease was not due 
to the manipulation, but rather was brought about by a habituation to the lab 
setting. There was no main effect of Sex (F (1, 51) = .178, p = .675) and no 
interaction effect of Time, Condition and Sex (F (1, 51) = 2.040, p = .159) on HR. 
Although there was a significant main effect of HTA group on HR (F (1, 51) = 
16.591, p < .001, η2p = .245), there was no interaction effect of Time, Condition 
and HTA group (F (1, 51) = .569, p = .454) on HR. See Table 4-2 for means of 
 
Figure 4-3. Mean heartbeat tracking accuracy scores at baseline and post-
Cyberball in the excluded and the included groups along with respective standard 
errors of means. Note: * p < .05. 
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HTA and HR pre- and post-Cyberball in both groups. 
Table 4-2. Means (and standard deviations) of average heart rate (HR) in the 
excluded and in the included groups pre- and post-Cyberball. 
  HR Time 1 HR Time 2 
 Excluded 
group (N = 
29) 
Low HTA (N = 14) 79.83 (9.22) 79.09 (9.77) 
High HTA (N = 15) 71.08 (11.67) 70.71 (11.57) 
Overall 75.30 (11.29) 74.75 (11.38) 
 Included 
group (N = 
30) 
Low HTA (N = 16) 91.39 (11.49) 89.62 (10.44) 
High HTA (N = 14) 74.76 (13.80) 73.86 (12.88) 
Overall 83.63 (15.00) 82.26 (13.95) 
Note: Time 1: pre-Cyberball, Time 2: post-Cyberball. 
4.2.3.3 Relationship Between Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy and Other Dependent 
Measures 
In order to examine whether the decrease in HTA from pre- to post-
Cyberball in the excluded group was associated with change in HR or with post-
Cyberball questionnaire measures, Pearson’s r correlation coefficients were 
computed for analyses where both variables were normally distributed, and 
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients were computed for analyses where one or 
both variables were not normally distributed. Variables, which were not normally 
distributed within the excluded group, included the Control subscale, self-reported 
exclusion and the perceived percentage of throws received. Baseline HTA scores 
in excluded participants were not correlated with any of the need subscales, nor 
mood or exclusion measures. Baseline HTA scores were, however, negatively 
correlated with change in HTA (HTA post-exclusion – HTA baseline) with 
individuals with higher baseline HTA experiencing a bigger decrease in HTA 
from baseline to post-exclusion. Even though baseline HTA and baseline heart 
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rate (HR) were negatively associated, change in HTA was not significantly 
correlated with baseline HR, or with change in HR (HR post-exclusion – HR 
baseline), or with any of the need subscales, nor mood, or exclusion measures. 
See Table 4-3 for correlation coefficients.  
Table 4-3. Correlation coefficients between baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy 
(baseline HTA) and change in heartbeat tracking accuracy (change in HTA) and 
other dependent variables in participants in the exclusion condition.   
Variable 1 Variable 2 
 Baseline HTA Change in HTA 
Baseline HTA --- -.376* 
Change in HTA -.376* --- 
Baseline HR -.493** .171 
Change in HR -.018 -.248 
Belonging -.074 .014 
Control -.155 .015 
Meaningful existence -.113 .054 
Self-esteem -.021 .075 
Negative affect .138 .262 
Positive affect -.073 -.045 
Feeling excluded .187 -.204 
Percentage of throws .264 -.132 
Note: * correlation is significant at α = .05 level, ** correlation is significant at α 
= .01 level (2-tailed). Also, note that Spearman’s rho non-parametric correlations 
 
 
116 
 
were calculated for Control, Negative affect, Feeling excluded and Percentage of 
throws as these were not normally distributed. The remaining correlation 
coefficients are Pearson’s r coefficients. N = 29. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
Experiment 3 utilised the Cyberball paradigm to investigate the effect of a 
stressful negative affective experience of social exclusion on interoceptive 
accuracy, measured via heartbeat tracking accuracy (HTA). Because previous 
research found that social exclusion increases activity in the anterior insula 
(Cacioppo et al., 2013; Eisenberger 2012a, 2012b) and because anterior insula 
activation has been associated with enhanced interoceptive accuracy (e.g., 
Critchley et al., 2004), it was hypothesised that HTA would increase from pre- to 
post-Cyberball in individuals who were excluded, but not in individuals who were 
included, during the game. The results of Experiment 3 indicate that HTA 
remained unchanged in individuals who were included during the game, however, 
contrary to the hypothesis, HTA decreased from baseline to post-Cyberball in 
individuals who were excluded. Neither sex, nor HTA group moderated the effect 
of condition on change in HTA. Nevertheless, change in HTA in the socially 
excluded individuals was related to baseline HTA, with those higher in baseline 
HTA showing a greater decrease in HTA after the exclusion. Change in HTA was 
not due to change in heart rate—included and excluded individuals decreased in 
heart rate to the same extent, whereas HTA changed only in the excluded group. 
The change in heart rate, therefore, can be attributed to habituation to the lab 
setting. It should be noted that there was an effect of HTA group on heart rate and 
individuals with higher baseline HTA had lower heart rates, overall, than 
individuals with lower baseline HTA. This finding is in line with past research 
indicating a negative association between heart rate and heartbeat perception 
accuracy (Ainley et al., 2012; Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Knapp-Kline & 
Kline, 2005; Stevens et al., 2011), likely due to decreasing stroke volume of 
individual heartbeats with increasing heart rate (Schandry et al., 1993). Also, the 
change in HTA was not significantly associated with any of the post-Cyberball 
questionnaire subscales. It should be noted that it was essential to administer the 
post-Cyberball questionnaire after the heartbeat counting task due to a potentially 
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short lived effect of social exclusion on HTA, in comparison to the established 
robust effect of social exclusion on the post-Cyberball questionnaire measures. 
However, a limitation of the study is that due to the delay in the administration of 
the post-Cyberball questionnaire, the self-reports were more reflective rather than 
reflexive, which could, in turn, potentially account for the lack of a correlation 
between changes in HTA and self-reported affect after the game. Lastly, baseline 
HTA was not significantly associated with outcome variables measured post-
exclusion, which is contrary to previous findings (e.g., Werner et al., 2009b), and 
is likely due to the fact that the current sample did not include a sufficient number 
of individuals on the opposite ends of the spectrum with regards to their 
interoceptive accuracy scores. Taken together, these results suggest that social 
exclusion can decrease individual ability to accurately perceive cardiac 
interoceptive signals, such as heartbeats.   
The decrease in HTA observed in Experiment 3 contradicts studies 
indicating increased activity in the insula—the interoceptive centre of the brain 
(Craig, 2009)—in response to social exclusion (see Cacioppo et al., 2013). 
However, the HTA decrease observed in Experiment 3 can be explained using 
previous research on the nature of social exclusion and its physiological and 
behavioural effects. One possibility is that decreased accuracy in detecting 
interoceptive signals might reflect a numbing response to social exclusion. 
Evidence for numbing effects of socially painful experiences comes from a series 
of experiments by DeWall and Baumeister (2006) who found that anticipated 
aloneness can bring about decreased sensitivity to physical pain, as reflected by 
higher pain thresholds, and higher pain tolerance in the experimental condition, 
lesser emotional sensitivity, as reflected by lesser empathising with another 
person’s physical and social pain, as well as decreased affective forecasting. In 
line with these results, it could be suggested that, in Experiment 3, individuals 
experienced social pain during the game, which then induced a pain-induced 
analgesic response. This hypothesis would also be in line with studies showing an 
inverse relationship between HTA and pain thresholds or pain tolerance levels 
(Pollatos et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it should be considered that DeWall and 
Baumeister used a different social exclusion paradigm than Experiment 3, and 
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studies investigating the effect of Cyberball exclusion on physical pain perception 
suggest that there is a heightening, rather than numbing, of physical pain 
following social pain (Eisenberger et al., 2006). Bernstein and Claypool (2012) 
suggest that exclusion severity might determine whether hyper- or hypo-
sensitivity to physical pain follows, with pain sensitization being associated with 
exclusion of lesser severity, and pain numbing being associated with highly severe 
exclusion. As there was no measure of physical pain in Experiment 3, it cannot be 
ascertained whether the participants experienced physical pain numbing or 
heightening following social exclusion. Consequently, the following experiment 
(Experiment 4) investigates the relationship between interoceptive and pain 
processing changes following social exclusion.  
4.3 Experiment 4 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Experiment 3 found that heartbeat tracking accuracy decreased from pre- 
to post-Cyberball in individuals who were excluded, but not in individuals who 
were included, during the game. This decrease in heartbeat tracking accuracy can 
be interpreted in the context of the pain overlap theory (Eisenberger et al., 2006), 
potentially constituting a form of an analgesic response that is a consequence of 
the socially painful experience of being socially excluded. Research evidence 
indicates that social exclusion can be followed by a numbing response reflected 
by decreased sensitivity to physical pain (e.g., DeWall & Baumeister, 2006). Even 
though heartbeat tracking accuracy has been found to be negatively correlated 
with pain thresholds and pain tolerance at rest (Pollatos et al., 2012), the 
relationship between changes in heartbeat tracking accuracy and changes in pain 
perception in response to a stressful negative affective experience has not been 
examined. The present study (Experiment 4) investigated heartbeat tracking 
accuracy and a pain perception both before and after a Cyberball game, during 
which participants were included or excluded. It was hypothesised that, as in 
Experiment 3, heartbeat tracking accuracy would decrease from pre- to post-
Cyberball in excluded individuals, but would remain unchanged in included 
individuals. It was hypothesised that pain thresholds would increase, while pain 
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intensity and pain unpleasantness ratings would decrease from pre to post-
Cyberball in excluded individuals, but would remain unchanged in included 
individuals. Lastly, it was hypothesised that in the excluded group, the change in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy from pre- to post-Cyberball would be inversely 
related to change in pain thresholds and directly associated with change in pain 
intensity and pain unpleasantness ratings from pre- to post-exclusion. Both painful 
and non-painful electrical stimuli were delivered during the pain assessment task 
in order to determine whether the potential effect of exclusion on pain sensitivity 
would be specific to the perception of painful exteroceptive signals, or whether it 
would generalise to the perception of exteroceptive signals that are both painful 
and not.  
4.3.2 Methods 
4.3.2.1 Experimental Design 
The study utilised a mixed design with a within-subjects factor of Time 
(pre-Cyberball, post-Cyberball) and between-subjects factor of Condition 
(excluded, included). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: included or excluded. See section 4.2.2.1.1 for a description of 
Cyberball and for details regarding the excluded and included conditions. The 
dependent measures of HTA, pain threshold and shock ratings were taken pre-
Cyberball and post-Cyberball. The post-Cyberball questionnaire was administered 
post-Cyberball. The order of the HTA task and the pain assessment task (pain 
threshold measurement and shock intensity and unpleasantness ratings) was 
counterbalanced across all participants both pre- and post-Cyberball (four possible 
task orders). 
4.3.2.2 Measures 
4.3.2.2.1 Post-Cyberball Questionnaire 
See section 4.2.2.2.2 for description of the Post-Cyberball Questionnaire. 
4.3.2.2.2 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy 
HTA was assessed using the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981) 
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outlined in Chapter 2. In this experiment, the assessment consisted of a three-trial 
block: 25-second, 35-second, and 45-second, trials, presented in a random order. 
As Experiment 3 used the POLAR RS800CX heart rate monitor during the HTA 
assessment, Experiment 4 aimed to replicate the effect found in Experiment 3 
using the piezo-electric pulse transducer (PowerLab 26T, AD Instruments, UK) to 
monitor participants’ true heart rate. 
4.3.2.2.3 Electrical Stimulation 
Electric shocks were delivered through two constant current electrical 
stimulators (DS7A, Digitimer) via two couples of surface electrodes placed in 
close proximity on the participants’ left inner wrist. The shocks were single 
constant current rectangular monophasic pulses with duration of 2-ms. Each pair 
of electrodes was connected to one constant current electrical stimulator. One 
stimulator delivered low intensity shocks and the other stimulator delivered high 
intensity shocks. The two pairs of electrodes were placed in close proximity so 
that the shocks from both stimulators occurred in locations on the wrist that were 
indiscriminable to the participant. Shock intensities were based on individual pain 
thresholds obtained during the threshold procedure at the beginning of each pain 
perception assessment (see section 4.3.2.2.3.1 below). Based on the procedure of 
Sawamoto et al. (2000), low intensity shocks were set to an intensity of 70% of 
the pain threshold intensity and high intensity shocks were set to an intensity of 
170% of the pain threshold intensity so that the high intensity shocks were below 
pain tolerance level and the low intensity shock were below pain threshold level, 
but above perceptual threshold level. During the pain perception task, 5 low 
intensity shocks and 5 high intensity shocks were delivered in random order. 
Participants were not informed about the intensity of each upcoming shock. One 
second after shock delivery, the participant was asked to rate shock intensity on a 
scale from 0 (not at all strong) to 10 (very strong) and shock unpleasantness also 
on a scale from 0 (not at all unpleasant) to 10 (very unpleasant). Each question, 
along with the rating scale, was displayed on the screen in front of the participant, 
one at a time. Participant was asked to answer each question verbally and the 
answers were recorded by the experimenter. The order in which the two shock 
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rating questions were administered was counterbalanced across participants. In 
every trial, a white fixation cross was displayed on the screen from the beginning 
of the trial until the shock rating questions were displayed. The stimuli were 
controlled and presented with Matlab software.  
4.3.2.2.3.1 Establishing the Pain Threshold 
The pain threshold was set through a staircase procedure. Participants 
received 2-ms shocks on the inner left wrist also in non-fixed time intervals and 
were asked to verbally report whether the stimulus was painful: ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
Once a pain threshold was found, 5 shocks of the pain threshold intensity and 5 
shocks of an intensity below the pain threshold intensity were delivered in random 
order, and participants were asked to verbally report whether each shock was 
painful: ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In case participant’s responses did not indicate that the 
shocks of the pain threshold intensity were painful and that the shocks of the 
intensity below pain threshold intensity were not painful, the thresholding 
procedure, as described above, was resumed. The pain threshold was always 
calibrated using the same electrical current stimulator, within and across 
participants. 
4.3.2.3 Procedure 
Upon completion of demographic information reports, participants were 
connected to the electrodes and the pulse-transducer by the experimenter. The 
procedure followed the procedure of Experiment 3, with the exception of also 
including a pain assessment task before and after the Cyberball game (see section 
4.3.2.1 for details of counterbalancing order). During each pain assessment task 
(both pre- and post-Cyberball), the experimenter calibrated the pain threshold and 
set the low and high shock intensities accordingly. Then 5 high and 5 low 
intensity shocks were delivered uncued and in random order (see section 4.3.2.2.3 
for details). The entire experiment was administered using Qualtrics online survey 
software (www.qualtrics.com). As in Experiment 3, participants were fully 
debriefed and informed about the real purpose of the study upon completion of the 
study and provided second-informed consent agreeing to let their data be used in 
the experiment after they have found out about the deception. See Figure 4-4 for a 
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graphical depiction of the procedure.  
4.3.2.4 Data Analysis 
4.3.2.4.1 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy Scores 
Heartbeat tracking accuracy (HTA) scores were calculated using the 
standard formula: 
1/3 Σ (1-(| actual heartbeats – reported heartbeats |) / actual heartbeats). 
Participants were categorised into two groups, consisting of 30 persons 
with lower baseline HTA (M = .54, SD = .09) and 29 persons with higher baseline 
HTA (M = .89, SD = .08), using a median split on the baseline HTA score (Mdn = 
.72). HTA scores were not normally distributed, as indicated by a Shapiro-Wilk 
test of normality (W = .925, p = .001). See Figure 4-5 for a frequency distribution 
 
Figure 4-4. Experimental procedure. 
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plot.  
 
 
Figure 4-5. Frquency distribution of pre-Cyberball HTA scores in Experiment 4. 
4.3.2.4.2 Average Heart Rate 
Average heart rate was calculated according to the following formula: 
 1/3 Σ ((actual heartbeats / length of time interval in seconds) * 60 
seconds) 
4.3.2.4.3 Shock Intensity and Unpleasantness Ratings 
Mean scores were calculated for the intensity ratings of low intensity 
shocks, for the intensity ratings of high intensity shocks, for the unpleasantness 
ratings of low intensity and for the unpleasantness ratings of high intensity 
shocks. 
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4.3.2.4.4 Post-Cyberball Questionnaire 
As in Experiment 3, items belonging to each of the four need subscales 
were summed (negative items were first reverse scored) to create four total scores 
of Belonging, Control, Meaningful existence, and Self-esteem. Items assessing 
positive affect and items assessing negative affect were summed to create total 
positive affect and negative affect scores, respectively. The two items assessing 
how ignored and how excluded the participants felt were summed.  
4.3.2.4.5 Data Analysis Overview 
Manipulation check analyses tested for differences in post-Cyberball 
questionnaire scores between the included and excluded groups. Where the scores 
were normally distributed, independent samples t-tests were computed and where 
the scores were not normally distributed, Mann–Whitney U tests were computed. 
Correlation analyses were conducted to test for association between dependent 
variables (HTA, pain perception and post-Cyberball questionnaire scores). The 
effect of social exclusion versus inclusion on HTA scores, HR and pain 
perception was examined using mixed ANOVAs with within-subjects factors of 
Time (baseline, post-Cyberball) and between-subjects factors of Condition 
(excluded or included), Sex (male, female) and HTA group (lower HTA, higher 
HTA). 
4.3.2.5 Participants 
Sixty-three (42 females; mean age = 24.51, SD = 6.21) students at Royal 
Holloway, University of London took part in the experiment in compensation for 
£10. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions so that half of 
the participants were in the experimental condition (N = 32) where they were 
excluded while playing Cyberball and the other half of the participants were in the 
control condition (N = 31) where they were included while playing Cyberball. All 
participants were non-psychology students who were naïve to the Cyberball 
paradigm. 
 
 
 
125 
 
4.3.2.5.1 Data Exclusion 
As in Experiment 3, participants whose manipulation check measures 
(reports of exclusion and mood during the game) were 2 standard deviations 
above/below their group mean were excluded from the main analysis. Three cases 
were excluded from the excluded group (exclusion scores and negative affect 
scores over 2 standard deviations below the condition mean), and one case was 
excluded from the included group (negative affect score over 2 standard 
deviations above the condition mean) with 59 cases remaining in total (29 in the 
excluded condition and 30 in the included condition).  
4.3.3 Results 
4.3.3.1 Post-Cyberball Questionnaire 
Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to test for differences in the post-
Cyberball questrionnaire subscales, as they were not normally distributed across 
all participants (with the exception of the Self-esteem and positive affect 
subscales, which were normally distributed across all participants, allowing for 
the use of independent samples t-tests). Bonferroni corrections for multiple 
comparisons were applied throughout the analysis. Participants in the exclusion 
condition reported significantly lower sense of Belonging (U = 41.500, Z = -
5.984, p < .001), Control (U = 102.500, Z = -5.064, p < .001), Meaningful 
existence (U = 137.000, Z = -4.535, p < .001), and Self-esteem (t (57) = 5.053, p < 
.001) after the Cyberball game than participants in the inclusion condition 
Moreover, participants in the exclusion condition reported feeling significantly 
more negative affect (U = 108.500, Z = -4.982, p < .001) and significantly less 
positive affect (t (57) = 5.457, p < .001) during the game than participants in the 
inclusion condition. Lastly, participants in the exclusion condition reported 
feeling significantly more excluded during the game (U = 44.000, Z = -6.003, p < 
.001) than participants in the inclusion condition, and estimated that they received 
a significantly lower percentage of total throws during the game (U = 36.500, Z = 
- 5.937, p < .001) than participants in the inclusion condition. Overall, the 
included and excluded groups differed significantly on all of the self-reported 
measures (see Table 4-3 for means and standard deviations), confirming that the 
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Cyberball manipulation was successful. Note that there were no significant 
differences between excluded male and female individuals, and between excluded 
individuals who had lower baseline HTA and higher baseline HTA, as indicated 
by p-values above .05 on a series of Mann-Whitney U tests, and independent 
sample t-tests. 
Table 4-4. Means (with standard deviations) and medians (with ranges) for self-
reported scores in the excluded and included conditions. 
 Excluded group (N = 29) Included group (N = 30) 
 Mean (SD) 
Median 
(range) 
Mean (SD) 
Median 
(range) 
Belonging 9.76 (2.44) 10.00 (12.00) 18.33 (3.99) 18.50 (16.00) 
Control 8.07 (2.75) 10.00 (15.00) 14.07 (4.03) 16.00 (14.00) 
Meaningful 
existence 
11.97 (3.64) 12.00 (12.00) 17.47 (3.99) 17.50 (16.00) 
Self-esteem 11.17 (3.99) 7.00 (9.00) 16.33 (3.85) 15.00 (15.00) 
Negative 
affect 
12.55 (3.87) 9.00 (11.00) 6.90 (2.44) 14.00 (14.00) 
Positive affect 8.65 (2.57) 13.00 (16.00) 13.13 (3.63) 6.00 (8.00) 
Feeling 
excluded 
8.31 (1.42) 8.00 (5.00) 4.17 (1.78) 4.00 (6.00) 
Percentage of 
throws  
10.48 (6.53) 10.00 (29.00) 31.25 (10.63) 30.00 (60.00) 
Note: The two groups differed significantly on all scores at α = .001 (2-tailed). 
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4.3.3.2 Relationship Between Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy and Pain Perception  
Baseline heartbeat perception accuracy was not significantly correlated 
with pain thresholds or with the intensity and unpleasantness ratings of high and 
low intensity shocks (in all participants and pre-Cyberball). Spearman’s rho 
correlation coefficients (all of the variables were not normally distributed) are 
listed in Table 4-5.  
Table 4-5. Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients between heartbeat tracking 
acuracy (HTA), pain thresholds, intensity and unpleasantness ratings of high and 
low intensity shocks pre-Cyberball in all participants. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. HTA -      
2. Pain threshold -.037 -     
3. Intensity HS -.026 .193 -    
4. Unpleasantness 
HS 
-.228 .228 .721*** -   
5. Intensity LS .000 .137 .415** .176 -  
6. Unpleasantness 
LS 
-.111 .196 .349** .416** .749*** - 
Note: ***: correlation is significant at p <.001 (2-tailed), **: correlation is 
significant at p < .01 (2-tailed). HS: high intensity shocks; LS: low intensity 
shocks. N = 56. 
4.3.3.3 Relationship Between Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy, Pain Thresholds and 
Post-Cyberball Questionnaire Measures 
Baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy did not significantly correlate with 
self-reported measures of exclusion, as measured with the post-Cyberball 
questionnaire (see Table 4-6). However, baseline pain threshold was significantly 
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correlated with several post-Cyberball questionnaire scores post-exclusion. 
Specifically, higher baseline pain thresholds were associated with higher sense of 
Belonging (as a trend), Meaningful existence and Self-esteem following exclusion 
in the Cyberball game. Additionally, higher baseline pain threshold was 
associated with lower level of Negative affect and higher level of Positive affect 
following the exclusion (see Table 4-6). 
Table 4-6. Correlation coefficients between post-Cyberball questionnaire 
measures and baseline pain thresholds, and baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy 
(baseline HTA) in the excluded group.   
Variable 1 Variable 2 
 Baseline pain threshold Baseline HTA 
Belonging .330┼ -.142 
Control .283 .125 
Meaningful existence .507** .049 
Self-esteem .579** .005 
Negative affect -.531** .031 
Positive affect .523** -.114 
Feeling excluded -.092 -.213 
Percentage of throws -.092 .118 
Note: ** correlation is significant at p < .01 (2-tailed), ┼ correlation is 
significant at p < .10 (2-tailed). Also, note that Spearman’s rho non-parametric 
correlations were calculated for Baseline pain threshold, Control, Meaningful 
existence, Self-esteem, Feeling excluded and Percentage of throws as these were 
not normally distributed. The remaining correlation coefficients are Pearson’s r 
coefficients. N = 28. 
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4.3.3.4 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy  
HTA scores pre-Cyberball were not significantly different in the included 
and excluded groups as revealed by a Mann-Whitney U test (U = 385.000, Z = -
.758, p = .456) (note that baseline and and post-Cyberball HTA scores were non-
normally distributed). The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant effect of 
Task order on HTA pre-Cyberball (χ2 (3, 59) = 1.448, p = .694) and post 
Cyberball (χ2 (3, 59) = 1.668, p = .644). Because the pre- and post-Cyberball HTA 
scores were non-normally distributed, and the baseline scores were not 
significantly different between the included and excluded conditions, normally 
distributed HTA change (HTA post-Cyberball – HTA pre-Cyberball) scores were 
used in subsequent analyses of HTA.  A 2 x 4 ANOVA with the between-subjects 
factors of Condition and Task order was used to analyse change in HTA (HTA 
post-Cyberball – HTA baseline), revealing no significant effect of Task order on 
HTA change (F (3, 51) = .104, p = .958) and no significant interaction effect of 
Task order and Condition on HTA change (F (3, 51) = .818, p = .490).  
HTA change scores were analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects 
ANOVA with factors of Condition (included or excluded), HTA group (lower 
HTA, higher HTA) and Sex (male, female). The results revealed no effect of 
Condition on HTA change (F (1, 51) = .449, p = .506). There was no main effect 
of Sex on HTA change (F (1, 51) = 1.011, p = .320), no interaction effect of 
Condition and Sex on HTA change (F (1, 51) = .199, p = .657), and no interaction 
effect of Condition and HTA group on HTA change (F (1, 51) = .974, p = .328). 
In order to test for the effect of Time (pre-Cyberball, post-Cyberball) on HTA, 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests were conducted on HTA scores pre- and post-
Cyberball in the included and excluded groups. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
indicated no significant difference in HTA from baseline to post-Cyberball in 
included individuals (Z = -.195, p = .855) and in excluded individuals (Z = -1.027, 
p = .314). 
Average heart rate (HR) scores were square root transformed in order to 
normalise the data, and were subsequently analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 4 mixed 
ANOVA with within-subjects factor of Time (pre-Cyberball, post-Cyberball) and 
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between-subjects factors of Condition (excluded or included), Sex (male, female), 
HTA group (lower HTA, higher HTA) and Task order (4 possible orders). There 
was no main effect of Task order (F (3, 31) = .048, p = .986), no main effect of 
Sex (F (1, 31) = .471, p = .498), no interaction effect of Task order and Condition 
(F (3, 31) = 1.732, p = .181) and no interaction effect of Sex and Condition (F (1, 
31) = .129, p = .722) on HR so the factors of Task order and Sex were removed 
from the analysis. The resultant 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of Time on HR (F (1, 55) = 10.093, p = .002, ηp2 = .155) with participants 
decreasing in HR from pre- to post-Cyberball. There was no significant 
interaction effect of Time and Condition on HR (F (1, 55) = .002, p = .966) 
indicating that HR in both groups decreased by a comparable degree, suggesting 
the decrease was not due to the manipulation, but rather habituating to the lab 
setting. There was a significant main effect of HTA group on HR (F (1, 55) = 
.983, p = .011, ηp2 = .112), with individuals with lower HTA displaying higher 
HR than individuals with higher HTA. There was a significant interaction effect 
of Time, Condition and HTA group on HR (F (1, 55) = 6.119, p = .016, ηp2 = 
.100). After splitting the data by Condition, there was a significant interaction of 
Time and HTA group on HR in the excluded group (F (1, 27) = 8.862, p = .006, 
ηp2 = .247) and not in the included group (F (1, 28) = 1.992, p = .169). Pairwise t-
tests revealed a significant decrease in HR from pre- to post-Cyberball only in 
excluded individuals with lower HTA (t (14) = 4.115, p < .001) and not in 
excluded individuals with higher HTA (t (13) = .871, p = .399). See Table 4-7 for 
means and standard deviations of HTA and HR pre- and post-Cyberball in both 
groups. See Table 4-7 for means and standard deviations of heartbeat tracking 
accuracy scores and average heart rate pre- and post-Cyberball in both conditions.  
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Table 4-7. Means (with standard deviations) and medians (with ranges) of the 
heartbeat tracking accuracy (HTA) and average heart rate (HR) in the excluded 
and in the included groups pre- and post-Cyberball. 
 Excluded group (N = 29) Included group (N = 30) 
 Mean (SD) 
Median 
(range) 
Mean (SD) 
Median 
(range) 
HTA Time 1 .69 (.19) .68 (.60) .73 (.20) .76 (.58) 
HTA Time 2 .71 (.19) .75 (.60) .73 (.20) .74 (.64) 
HR Time 1 77.72 (14.89) 76.20 (63.22) 76.90 (10.38) 75.57 (44.72) 
HR Time 2 75.52 (12.49) 75.49 (58.63) 74.93 (11.15) 73.66 (52.20) 
Note: Time 1: pre-Cyberball, Time 2: post-Cyberball. 
4.3.3.5 Pain Perception  
4.3.3.5.1 Pain Thresholds 
Three outliers were identified with scores over 3.5 standard deviations 
above sample mean on both threshold values and were excluded from this analysis 
(2 in the included condition and 1 in the excluded condition) resulting in a total of 
56 cases being included in this analysis. The scores were transformed to normality 
using a square root transformation. Pain thresholds at baseline were not 
significantly different in the included and excluded groups as indicated by an 
independent samples t-test (t (54) = -.893, p = .376). The threshold values were 
entered into a 2 x 2 x 4 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with within-subjects factor of 
Time (baseline, post-Cyberball) and between-subjects factors of Condition 
(included, excluded), Task order (4 possible orders), Sex (male, female) and HTA 
group (lower HTA, higher HTA). As there was no significant effect of Task order 
(F (3, 30) = .384, p = .766) and no significant interaction effect of Task order and 
Condition (F (3, 30) = 2.813, p = .056) on thresholds, the factor of Task order was 
removed from the analysis. The resulting 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA revealed 
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no significant effect of Time (F (1, 48) = .014, p = .905) and no significant 
interaction of Time and Condition (F (1, 48) = .820, p = .370) on pain thresholds. 
There was no main effect of Sex (F (1, 48) = 3.209, p = .080), no interaction of 
Sex and Condition (F (1, 48) = .009, p = .924) and no interaction of Sex, 
Condition and Time (F (1, 48) = .064, p = .802) on pain thresholds. There was no 
main effect of HTA group (F (1, 48) = .765, p = .386), no interaction of HTA 
group and Condition (F (1, 48) = .979, p = .327) and no interaction of HTA group, 
Condition and Time (F (1, 48) = .825, p = .368) on pain thresholds. See Figure 4-
7 for a graphical depiction of the results. 
4.3.3.5.2 Shock Intensity and Unpleasantness Ratings 
Both intensity and unpleasantness ratings of the high intensity shocks pre-
Cyberball were not significantly different between the included and excluded 
groups (Z = -.788, p = .438 and t (42) = .870, p = .389, respectively), as well 
shock intensity and unpleasantness ratings of the low intensity shocks pre-
Cyberball were not significantly different between the included and excluded 
groups (Z = -.165, p = .875 and Z = -.436, p = .670, respectively). Note that both 
pre- and post-Cyberball high and low intensity shock intensity ratings were non-
 
Figure 4-6. Pain thresholds pre- and post-Cyberball in the included and excluded 
groups along with respective standard errors of means. 
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normally distributed and pre- and post-Cyberball low intensity shock 
unpleasantness ratings were non-normally distributed.  
4.3.3.5.2.1 High Intensity Shocks 
Intensity ratings of high intensity shocks (squared, in order to transform 
the scores to normality) were analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with a 
within-subjects factor of Time (pre-Cyberball, post-Cyberball) and between-
subjects factors of Condition (included or excluded), Sex (male, female) and HTA 
group (lower HTA, higher HTA). The results revealed no main effect of Time (F 
(1, 48) = 3.085, p = .085), no interaction of Time and Condition (F (1, 48) = .441, 
p = .510), no interaction of Time, Condition and Sex (F (1, 48) = 1.074, p = .305) 
and no interaction of Time, Condition and HTA group (F (1, 48) = .000, p = .996) 
on the intensity ratings of high intensity shocks. Also, there was no main effect of 
Sex (F (1, 48) = .334, p = .566) and no main effect of HTA group (F (1, 48) = 
.743, p = .393) on the intensity ratings of high intensity shocks. See Table 4-8 for 
means and standard deviations of the intensity ratings of high intensity shocks 
across conditions. 
Unpleasantness ratings of high intensity shocks were analysed in a 2 x 2 x 
2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with the same factors as above, revealing a main effect of 
Time (F (1, 48) = 4.141, p = .047, ηp2 = .079), with unpleasantness ratings of high 
intensity shocks increasing from pre- to post-Cyberball in all participants, 
regardless of participants’ group. There was no interaction of Time and Condition 
(F (1, 48) = .008, p = .928), no interaction of Time, Condition and Sex (F (1, 48) 
= .258, p = .614) and no interaction of Time, Condition and HTA group (F (1, 48) 
= .192, p = .663) on the unpleasantness ratings of high intensity shocks. Also, 
there was no main effect of Sex (F (1, 48) = 1.197, p = .279) and no main effect of 
HTA group (F (1, 48) = 1.400, p = .243) on the unpleasantness ratings of high 
intensity shocks. See Table 4-8 for means and standard deviations of the 
unpleasantness ratings of high intensity shocks across conditions. 
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Table 4-8. Mean intensity ratings (and standard deviations) and mean 
unpleasantness ratings (and standard deviations) of low intensity shocks and of 
high intensity shocks pre- and post-Cyberball in included and excluded groups. 
  Low Shock High Shock 
  Intense Unpleasant Intense Unpleasant 
Included 
group 
(N = 28) 
Pre-
Cyberball 
2.42 (1.58) 2.00 (1.50) 7.06 (1.45) 6.49 (1.49) 
Post-
Cyberball 
2.46 (1.79) 2.19 (1.67) 7.33 (1.55) 7.02 (1.43) 
Excluded 
group 
(N = 28) 
Pre-
Cyberball 
2.15 (1.11) 1.76 (1.21) 6.62 (2.04) 6.25 (1.72) 
Post-
Cyberball 
2.56 (1.25) 1.91 (1.25) 6.97 (2.13) 6.69 (1.80) 
 
4.3.3.5.2.2 Low Intensity Shocks 
Intensity ratings of low intensity shocks (square root transformed to 
normality) were analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with a within-subjects 
factor of Time (pre-Cyberball, post-Cyberball) and between-subjects factors of 
Condition (included or excluded), Sex (male, female) and HTA group (lower 
HTA, higher HTA). The results revealed no main effect of Time (F (1, 48) = .790, 
p = .379), no interaction of Time and Condition (F (1, 48) = 3.061, p = .087), no 
interaction of Time, Condition and Sex (F (1, 48) = 2.207, p = .144) and no 
interaction of Time, Condition and HTA group (F (1, 48) = .119, p = .731) on the 
intensity ratings of low intensity shocks. Also, there was no main effect of Sex (F 
(1, 48) = .205, p = .653) and no main effect of HTA group (F (1, 48) = .515, p = 
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.476) on the intensity ratings of low intensity shocks. See Table 4-6 for means and 
standard deviations of the intensity ratings of low intensity shocks across 
conditions. 
Unpleasantness ratings of low intensity shocks (also square root 
transformed to normality) were analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with 
the same factors as above, revealing no main effect of Time (F (1, 48) = .741, p = 
.394), no interaction of Time and Condition (F (1, 48) = .647, p = .425), no 
interaction of Time, Condition and Sex (F (1, 48) = 2.753, p = .104) and no 
interaction of Time, Condition and HTA group (F (1, 48) = .439, p = .511) on the 
unpleasantness ratings of low intensity shocks. Also, there was no main effect of 
Sex (F (1, 48) = .196, p = .660) and no main effect of HTA group (F (1, 48) = 
.648, p = .425) on the unpleasantness ratings of low intensity shocks. See Table 4-
6 for means and standard deviations of the unpleasantness ratings of low intensity 
shocks across conditions. 
4.3.4 Discussion 
Experiment 4 investigated the effect of a stressful negative affective 
experience of social exclusion on interoceptive accuracy (measured via heartbeat 
tracking accuracy) and on pain perception (measured via pain thresholds and 
intensity and unpleasantness ratings of high and low intensity shocks). As 
Experiment 3 found that heartbeat tracking accuracy decreased from pre- to post-
exclusion, it was hypothesised that the same effect of social exclusion on 
heartbeat tracking accuracy would be observed in Experiment 4. Experiment 4 
tested the hypothesis that the decrease in heartbeat tracking accuracy from pre- to 
post-exclusion observed in Experiment 3 was due to a numbing effect of social 
exclusion. This hypothesis was based on the findings of DeWall and Baumeister 
(2006), who observed a decrease in physical pain following social exclusion and 
on the results of Pollatos et al. (2012), indicating an inverse relationship between 
heartbeat tracking accuracy and sensitivity to pain. Consequently, it was predicted 
that, in Experiment 4, a decrease in heartbeat tracking accuracy and a decrease in 
pain sensitivity (as reflected by increased pain thresholds and decreased pain 
intensity and pain unpleasantness ratings) would be observed from pre- to post-
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Cyberball in the excluded, but not in the included individuals. It was hypothesised 
that change in heartbeat tracking accuracy and pain sensitivity in the excluded 
participants would be inversely related. 
Contrary to the predictions set out at the beginning of Experiment 4, social 
exclusion during the Cyberball game did not decrease heartbeat tracking accuracy. 
Social exclusion, furthermore, did not decrease pain sensitivity, as evidenced by 
unchanged pain thresholds and the intensity and unpleasantness ratings of high 
intensity shocks. Unpleasantness ratings of high intensity shocks increased from 
pre- to post-Cyberball in all individuals, regardless of inclusion/exclusion, likely 
reflecting time-related sensitisation to pain. This results of sensitisation to pain 
unpleasantness is in line with findings of Meulders, Vansteenwegen and Vlaeyen 
(2012) indicating sensitisation to electrocutaneous pain unpleasantness (and not 
pain intensity) occurring in females during pain conditioning. Meulders and 
colleagues suggest that this sensitisation effect might be due to increases in 
conditioned fear of pain throughout the experiment. As the present study 
(Experiment 4) also used a conditioning paradigm and electrocutaneous 
stimulation to induce pain (while the sample was predominantly female), it is 
likely that increased pain unpleasantness ratings in included and excluded 
participants reflect the pain unpleasantness sensitisation effect observed by 
Meulders et al.  
Interestingly, average heart rate decreased in individuals with low baseline 
heartbeat tracking accuracy from pre- to post-exclusion, but not in individuals 
with high baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy. Heart rate was unchanged in 
individuals who were included during the Cyberball game. The decrease in 
average heart rate from pre- to post-Cyberball in the excluded individuals might 
be a manifestation of heart rate deceleration in response to social exclusion that 
has been previously observed in research on the topic (e.g., Gunther Moor et al., 
2010). As individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy had average heart 
rates significantly lower than individuals with lower heartbeat tracking 
accuracy—in line with past research (e.g., Ainley et al., 2012; Stevens et al., 
2011)—it might be the case that individuals with high heartbeat tracking accuracy 
faced a ‘floor effect’, with their heart rates not decreasing as much following the 
 
 
137 
 
exclusion due to already being relatively low. It should be noted, however, that 
Experiment 4 did not aim to investigate the effect of social exclusion on heart 
rate, and consequently heart rate was not monitored during the Cyberball game, 
limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from the data.  
The results of Experiment 4 indicated that heartbeat tracking accuracy was 
not significantly correlated with sensitivity to pain at rest, as reflected by lack of 
significant associations between heartbeat tracking accuracy scores and pain 
thresholds as well as intensity and unpleasantness ratings of high and low 
intensity shocks. The lack of a relationship between heartbeat tracking accuracy 
and pain sensitivity observed in Experiment 4 is contrary to the results of Pollatos 
et al. (2012) who found a significant negative correlation between heartbeat 
tracking accuracy scores and pressure pain thresholds and pressure pain tolerance. 
However, it should be noted that an association between interoceptive accuracy 
and pain perception has not always been observed. For example, Werner et al. 
(2009b) failed to observe a significant relationship between cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy and the perception of heat pain. A potential reason for the disparate 
results of the present study, of the results of Pollatos et al. and of the results of 
Werner et al. might be the use of varying methods of pain assessment 
(electrocutaneous pain, pressure pain and heat pain, respectively). Even though it 
has been suggested that pain thresholds to different types of stimuli (i.e., heat, 
electric, pressure) measure the same phenomenon of general pain sensitivity (e.g., 
Neddermeyer, Flühr, & Lötsch, 2008), it might be the case that different pain 
modalities tap into distinct dimensions of nociception (Neziri et al., 2011). 
Consequently, consistent methodology in pain assessment and interoceptive 
accuracy assessment across experiments is necessary in order to establish the 
nature of the relationship between interoceptive accuracy and pain perception.  
As previous research found that the experience of social exclusion can 
activate an endogenous opioid system (Hsu et al., 2013) as well as be followed by 
decreased sensitivity to physical pain (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006), it was 
hypothesised that excluded, but not included, individuals in Experiment 4 would 
show increased pain thresholds and decreased intensity and unpleasantness ratings 
of high intensity shocks following the Cyberball game. The results of Experiment 
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4 indicated no effect of social exclusion on pain sensitivity. However, baseline 
pain thresholds were inversely related to the severity of the psychological 
response to social exclusion, as measured by the self-reported outcomes reported 
on the post-Cyberball questionnaire. This relationship between physical pain 
sensitivity and social pain sensitivity has been previously observed by Eisenberger 
et al. (2006), and likely is the manifestation of common mechanisms being 
involved in social and physical pain processing (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004). 
The findings of Experiment 4 indicating no effect of social exclusion on physical 
pain are contrary to the results of DeWall and Baumeister (2006), but also to other 
research evidence indicating pain sensitisation following social exclusion (e.g., 
Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). Bernstein and Claypool (2012) 
suggest that whether social exclusion leads to pain heightening or pain numbing 
might depend on the severity of the exclusion, observing that a more severe 
version of an exclusion manipulation led to higher pressure pain thresholds and 
tolerance levels, while a less severe version of the exclusion manipulation led to 
lower pressure pain thresholds and tolerance levels. While the exclusion paradigm 
might influence the effect of social exclusion on pain perception, other aspects of 
the methodology, such as pain modality measured, might account for disparate 
results across experiments investigating the effect of social exclusion on pain. 
Importantly, there might be a limit to social and physical pain overlap. More 
specifically, Riva et al. (2014) have observed that fear of physical pain and fear of 
social pain selectively affect the experience of physical and social pain, 
respectively, failing to find an effect of fear of physical pain on the experience 
social pain and vice versa. Additionally, a recent meta-analysis by Cacioppo et al. 
(2013) did not indicate a full overlap in the neural networks activated by social 
rejection and by physical pain, suggesting that the connection between social and 
physical pain systems might be more complex than previously thought. 
Consequently, Cacioppo and colleagues suggest that the neural network activated 
by social exclusion – reliably involving the anterior insula and the anterior 
cingulate – might be more reflective of “social uncertainty, rumination, distress, 
and craving rather than social pain per se” (p. 2). For further discussion of the 
limitations of the pain overlap theory, see Iannetti, Salomons, Moayedi, Mouraux 
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and Davis (2013).  
Finally, several inter-individual difference variables might moderate the 
effect of social exclusion on pain perception. For example, pain perception can be 
directly influenced by individual levels of pain catastrophising (Weissman-Fogel, 
Sprecher, & Pud, 2008) and fear of pain (Hirsh, George, Bialosky, & Robinson, 
2008), and therefore might also influence the way in which social exclusion 
affects pain perception. Moreover, as the way in which an individual relates to 
others (i.e., their attachment style) may influence his or her predictions about 
safety and threat (Krahé et al., 2013), attachment style might be a key factor 
moderating the effect of social exclusion on pain perception. Frías and Shaver 
(2014) found that attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance predicted pain 
sensitivity during a cold pressor task following exclusion in a Cyberball game, 
suggesting that the effect of exclusion on pain perception might be moderated by 
attachment style. Consequently, the fact that social exclusion did not affect pain 
sensitivity in Experiment 4 might be explained by unmeasured individual 
difference characteristics of the tested sample. 
4.4 General Discussion 
Experiment 3 examined the effect of social exclusion on heartbeat tracking 
accuracy, finding that individuals who were socially excluded while playing the 
Cyberball game displayed decreased heartbeat tracking accuracy following the 
game as compared to baseline. As social exclusion has been previously observed 
to bring about a numbing of physical pain, it was hypothesised that the decrease in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy after the exclusion might be reflective of bodily 
numbing induced by the experience of social pain. Experiment 4 aimed to test this 
hypothesis by measuring both heartbeat tracking accuracy and pain perception 
before and after social exclusion. However, Experiment 4 failed to replicate the 
decrease in heartbeat tracking accuracy from pre- to post-exclusion. Further, the 
results of Experiment 4 did not show a physical numbing effect in socially 
excluded individuals.  
It must be considered that Experiment 4 was not a direct replication of 
Experiment 3 and the lack of an effect of social exclusion on heartbeat tracking 
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accuracy in Experiment 4 does not invalidate the results of Experiment 3. 
Considering pain anticipation is inherently anxiety provoking, it could have 
increased heartbeat tracking accuracy, thereby cancelling out the decrease in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy evoked by social exclusion. The hypothesis that pain 
anticipation would impact heartbeat tracking accuracy is supported by evidence 
from brain imaging studies showing increased insula activity during pain 
anticipation (Chua et al., 1999; Ploghaus et al., 1999), and is explored in 
Experiment 5 described in the following chapter. Additionally, is possible that 
pain perception was affected by engaging in the cardiac interoceptive accuracy 
task. Pain is a highly subjective experience that is determined not only by bottom-
up perceptual input, but that is strongly conditional on top-down modulation by 
cognitive factors such as expectations and beliefs (see Atlas & Wager, 2012 for a 
review). As attention to the body has been proposed to be one of the factors 
affecting pain perception, as well as mediating the effect of pain anticipation on 
pain perception (Crombez, Van Damme, & Eccleston, 2005), it is a possibility 
that the heartbeat tracking task also had an effect on pain perception, although the 
direction of the potential effect is not certain. While some studies indicate that 
attention toward pain increases the experience of pain and attention away from 
pain decreases pain (Miron, Duncan, & Bushnell, 1989; Bantick et al., 2002), 
there is considerable evidence for the opposite, with results suggesting that 
increased bodily attention is associated with reduced pain (Leventhal, Brown, 
Shacham, & Engquist, 1979; Longo et al., 2009). These inconsistencies have been 
postulated to result from a variety of factors, including differential focus on the 
affective versus sensory aspects of pain, or the mode of somatic focus (Eccleston, 
1995; Seminowicz & Davis, 2007). These theories, however, fail to provide 
definite evidence for any single mechanism mediating the link between attention 
to, and perception of bodily signals and the experience of pain, necessitating 
further empirical investigation. The following chapter describes Experiment 5, in 
which the relationship between interoceptive accuracy and pain processing is 
further investigated.  
As Experiment 4 found no relationship between changes in heartbeat 
tracking accuracy and pain sensitivity following social exclusion, explanations 
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alternative to the numbing effect of social exclusion must be considered in 
interpreting the results of Experiment 3. As threat captures and holds attention 
(e.g., Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004), one 
could argue that the decrease in heartbeat tracking accuracy following Cyberball 
exclusion in Experiment 3 might have resulted from a lack of availability of 
attentional resources necessary to perform the heartbeat counting task, which, 
instead, were deployed to process the social threat of the exclusion. Consequently, 
an alternative explanation of the heartbeat tracking accuracy decrease following 
social exclusion observed in Experiment 3 might be a switch from relying on the 
predictive control system to relying on the reactive control system of the brain 
(Tops, Boksem, Luu, & Tucker, 2010; Tops, Boksem, Quirin, IJzerman, & Koole, 
2014). Tops and colleagues (2010, 2014) propose that the predictive control 
system—associated with the posterior medial-dorsal cortical system—processes 
familiar information and guides behaviour in familiar and highly predictable 
environments, while the reactive control system—tied to the anterior temporal-
ventrolateral prefrontal cortical system—processes novel, and salient stimuli in 
unpredictable environments. Tops and colleagues argue that the predictive system, 
being guided by internal models of self and others, is essential for internally 
directed cognition and self-reflection, and consequently, being able to access 
one’s own state, whereas the reactive system is guided by the experiential mode 
which is focused on the here and now, with environmental cues directing ongoing 
evaluation of action progress. As social exclusion constitutes a highly salient and 
threatening situation in which individuals must become more vigilant of the 
surroundings, it likely activates the reactive control system. This is supported by 
research on the effects of social exclusion on thermoregulation, which shows that 
socially excluded individuals show decreased skin temperature, most likely due to 
the reactive system increasing core body temperature, and decreasing skin 
temperature and blood flow to the extremities (see IJzerman et al., 2012). 
Consequently, in Experiment 3, social exclusion could have triggered a shift from 
predictive to reactive control, which could have caused attention to be oriented 
externally rather than internally, resulting in decreased accuracy in detecting 
internal bodily signals such as heart beats.  
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Finally, decreased self-focus and increased other-focus could be used to 
explain the results of Experiment 3. As social isolation constitutes a threat to the 
organism, socially rejected individuals are likely to engage in behavioral patterns 
aimed at reestablishing social bonds following rejection. For example, Lakin, 
Chartrand and Arkin (2008) observed that after being excluded in a Cyberball 
game, individuals mimicked a stranger to a larger degree than those who did not 
experience the social rejection. Further, Hess and Pickett (2010) found that 
individuals excluded during the Cyberball game showed reduced memory for self-
related social behaviours, and increased memory for other-related social 
behaviours, as compared to individuals included in the game. Overall, these 
results suggest that social exclusion can bring about a decrease in self-focus, and 
an increase in other-focus. While nonconscious mimicry and other affiliation-
increasing behaviours inherently rely on disengaging from the self and reengaging 
with the other, some researchers have suggested that decreased self-focus in an 
emotionally painful situation might also serve as a defence strategy in which the 
individual protects him or herself from aversive self-awareness (e.g., Twenge, 
Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003), which can bring about distressing thoughts about 
the self, in light of the socially painful situation (e.g., Heatherton & Baumeister, 
1991). However, Hess and Pickett (2010) highlight that by disengaging from the 
self, the individual can simultaneously avoid the distress brought about by social 
failure, while freeing attentional resources, which can then be allocated to others 
and the external world, with the aim to increase affiliation and improve the 
likelihood of social success in the future. As past research shows that conditions 
characterized by heightened self-focus are associated with enhanced heartbeat 
tracking accuracy (Ainley et al., 2012, 2013), it is likely that the decrease in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy following social exclusion observed in Experiment 3 
reflected decreased self-focus and increased other-focus following the exclusion. 
It should be noted that Experiment 3 did not measure other-focus. While it is 
likely that social exclusion during the Cyberball game brought about a decrease in 
self-focus, which in turn resulted in poorer heartbeat tracking accuracy, the exact 
nature of the mechanism behind this effect posits a topic for future investigation.  
Overall, Experiment 3 and 4 investigated the effect of a stressful negative 
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affective experience of being socially excluded on cardiac interoceptive accuracy, 
as measured by heartbeat tracking accuracy. Experiment 3 indicated a decrease in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy from pre- to post-Cyberball in the excluded, but not in 
the included, individuals. Experiment 4 tested the hypothesis that the exclusion-
evoked decrease in heartbeat tracking accuracy observed in Experiment 3 was a 
manifestation of a general pain numbing due to experiencing social pain. 
Experiment 4 measured heartbeat tracking accuracy and pain sensitivity both 
before and after the Cyberball game. The results of Experiment 4 indicated no 
change in heartbeat tracking accuracy or pain sensitivity due to social exclusion. 
Consequently, alternative explanations of the effect of social exclusion on 
heartbeat tracking accuracy observed in Experiment 3 were considered, including 
a shift from predictive to reactive system control as well as decrease in self-focus 
and increase in other-focus due to social exclusion. Even though the effect of 
social exclusion on heartbeat tracking accuracy was not replicated in Experiment 
4, it must be considered that Experiment 4 did not employ the same design as 
Experiment 3, introducing a very salient measure of pain anticipation of which 
could have influenced interoceptive accuracy. Experiment 5, described in the 
following chapter, directly examined the hypothesis that pain anticipation can 
affect heartbeat tracking accuracy. 
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Chapter 5: Stability of Interoceptive Accuracy During Pain 
Anticipation4 
5.1 Introduction 
Negative affective experiences of public speaking anticipation and social 
exclusion are social in character; the present study, Experiment 5, investigated the 
effect of stress and negative affect resultant from heightened physical, rather than 
social threat, on heartbeat tracking accuracy. Experiment 4 did not find an effect 
of social exclusion on heartbeat tracking accuracy that was observed in 
Experiment 3, which could be due to introducing a salient measure of pain 
assessment in Experiment 4, which could have increased stress and negative affect 
in individuals, potentially influencing heartbeat tracking accuracy as a 
consequence. Moreover, in Experiment 4, pain perception was not affected by the 
social exclusion manipulation, which is contrary to previous research on the topic 
(e.g., DeWall & Baumeister, 2006; Eisenberger et al., 2003). As pain perception is 
strongly modulated by top-down cognitive factors such as attention (Villemure & 
Bushnell, 2002)—including attention to the body (Eccleston, Crombez, Aldrich, 
& Stannard, 1997)—it is possible that the heartbeat tracking task, which directed 
attention to interoceptive bodily signals, also affected the perception of painful 
stimuli after social exclusion. As previous research has not examined the effect of 
pain anticipation on heartbeat tracking accuracy nor the effect of interoceptive 
attention on pain perception, Experiment 5 examined whether pain anticipation 
influences heartbeat tracking accuracy, while also investigating the effect of an 
interoceptive attention task (engaging in a heartbeat tracking task), as opposed to 
an exteroceptive attention task (engaging in an auditory tone counting task) and 
no attentional task, on pain perception. 
                                                
 
4 Experiment 5 is in revision as Durlik, C., Pincus, T., Cardini, F., & Tsakiris, M. (In preparation). 
Pain anticipation increases cardiac interoceptive accuracy: an experimental study.  
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As described in Chapter 4, interoception has been implicated in pain 
processing. Pain anticipation has been observed to activate the interoceptive 
centre of the brain, the anterior insula (Chua et al., 1999; Ploghaus et al., 1999). 
The anterior insula has been found to mediate the effect of cued anticipation on 
pain perception (Atlas, Bolger, Lindquist, & Wager, 2010) and the likelihood of a 
threshold pain stimulus being classified as painful can be predicted by increased 
cross-talk between the left anterior insula and the midcingulate cortex during the 
anticipation of that stimulus (Wiech et al., 2010). Moreover, activity in the insula 
has been associated with the pain-evoked increase in sympathetic autonomic 
nervous system activation (Critchley, Elliott, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000) and has 
been implicated in the affective component of the experience of pain (Rainville, 
2002). Consequently, Pollatos et al. (2012) suggest that the insula “serves as an 
interface between interoception, interoceptive sensitivity and pain processing” (p. 
1684). Nevertheless, while the insula has been implicated in pain anticipation and 
pain perception, few studies have directly investigated the relationship between 
interoceptive accuracy and pain processing.  
Two published studies (Pollatos et al., 2012; Werner et al., 2009b) and 
Experiment 4 of the current thesis investigated the relationship between heartbeat 
tracking accuracy and pain perception, producing varied results. While Pollatos 
and colleagues found that individuals with higher heartbeat tracking accuracy had 
lower pain thresholds and lower pain tolerance levels than individuals with lower 
heartbeat tracking accuracy, the results of the study by Werner et al. and the 
results of Experiment 4 indicated no significant differences in pain sensitivity 
between individuals low and high in heartbeat tracking accuracy. As the study by 
Pollatos et al., the study by Werner et al. and Experiment 4 of the current thesis 
measured pain sensitivity using different pain modalities (pressure, heat and 
electrical pain modalities, respectively), which might involve distinct aspects of 
nociception (Neziri et al., 2011), it might be the case that interoceptive accuracy is 
selectively related to pain sensitivity in some, but not all, nociceptive modalities. 
While more research is necessary to delineate the nature of the relationship 
between trait interoceptive accuracy and pain perception, research investigating 
state interoceptive accuracy in relation to pain processing is also lacking. 
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One study to date investigated the way in which state interoceptive 
accuracy is affected by the stressful negative experience of physical pain. Schulz, 
Lass-Hennemann et al., (2013) measured changes in heartbeat tracking accuracy 
and in heartbeat discrimination accuracy in response to a cold pressor task, in 
which individuals were instructed to leave their hands for 3 minutes in cold water 
(0-3°C), as compared to a control manipulation, in which individuals left their 
hands for 3 minutes in comfortably warm water (32-35°C). Schulz, Lass-
Hennenmann and colleagues observed that while heartbeat discrimination 
decreased, heartbeat tracking accuracy increased, in individuals who performed 
the cold pressor task. Schulz, Lass-Hennenmann et al. suggest that these 
discrepant results might be accounted for by the competition of cues model 
(Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980) and that the stressful experience of the cold 
pressor task might direct attention towards visceral signals, resulting in less 
attention being deployed on the processing of exteroceptive signals, which is 
required during the heartbeat discrimination task. As the cold pressor task has 
been widely used to experimentally induce mild to moderate thermal pain (Ahles, 
Blanchard, & Leventhal, 1983; Hodes, Howland, Lightfoot, & Cleeland, 1990; 
Leventhal et al., 1979; Meagher, Arnau, & Rhudy, 2001), the results of Schulz, 
Lass-Hennenmann et al. suggest that the experience of pain might increase 
heartbeat tracking accuracy. Nevertheless, because a social evaluative component 
was also part of the manipulation (presence of a camera and experimenter of 
opposite sex during the cold pressor task), it cannot be ascertained that the pain 
manipulation in itself (without the social component) would also increase 
heartbeat tracking accuracy. Additionally, as the heartbeat tracking measurement 
was present after the pain-inducing task, the results of the study by Schulz, Lass-
Hennenmann et al. do not provide information about the effects of pain 
anticipation on heartbeat tracking accuracy. As neuroimaging studies have 
demonstrated a certain degree of dissociation in neural activation associated with 
anticipation and perception of pain (Ploghaus et al., 1999) and non-painful 
emotional stimuli (Bermpohl et al., 2006), it remains to be investigated whether 
the effect of pain perception on interoceptive accuracy observed by Schulz, Lass-
Hennenmann et al. extends to pain anticipation. 
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It is not presently clear whether anticipation of painful stimuli itself affects 
state interoceptive accuracy. Johnston, Atlas and Wager (2012) observed that 
anticipation of heat pain improved heat discrimination, suggesting that the 
prospect of experiencing pain might enhance bodily perception. However, as heat 
sensations in the study by Johnston et al. were pain-relevant bodily signals, it is 
not clear whether pain anticipation would also increase the perception of bodily 
signals which are not directly pain relevant (e.g., heartbeats). It can be 
hypothesised that pain anticipation would increase interoceptive accuracy due to 
the negative affective character of the experience. Physically aversive stimuli 
increase negative affect and evoke strong psychophysiological reactions such as 
heightened autonomic arousal (see Kyle & McNeil, 2014 for a review), 
consequently, it is not surprising that the anticipation of pain evokes negative 
affective reactions such as fear and anxiety, activating interoceptive brain regions, 
which are also associated with negative affect and salience detection (Chua et al., 
1999; Ploghaus et al., 1999).  
The present study (Experiment 5) investigated the effect of pain 
anticipation on interoceptive accuracy, as measured by heartbeat tracking 
accuracy. Pain anticipation was manipulated using a cued anticipation paradigm, 
in which participants were visually cued to expect either a low intensity shock 
(below the pain threshold), a high intensity shock (above the pain threshold) or a 
shock of an uncertain intensity (either low or high intensity), which were then 
rated on their intensity and unpleasantness. Both, high intensity shock anticipation 
condition and uncertain intensity shock anticipation condition were included, as 
they manipulated fear of shock and anxiety about shock, respectively (Ploghaus, 
Becerra, Borras, & Borsook, 2003). A certain expectation of an aversive outcome 
has been associated with fear responding (aimed at dealing with impeding threat) 
and subsequent hypoalgesia), while uncertainty with regards to an aversive 
outcome (pertaining to its timing and occurrence) evokes anxiety and results in 
hyperalgesia (Ploghaus et al., 2003). Most studies investigating cued pain 
anticipation used uncertain cue conditions, manipulating threat of shock in order 
to engage attention and increase anxiety in participants; however, recent research 
indicates that uncertain cue conditions might be associated with neural responses 
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not necessarily indicative of dealing with pain anticipation and threat of pain 
(stimulus-targeted preparatory activity), but with coping with the affectively 
salient and aversive situation of anxiety and uncertainty (Seidel et al., 2015). As 
both of these affective contexts, fear and anxiety, are of interest in relation to state 
interoceptive accuracy, the present study (Experiment 5) utilised the cued pain 
anticipation paradigm employed by Seidel et al. (2015) (also drawing on 
Sawamoto et al., 2000).  
The 3 x 3 factorial design of the present study (Experiment 5) with within-
subjects factors of Anticipation cue (anticipation of a high intensity (painful) 
electric shock with 100% certainty, anticipation of a low intensity (non-painful) 
electric shock with 100% certainty and anticipation of an electric shock of an 
uncertain intensity (50% of the following shocks being painful and 50% of the 
following shocks being non-painful)) and Task during anticipation (heartbeat 
tracking task, auditory tone tracking task and no task) allowed for a controlled 
investigation of the effect of different anticipation conditions on heartbeat 
tracking accuracy and of the effect of the heartbeat tracking task on pain 
perception. As individuals performed the heartbeat tracking task in all three 
anticipation conditions, a direct comparison of the effect of fear induced by the 
certain pain anticipation condition and anxiety induced by the uncertain 
anticipation condition on heartbeat tracking accuracy was possible. It was 
hypothesised that interoceptive accuracy would be increased by the two 
affectively distressing conditions of pain fear and pain anxiety, as reflected by 
higher heartbeat tracking accuracy scores during anticipation of high intensity 
(painful) electric shocks and during anticipation of an electric shocks of uncertain 
intensity, as compared to anticipation of low intensity (non-painful) electric 
shocks. As heartbeat tracking accuracy scores as well as insula activity have been 
associated with the affective (ratings of pain unpleasantness), as opposed to 
sensory (ratings of pain unpleasantness) dimension of pain perception (Pollatos et 
al., 2012; Rainville, 2002), it has been considered that potential changes in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy in response to pain anticipation would be associated 
with higher pain unpleasantness (rather than intensity) ratings in the present study. 
Lastly, participants anticipated low, high and uncertain intensity shocks while 
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performing the heartbeat tracking task (directing attention to interoceptive 
signals), while performing an auditory tone tracking task (directing attention to 
exteroceptive signals) and while not being engaged in an explicit attentional task 
(no task condition), which allowed for an investigation of the effect of 
interoceptive versus exteroceptive attention on pain perception.  
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Experimental Design 
A 3 x 3 within-subjects factorial design was employed, with factors of 
Anticipation cue (low intensity shock anticipation, high intensity shock 
anticipation, uncertain intensity shock anticipation) and Task (heartbeat tracking 
accuracy task, auditory tone tracking task, no task). Participants performed a 
heartbeat tracking task (see section 5.2.1.1), an auditory tone tracking task (see 
section 5.2.1.2) and no task while being visually cued (see Figure 5-1a) to 
anticipate either a low intensity shock (below the pain threshold), a high intensity 
shock (above the pain threshold) or a shock of an uncertain intensity (either low or 
high intensity). See section 5.2.1.3 for details regarding shock intensity 
calibration. A total of 54 shocks were administered (see Table 5-2 for breakdown 
of trials): 27 high intensity shocks (18 following the high intensity shock cues and 
9 following the uncertain shock intensity cues) and 27 low intensity shocks (18 
following the low intensity shock cues and 9 following the uncertain intensity 
cues). The shocks were split into two blocks of 27 trials. Trial order was fully 
randomised within each block. The two blocks were administered in a 
counterbalanced order across participants. 
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Figure 5-1. Experimental design: a) anticipation cues and their associated shock 
intensities; b) auditory tone counting trial and heartbeat counting trial procedure; 
c) No task trial procedure.  Notes: LIC: low intensity shock cue, HIC: high 
intensity shock cue, UIC: uncertain intensity shock cue, LS: low intensity shocks, 
HS: high intensity shocks. 
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Table 5-1. Anticipation cue trials within each task condition. 
 Task during anticipation 
 
Heartbeat 
tracking 
Auditory tone 
tracking 
No task 
Total number of 
trials 
18 trials 18 trials 18 trials 
Trial breakdown 6 LIC trials 
6 HIC trials 
6 UIC trials  
(3 followed by LS 
and 3 followed by 
HS) 
6 LIC trials 
6 HIC trials 
6 UIC trials  
(3 followed by LS 
and 3 followed by 
HS) 
6 LIC trials 
6 HIC trials 
6 UIC trials  
(3 followed by LS 
and 3 followed by 
HS) 
Notes: LIC: Low intensity shock cue, HIC: High intensity shock cue, UIC: 
uncertain intensity shock cue. LS: low intensity shocks, HS: high intensity shocks.  
5.2.1.1 Heartbeat Tracking Task 
In line with previous experiments described in the current thesis, HTA was 
assessed using the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981). HTA was assessed 
at baseline, before the main experiment with a block of 25-second, 35-second, and 
45-second trials presented in a random order. During pain anticipation, HTA was 
assessed in 20-second, 25-second, 30-second, 35-second, 40-second and 45-
second trials in each of the three anticipation conditions (anticipation of a low 
intensity shock, anticipation of a high intensity shock, and anticipation of a shock 
of an uncertain intensity). Six trials were used during the cued pain anticipation 
task in order to ensure sufficiently high statistical power. Note that the 
anticipation of uncertain intensity shock trials were followed either by high 
intensity shocks or by low intensity shocks; having six HTA trials per anticipation 
condition allowed for low shocks preceded by the uncertain intensity shock 
anticipation cue and for high shocks preceded by the uncertain intensity shock 
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anticipation cue to be associated with three HTA trials each, allowing for an 
investigation of the effect of the HTA task on the perception of these shocks. 
Participants’ true heart rate during the HTA task was monitored using a piezo-
electric pulse transducer attached to the participant’s right index finger (PowerLab 
26T, AD Instruments, UK). 
5.2.1.2 Auditory Tone Tracking Task 
The auditory tone tracking task served as a control condition for the 
heartbeat tracking task (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos, Schandry et al., 2007; 
Wiebking et al., 2014; Zaki et al., 2012). During the auditory tone tracking task 
the participant was instructed to mentally count computer generated audio tones 
wile anticipating a low intensity shock, a high intensity shock or a shock of an 
uncertain intensity. The participant was instructed to count the number of audio 
tones that s/he heard from the moment s/he received an audio computer-generated 
cue of a recording of the word ‘go’, signaling the start of the trial, until s/he 
received a cue of a recording of the word ‘stop’, signaling the end of the trial and 
then to verbally report the number of audio tones s/he has counted to the 
experimenter. Within each anticipation cue condition there were 6 trials of 
auditory tone tracking lasting 20-s, 25-s, 30-s, 35-s, 40-s, and 45-s, corresponding 
to the lengths of the heartbeat tracking intervals. The audio tones had a frequency 
of 333 Hz and ranged from 60 tones per minute to 69 tones per minute with 
irregular inter-tone intervals, approximating the pace of an average heart rate. No 
information regarding the length of the individual trials, or feedback regarding 
participants’ performance was given.  
5.2.1.3 Electrical Stimulation 
As in Experiment 4, electric shocks were delivered through two constant 
current electrical stimulators (DS7A, Digitimer) via two couples of surface 
electrodes placed in close proximity on the participants’ left inner wrist. The 
shocks were single constant current rectangular monophasic pulses with duration 
of 2-ms. Each pair of electrodes was connected to one constant current electrical 
stimulator. One stimulator delivered low intensity shocks and the other stimulator 
delivered high intensity shocks. As the two pairs of electrodes were placed in 
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close proximity, shocks from both stimulators occurred in locations on the wrist 
that were indiscriminable to the participant. Shock intensities were based on 
individual pain thresholds obtained during the threshold procedure at the 
beginning of the experiment, and which was recalibrated between the two 
experimental blocks (see section 5.2.1.3.1). As in Experiment 4 and based on the 
procedures of Sawamoto et al. (2000) and Seidel et al. (2015), low intensity 
shocks were set to an intensity of 70% of the pain threshold intensity and high 
intensity shocks were set to an intensity of 200% of the pain threshold intensity so 
that the high intensity shocks were below pain tolerance level and the low 
intensity shocks were below pain threshold level, but above perceptual threshold 
level. It should be noted that Sawamoto et al. calibrated painful stimuli at 170-
200% of threshold intensity. In Experiment 4, high intensity shocks were 
calibrated at 170% of the threshold intensity, however, as the present experiment 
(Experiment 5) explicitly manipulated pain anticipation, high intensity shocks 
were set to 200% of threshold intensity to ensure that they experienced as painful. 
As in Seidel et al. (2015), it was ensured that the high shock intensity was below 
pain tolerance level and at a level that did not cause severe distress to the 
participant. 
5.2.1.3.1 Establishing the Pain Threshold 
The same procedure of calibrating the pain threshold that was used in 
Experiment 4 was used in the present study (Experiment 5). The pain threshold 
was set through a staircase procedure. Participants received 2-ms shocks on either 
location on the inner left wrist also in non-fixed time intervals and were asked to 
verbally report whether the stimulus was painful: ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Once a pain 
threshold was found, 5 shocks of the pain threshold intensity and 5 shocks of an 
intensity below the pain threshold intensity were delivered in random order, and 
participants were asked to verbally report whether each shock was painful: ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’. In case participant’s responses did not indicate that the shocks of the pain 
threshold intensity were painful and that the shocks of the intensity below pain 
threshold intensity were not painful, the threshold procedure, as described above, 
was resumed.  
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5.2.2 Measures 
5.2.2.1 Self-Reported Measures 
5.2.2.1.1 Fear of Pain 
Fear of pain was measured using the 9 item version of the Fear of Pain 
Questionnaire (FPQ-9; McNeil & Rainwater, 1998), consisting of three subscales: 
fear of minor pain, fear of major pain and fear of medical pain, with possible 
scores ranging from 9 to 45. 
5.2.2.1.2 Shock Intensity and Unpleasantness Ratings 
Participants were asked to rate shock intensity on a Visual Analogue Scale 
(VAS) ranging from 0 (not at all strong) to 10 (very strong) and shock 
unpleasantness also on a VAS scale from 0 (not at all unpleasant) to 10 (very 
unpleasant).  
5.2.2.1.3 Anxiety Ratings 
Participants were asked to provide retrospective ratings of anxiety 
experienced during each anticipation cue condition on a VAS scale ranging from 
0 (not at all anxious) to 10 (extremely anxious). 
5.2.2.2 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy Scores 
HTA scores obtained during the HTA task were the non-self-report 
dependent measure.  
5.2.3 Procedure 
Participants reported demographic information and completed the FPQ-9. 
The electrodes and the pulse-transducer were then connected by the experimenter 
and the baseline HTA assessment was completed. Then, the experimenter 
calibrated the pain threshold and set the low and high shock intensities 
accordingly. Prior to each experimental trial, information about which task was to 
be performed while anticipating the upcoming shock (heartbeat tracking task, 
auditory tone tracking task or no task) was displayed, along with a reminder that a 
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visual cue indicating which shock strength to anticipate will appear as soon as the 
trial begins. 
The shock was delivered 4-s, 5-s, 6-s, 7-s, 8-s or 9-s (counterbalanced 
across trials and conditions) from the moment the participant finished the task, or 
from the beginning of the trial in the no-task condition. As in Seidel et al. (2015) 
uncertainty about the exact timing of shocks was used across anticipation 
conditions to ensure engagement of attention during the entire task. One second 
after shock delivery the participant provided shock intensity and unpleasantness 
ratings (order counterbalanced across participants). In every trial the visual cue 
was displayed on the screen from the beginning of the trial until the shock rating 
questions were displayed. See Figure 5-1b-c for a graphical depiction of the trial 
structure in the heartbeat tracking task trials, auditory tone tracking task trials and 
no task trials. After the first experimental block, pain thresholds were recalibrated 
and shock intensities were adjusted accordingly. After the experiment, 
participants provided retrospective ratings of anxiety they experienced during the 
three cued anticipation conditions. Participants were then fully debriefed. The 
stimuli were controlled via a PC running NI LabVIEW 2011 software, which was 
also used to record participants’ responses. 
5.2.4 Data Analysis 
5.2.4.1 Fear of Pain Scores 
Fear of pain scores were calculated by summing the 9 items on the FPQ-9. 
The possible range of scores was from 9 to 45, and the sample mean was 26.862 
(SD = 4.918). The sample mean and standard deviation are for a sample of 40 
participants, as one participant did not complete the questionnaire.   
5.2.4.2 Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy Scores 
Mean HTA scores were calculated for baseline and for each of the three 
shock anticipation cue conditions: anticipating a low intensity shock, anticipating 
a high intensity shock, and anticipating a shock of uncertain intensity. HTA scores 
were calculated using the following formula: 
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1/number of trials Σ (1-(| actual heartbeats – reported heartbeats |) / 
actual heartbeats). 
Participants were categorized into two HTA groups, consisting of 20 persons with 
lower baseline HTA (M = .48, SD = .13) and 20 persons with higher baseline 
HTA (M = .79, SD = .09), using a median split on the baseline HTA score (Mdn = 
.67). HTA scores were normally distributed, as indicated by a Shapiro-Wilk test 
of normality (W = .973, p = .433). See Figure 5-2 for a frequency distribution plot.  
 
 
Figure 5-2. Frequency distribution of baseline HTA scores in Experiment 5. 
5.2.4.3 Average Heart Rate 
Average heart rate was calculated according to the following formula: 
 1/3 Σ ((actual heartbeats / length of time interval in seconds) * 60 
seconds) 
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5.2.4.4 Shock Intensity and Unpleasantness Ratings 
Mean shock intensity and mean shock unpleasantness ratings were 
calculated for all participants, separately for each of the 4 shock conditions: low 
intensity shock after anticipating a low intensity shock, high intensity shock after 
anticipating a high intensity shock, low intensity shock after anticipating a shock 
of an uncertain intensity and a high intensity shock after anticipating a shock of an 
uncertain intensity.  
5.2.4.5 Data Analysis Overview 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests examined differences in intensity and 
unpleasantness ratings of low and high intensity shocks and of shock preceded by 
the different anticipation cues.  The effect of anticipation task (heartbeat tracking, 
auditory tone tracking and no task) on pain perception was tested using 
Friedman’s non-parametric tests on the intensity ratings of high intensity shocks 
and on unpleasantness ratings of high intensity shocks. The effect of anticipation 
cue on HTA and HR was assessed using generalized linear mixed-effects models 
(GLMMs) with fixed factors of Anticipation condition (3 levels: low intensity 
shock, high intensity shock, unknown intensity shock), Fear of pain (continuous), 
and the interaction of Anticipation condition and Fear of pain. Participant 
identification numbers were entered into the model as a random effect because of 
the repeated measures design of the study, accounting for the interdependence of 
responses from the same subjects. Correlation analyses were conducted to explore 
associations between baseline HTA, HTA change, fear of pain and pain 
perception scores. 
5.2.5 Participants 
The sample consisted of 41 (38 females; Mean age = 18.65 years, SD = .66 
years) first year undergraduate psychology students at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. Each participant took part in the experiment voluntarily 
and received course credit in compensation.  
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5.2.5.1 Data Exclusions 
One participant was missing data on the Fear of Pain Questionnaire and 
was excluded from analyses involving this variable, which then resulted in a 
sample of 40 (37 females; Mean age = 18.65 years, SD = .66 years). 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Manipulation Check 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests confirmed that painful shocks were rated as 
significantly more intense (Z = -5.579, p < .001) and more unpleasant (Z = - 
5.579, p < .001) than non-painful shocks. High intensity shocks preceded by the 
high intensity shock anticipation cue were rated as more intense and more 
unpleasant than high intensity shocks preceded by the uncertain shock intensity 
anticipation cue (Z = -3.939, p < .001, Z = -3.581, p < .001, respectively). Low 
intensity shocks preceded by the low intensity shock anticipation cue were rated 
as less intense and less unpleasant than low intensity shocks preceded by the 
uncertain intensity shock anticipation cue (Z = -4.149, p < .001, Z = -3.743, p < 
.001). Non-parametric test statistics were calculated due to the data not being 
normally distributed. Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons were used 
when assessing for significance. Table 5-2 lists the median intensity and 
unpleasantness ratings per anticipation condition.  
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Table 5-2. Median intensity and unpleasantness ratings (and ranges) for low and 
high intensity shocks across anticipation conditions. 
Shock 
intensity 
Preceding 
cue 
Intensity VAS Unpleasantness VAS 
Low UIC 1.89 (4.56) 1.44 (3.33) 
 LIC 1.17 (4.83) 1.00 (3.39) 
 Total 1.64 (4.64) 1.25 (3.36) 
High UIC 6.89 (5.55) 6.67 (6.33) 
 HIC 7.22 (5.66) 6.78 (6.72) 
 Total 7.08 (5.61) 6.70 (6.53) 
Note: LIC: Low intensity shock cue, HIC: High intensity shock cue, UIC: 
uncertain intensity shock cue. VAS ratings of low and high intensity shocks are 
significantly different at α = .001 level (1-tailed).  
5.3.2 Effect of Anticipation on Pain Perception 
The effect of task (heartbeat tracking, auditory tone tracking and no task) 
on pain perception was tested using Friedman’s non-parametric tests on the 
intensity ratings of high intensity shocks and on unpleasantness ratings of high 
intensity shocks. Non-parametric analyses were used as shock ratings were not 
normally distributed. There were no significant differences in high intensity shock 
intensity ratings (χ2 (2, N = 41) = 1.252, p = .540) and unpleasantness ratings (χ2 
(2, N = 41) = 2.922, p = .233) based on preceding task. Additionally, there were 
no significant differences in low intensity shock intensity ratings (χ2 (2, N = 41) = 
6.959, p = .0316; note that p-value was non-significant after Bonferroni 
correction) and unpleasantness ratings (χ2 (2, N = 41) =2.392, p = .302) based on 
preceding task. 
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5.3.3 Associations Between Baseline Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy, Pain 
Thresholds and Fear of Pain 
The associations between baseline HTA, baseline pain thresholds and fear 
of pain were explored. The analyses indicated a non-significant trend in the 
association between baseline HTA and fear of pain. Baseline HTA and baseline 
pain thresholds were not correlated. Pain thresholds were negatively associated 
with fear of pain scores. This association remained significant after applying the 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (p = .05/3 = .017). See Table 5-3 
for correlation coefficients and respective correlation coefficients.  
Table 5-3. Associations (along with 95% confidence intervals) between baseline 
heartbeat tracking accuracy, baseline pain thresholds and fear of pain.  
 1. 2. 3. 
1. HTA 1 -   
2. Pain threshold 1 -.084 [-.381, .299] -  
3. FOP .266† [-.049, .533] -.419** [-.646, -.124] - 
Note: **: p < .01, †: p < .10. HTA 1: heartbeat tracking accuracy at baseline; 
Pain threshold 1: pain threshold at baseline; FOP: Fear of pain. Spearman’s rho 
correlation coefficients were computed for correlations involving Pain threshold 
1, as this variable was not normally distributed. N = 41 (for calculations 
including FOP, N = 40). 
5.3.4 Effect of Pain Anticipation Cue on Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy 
HTA difference scores (HTA during anticipation – HTA at baseline) were 
entered into a generalized linear mixed-effects model (GLMM) with fixed factors 
of Anticipation condition (3 levels: low intensity shock, high intensity shock, 
unknown intensity shock), Fear of pain (continuous), and the interaction of 
Anticipation condition and Fear of pain. Participant identification number was 
entered into the model as a random effect because of the repeated measures design 
of the study, accounting for the interdependence of responses from the same 
subjects. The analysis indicated that the overall model was significant (F (5, 114) 
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= 4.141, p = .002). A scatter plot of the observed values against the values 
predicted by the model indicated good model fit (R2 = 0.909). The effect 
Anticipation condition on HTA difference scores (F (2, 114) = 1.773, p = 0.174) 
and the effect of Fear of pain on HTA difference scores (F (1, 114) = 1.816, p = 
0.180) did not reach significance. The interaction effect of Anticipation condition 
and Fear of pain on HTA scores (F (2, 114) = 3.326, p = 0.039) was significant. 
Subsequent pairwise contrasts performed on HTA difference scores in each 
Anticipation condition on individuals low, medium and high in Fear of pain (as 
indicated by mean Fear of pain scores  ± 1SD: 26.86 ± 4.88) revealed a significant 
effect of Anticipation condition on HTA difference scores in individuals high in 
Fear of pain only (F (2, 114) = 9.203, p < 0.001), with HTA difference scores 
being the largest in high intensity shock anticipation condition, as compared to 
HTA difference scores in the unknown intensity shock anticipation condition (t 
(114) = 4.271, p < 0.001, contrast estimate = 0.35 (SE = 0.008), 95% CI [0.019, 
0.051]) and HTA difference scores in low intensity shock condition (t (114) = 
2.177, p = 0.032, contrast estimate = 0.027 (SE = 0.012), 95% CI [0.002, 0.051]). 
There was no significant difference in HTA difference scores between the 
unknown intensity shock anticipation condition and the low intensity shock 
anticipation condition (t (114) = -0.742, p = 0.460, contrast estimate = -.008 (SE = 
0.011), 95% CI [-0.031, 0.014]). There was no significant effect of the 
Anticipation condition on HTA difference scores in individuals with mean Fear of 
pain scores (F (2, 114) = 2.410, p = 0.094) or in individuals with low Fear of pain 
scores (F (2, 114) = 0.023, p = 0.978), although the effect could be interpreted as 
trending on significance in the mean Fear of pain group.  
In order to ensure that the effect of high intensity shock anticipation cue 
on HTA was not due to changes in average heart rate (HR), HR difference (HR 
during anticipation – HR at baseline) were also analysed in a GLMM testing for 
fixed effects of Anticipation condition, Fear of Pain and the interaction between 
them, while treating the participant identification number as a random factor. The 
overall model was significant (F (5, 114) = 4.718, p = 0.001), with a scatter plot 
of the observed values against the values predicted by the model indicating good 
model fit (R2 = 0.985). The main effect of Anticipation condition and interaction 
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effect of Anticipation condition and Fear of pain were significant (F (2, 114) = 
4.863, p = 0.009 and F (2, 114) = 3.455, p = 0.035, respectively). The effect of 
Fear of pain was not significant (F (1, 114) = 0.940, p = 0.334).  Subsequent 
pairwise contrasts revealed a significant effect of Anticipation condition on HR 
difference scores in individuals with low and mean Fear of pain scores (F (2, 114) 
= 9.203, p < 0.001, F (2, 114) = 4.097, p = 0.019, respectively) and not in 
individuals with high Fear of pain scores (F (2, 114) = 0.783 p = 0.460). In 
individuals low in Fear of pain, HR difference scores were smallest in the 
unknown intensity shock anticipation condition, as compared to the high intensity 
shock anticipation condition  (t (114) = 4.301, p < 0.001, contrast estimate = 1.380 
(SE = 0.321), 95% CI [0.745, 2.016]) and compared to the low intensity shock 
anticipation condition (t (114) = 3.779, p < 0.001, contrast estimate = 1.372 (SE = 
0.363), 95% CI [0.653, 2.090]). HR difference scores were not significantly 
different between the high intensity shock anticipation condition and the low 
intensity shock anticipation condition (t (114) = 0.028, p = 0.978, contrast 
estimate = 0.009 (SE = 0.318), 95% CI [-0.620, 0.638]). In individuals with mean 
Fear of pain scores, HR difference scores in the unknown intensity shock 
anticipation condition were significantly lower than in the high intensity shock 
anticipation condition (t (114) = 2.857, p = 0.005, contrast estimate = 0.764, (SE = 
0.267), 95% CI [0.234, 1.293]), but not than HR difference scores in the low 
intensity shock anticipation condition (t (114) = 1.102, p = 0.296, contrast 
estimate = 0.296 (SE = 0.268), 95% CI [-0.236, 0.827]). HR difference scores in 
the low intensity shock anticipation condition and the high intensity shock 
anticipation condition did not differ significantly (t (114) = -1.506, p = 0.135, 
contrast estimate = -4.68 (SE = 0.311), 95% CI [-1.084, 0.148]). 
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Table 5-5. Means (with standard deviations) and medians (with ranges) of 
heartbeat tracking accuracy scores and heart rate at baseline and during the three 
cued anticipation conditions. 
 HTA HR 
 Mean (SD) 
Median 
(range) 
Mean (SD) 
Median 
(range) 
Baseline .64 (.19) .67 (.76) 80.17 (14.96) 82.69 (70.63) 
Low intensity cue .70 (.17) .71 (.65) 79.95 (11.80) 82.38 (45.70) 
High intensity 
cue 
.71 (.17) .78 (.64) 80.25 (11.61) 81.64 (44.14) 
Uncertain 
intensity cue 
.69 (.17) .73 (.60) 79.48 (11.70) 79.48 (44.61) 
 
5.3.5 Associations Between Changes in Heartbeat Tracking Accuracy During 
Pain Anticipation and Self-Reported Measures 
In order to examine whether HTA difference scores due to shock 
anticipation were associated with the intensity and unpleasantness ratings of 
shocks in each condition, Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients 
were calculated (all the intensity and unpleasantness ratings were not normally 
distributed). HTA difference scores during high intensity shock anticipation were 
not significantly correlated with shock intensity (rs = .053, p = .745, 95 % CI [-
.262, .358]) or shock unpleasantness ratings (rs = -.028, p = .864, 95 % CI [-.336, 
.286]) of high intensity shocks. HTA difference scores due to low intensity shock 
anticipation were not significantly correlated with shock intensity (rs = -.101, p = 
.535, 95 % CI [-.399, .217]) or shock unpleasantness ratings (rs = -.280, p = .080, 
95 % CI [-.544, .034]) of low intensity shocks. Shock intensity ratings and shock 
unpleasantness ratings of low intensity shocks preceded by the uncertain shock 
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intensity cue were not significantly associated with HTA difference scores during 
their anticipation (rs = .092, p = .571, 95 % CI [-.225, .392]; rs = -.119, p = .464, 
95 % CI [-.415, .199], respectively). Shock intensity ratings and shock 
unpleasantness ratings of high intensity shocks preceded by the uncertain shock 
intensity cue were not significantly associated with HTA difference scores during 
their anticipation (rs = .041, p = .800, 95 % CI [-.274, .348]; rs = -.039, p = .811, 
95 % CI [-.346, .275], respectively).  
Table 5-6 lists the correlation coefficients (along with 95% confidence 
intervals) between HTA difference scores, and HTA baseline scores, retrospective 
anxiety scores and fear of pain scores. HTA difference scores in the high shock, 
low shock and unknown shock anticipation conditions were significantly 
negatively related to baseline HTA scores indicating that individuals with lower 
HTA experienced higher changes in HTA throughout the task. HTA difference 
scores during the task were not significantly associated with retrospective anxiety 
reports. Fear of pain scores were not significantly related to HTA difference 
scores in the low and high intensity shock anticipation conditions, but were 
marginally negatively related to HTA difference scores in the unknown intensity 
shock anticipation condition. After applying the Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons (p = .05/9 = .005), only the associations between HTA 
difference scores and HTA baseline remained significant. 
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Table 5-6. Associations (along with 95% confidence intervals) between heartbeat 
tracking accuracy baseline and difference scores across cued anticipation 
conditions and self-reported measures (retrospective anxiety reports across cued 
anticipation conditions and fear of pain scores) 
 Baseline HTA 
Retrospective 
Anxiety 
FOP 
1. HTA(D) 
LIC 
-.475** [-.685, -.192] .021 [-.292, .33] -.133 [-.426, .186] 
2. HTA(D) 
HIC 
-.492** [-.696, -.214] -.170 [-.457, .149] -.235 [-.509, .082] 
3. HTA(D) 
UIC 
-.497** [-.7, -.22] -.017 [-.326, .296] -.287† [-.549, .026] 
Note: **: p < 0.01, †: p < 0.10. HTA: Heartbeat tracking accuracy; (D): difference 
scores, LIC: Low intensity shock cue, HIC: High intensity shock cue, UIC: 
uncertain intensity shock cue; FOP: Fear of pain.  Non-parametric Spearman’s 
rho correlation coefficients were calculated for associations involving 
Retrospective Anxiety ratings associated with LIC and HIC as these variables 
were non-normally distributed. N = 40. 
5.4 Discussion 
Experiment 5 investigated changes in heartbeat tracking accuracy (HTA) 
as a function of cue-manipulated pain anticipation, while also examining potential 
differences in pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings based on the attentional 
task (heartbeat tracking task, manipulating interoceptive attention, as compared to 
an auditory tone tracking task, manipulating exteroceptive attention and to a no 
task condition) that was performed during anticipation. The results of Experiment 
5 indicated that HTA increased the in individuals with high fear of pain, during 
high intensity (painful) electric shock anticipation condition; In this group, HTA 
change during the high intensity shock anticipation condition was significantly 
larger than HTA change during the uncertain shock intensity anticipation 
condition and than HTA change during the low intensity (non-painful) shock 
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condition. It should be noted that in the low HTA group, HTA was significantly 
higher during the pain anticipation task, overall, in comparison to baseline. Larger 
HTA improvements in lower, as opposed to higher, baseline HTA individuals 
have been previously observed in research investigating state changes in HTA 
(e.g., Ainley et al., 2012). Importantly, changes in heart rate did not drive changes 
in HTA, as average heart rate difference scores did not differ significantly 
between the anticipation conditions or between anticipation task overall and 
baseline. The lack of heart rate changes was not taken as indicative of a failed 
manipulation, because studies on the effects of pain anticipation on heart rate 
show mixed patterns of responding with some individuals showing increases and 
others showing decreases in average heart rate due to pain anticipation (Willer, 
1975; Fazalbhoy, Birznieks, & Macefield, 2012). Additionally, changes in heart 
rate due to anticipation of pain can be moderated by various factors—for example, 
employment of emotion regulation techniques has been found to inhibit heart rate 
increases during pain anticipation (Braams, Blechert, Boden, & Gross, 2012)—
which were not measured during the experiment. Of course, it also has to be 
considered that changes in other cardiac parameters (e.g., stroke volume, blood 
pressure), which were not measured in the present study, could have accompanied 
changes in heartbeat tracking accuracy during pain anticipation. As average heart 
rate obtained from the heartbeat tracking trials of the interoceptive accuracy task 
are not a sensitive measure of cardiac and autonomic activity, future research 
should aim to investigate the interaction of autonomic reactivity during pain 
anticipation and changes in interoceptive accuracy by employing more sensitive 
measures of physiological reactivity.  
HTA change during the high intensity shock anticipation condition was 
not associated with pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings of the high intensity 
shocks preceded by high intensity shock anticipation cues. Importantly, high 
intensity shocks preceded by the high intensity shock anticipation (certain 
expectancy) cue condition were rated as significantly more intense and 
significantly more unpleasant than high intensity shocks preceded by the uncertain 
shock intensity anticipation cue condition. Low intensity shocks preceded by the 
low intensity shock anticipation (certain expectancy) cue condition were rated as 
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significantly less intense and significantly less unpleasant than low intensity 
shocks preceded by the uncertain shock intensity anticipation cue condition. There 
were no significant differences between ratings of intensity and unpleasantness of 
shocks preceded by the heartbeat tracking task, as compared to shocks preceded 
by an auditory tone tracking task and shocks preceded by no task. Additionally, 
baseline HTA was not associated with pain thresholds or pain intensity and 
unpleasantness ratings across conditions, which was contrary to the results of the 
study by Pollatos et al. (2012), but in line with the results of Werner et al. (2009b) 
and with the results of Experiment 4.  
It should be noted, however, that in Experiment 5, baseline HTA was 
marginally associated with fear of pain scores, which, in turn, were inversely 
related to pain thresholds. Future research should consider the possibility of fear 
of pain mediating the relationship between HTA and pain threshold and pain 
tolerance level via pain-related negative affect exerting a sensitising influence on 
pain perception. As HTA has been consistently linked with increased emotional 
reactivity (Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007) and elevated anxiety (see Domschke et 
al., 2010 for review), while negative affect has been linked to pain sensitisation 
(see Janssen, 2002 for review), it is possible that the relationship between HTA 
and pain perception might differ on an individual level, as a function of negative 
affect associated with the experience of pain. Overall, more research is needed in 
order to delineate the exact nature of the relationship between interoceptive 
accuracy and pain perception. Of course, as mentioned previously, different pain 
assessment methods in all four studies on the topic—Experiments 4 and 5 of the 
current thesis, the study by Pollatos et al. and the study by Werner et al—could 
also account for discrepant results, highlighting the importance of ensuring 
consistent methodological designs in the investigations on the topic, which can 
then ease cross-study comparisons. 
Importantly, the studies by Werner et al. and by Pollatos et al. focused on 
interoceptive accuracy and pain sensitivity as trait variables, leaving the role of 
state cardiac interoceptive accuracy in the experience of pain unexamined. The 
current study, Experiment 5, is the first study to examine the relationship between 
pain anticipation and pain perception in relation to state cardiac interoceptive 
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accuracy. Previous research has found anterior insula activity during pain 
anticipation (Chua et al., 1999; Ploghaus et al., 1999), and has established the 
anterior insula as being a critical mediator of the effect of cued anticipation on 
pain perception (Atlas et al., 2010). These findings, by extension, suggest that 
interoceptive perception and accuracy might also constitute an important 
mechanism involved in pain anticipation. Indeed, the results of Experiment 5 
indicate that pain anticipation heightens heartbeat tracking accuracy, expanding 
on previous studies which reported an enhancement in accurate bodily perception 
(improved heat discrimination) in individuals anticipating pain (Johnston et al., 
2012). The findings of Experiment 5 suggest that pain anticipation enhances 
processing of interoceptive signals, which might constitute an important 
mechanism through which the body prepares itself to deal with impeding threat. 
As enhanced heartbeat tracking accuracy during high intensity shock anticipation 
was associated with higher retrospective reports of anxiety experienced during 
those trials, it is likely that heightened heartbeat tracking accuracy in this 
condition was a result of a fear driven attentional bias to bodily sensations, in this 
case, extending to interoceptive sensations.  
Contrary to the hypotheses set out at the beginning of Experiment 5, the 
uncertain shock intensity anticipation cue condition, which can be interpreted as 
manipulating pain anxiety, did not bring about an increase in HTA, which was 
observed only during the high shock anticipation cue condition, which can be 
interpreted as manipulating pain fear (Ploghaus et al., 2003). The uncertain shock 
intensity anticipation cue condition was hypothesised to increase HTA as salient, 
uncertain and anxiety-provoking stimuli have been found to activate the anterior 
insula (Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 2013; Menon & Uddin, 2010; 
Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), which is the central brain region processing 
interoceptive information (Craig, 2009). A direct association between anxiety and 
interoceptive accuracy has been repeatedly observed (Domschke et al., 2010), 
whereas anticipatory anxiety evoked by the socially threatening experience of 
public speaking anticipation has been found to increase HTA (Experiment 1 of the 
current thesis), suggesting that increased anxiety due to pain anticipation could 
also increase HTA. Consequently, it might be considered to be surprising that 
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HTA change during uncertain shock intensity anticipation cue condition was not 
significantly different from HTA change during low intensity (non-painful) shock 
anticipation cue condition and was significantly lower than HTA change during 
high intensity (painful) shock anticipation cue condition. While it is possible that 
fear, rather than anxiety, associated with pain increases interoceptive accuracy, 
several other explanations of the observed pattern of results must be considered.  
Firstly, it is possible that the high shock anticipation condition did not 
evoke fear but instead evoked anxiety, whereas the uncertain shock anticipation 
condition also evoked anxiety, but to a lesser extent than the high shock 
anticipation condition. Note that increased pain perception has been associated 
with anxiety rather than fear, which has been observed to bring about reduced 
pain perception (Rhudy & Meagher, 2000). In Experiment 5 the intensity and 
unpleasantness ratings of high intensity (painful) shocks were significantly higher 
if the painful shocks were preceded by the high shock anticipation cues than if the 
painful shocks were preceded by the uncertain intensity shock anticipation cues. 
These findings can be contrasted with research indicating that uncertain pain is 
perceived as more intense and unpleasant than certain pain (Yoshida, Seymour, 
Klotzenburg, & Dolan, 2013), albeit being in line with findings of studies 
examining the effects of expectancies on pain, which observed pain perception to 
be biased in the expected direction (Brown, Seymour, Boyle, El-Deredy, & Jones, 
2008; Morton, El-Deredy, Watson, & Jones, 2010; Wiech et al., 2014). Finally, it 
has been shown that expected emotional events evoke enhanced neural responses 
in comparison to unexpected emotional events (Lin et al., 2012), which could be 
further used to explain the enhanced response to the high intensity shock 
anticipation condition, as compared to the uncertain intensity shock anticipation 
condition.  
Secondly, participants were informed of the number of high and low 
intensity shocks that were to be delivered during the experiment (because of 
ethical considerations) and that were associated with each type of cue, it is 
possible that the threat level associated with each anticipation cue was dependent 
on the number of high intensity shocks that the cue was associated with. As the 
uncertain intensity cue was associated with half of the number of high intensity 
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shocks that the high intensity cue was associated with, the uncertain intensity cue 
might have acted as a moderate threat signal, whereas the high intensity shock cue 
might have constituted a high threat signal. Varying levels of threat have been 
related to differential behavioural and neural responses (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Straube, Schmidt, Weiss, Mentzel, & Miltner, 2009). Whereas during moderate 
threat individuals tend to display avoidance behaviour, directing their attention 
away from the source of threat, which may lead to decreased pain (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998), during stronger threat, individuals tend to display preparatory 
behaviour, where they become more vigilant of expected threatening stimuli, 
which may lead to increased pain (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). Additionally, the interoceptive brain regions, the insular and anterior 
cingulate cortices, have been observed to show a linear response to anticipatory 
threat, with activation in these areas increasing from low to moderate to high 
threat (Drabant et al., 2011). Consequently, it is possible that the high intensity 
shock anticipation cue condition was subjectively perceived as more threatening 
and therefore induced higher levels of negative affect than the uncertain intensity 
shock anticipation cue condition, potentially increasing interoceptive accuracy to 
a larger extent. A limitation of the current study is that because there were no 
trial-by-trial measures of anxiety and perceived level of threat, it is not possible to 
ascertain that participants indeed experienced more negative affect and higher 
levels of threat during anticipation of the high intensity shocks as compared to 
anticipating shocks of an uncertain intensity. Future studies should replicate the 
pain anticipation paradigm of Experiment 5 to assess changes in HTA, while also 
administering a trial-by-trial assessment of perceived shock expectancy and 
anxiety that would allow to directly examine whether the level of certainty about 
the occurrence of a high intensity shock affects HTA. 
In summary, the main objective of Experiment 5 was to investigate the 
effect of a stressful negative affective experience that is not social in character 
(and which manipulates physical threat) on state interoceptive accuracy, as 
measured with HTA. Additionally, the study aimed to further examine the 
relationship between interoceptive accuracy and pain perception, while also 
testing for the effect of interoceptive attention manipulated by the heartbeat 
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tracking task on pain perception. As Experiment 1 found that an anxiety evoking 
manipulation that is social in character (public speaking anticipation) increased 
HTA, the hypotheses at the beginning of Experiment 5 predicted that an anxiety 
evoking manipulation that is not social (pain anticipation) would also increase 
HTA. This prediction was confirmed, as HTA changed to the largest extent during 
the high shock intensity anticipation condition. Importantly, the results of 
Experiment 5 provide a potential explanation for Experiment 4 not replicating the 
decrease in HTA in response to social exclusion that was found in Experiment 3. 
The results of Experiment 5 suggest that the lack of an effect of social exclusion 
on heartbeat tracking accuracy in Experiment 4 could have been due to 
simultaneous and cancelling each other out effects of social exclusion and of pain 
anticipation on heartbeat tracking accuracy HTA. As in Experiment 4, pain 
perception was also not affected by social exclusion (contrary to previous findings 
such as DeWall and Baumeister, 2006; Eisenberger et al., 2003) it was taken into 
consideration that engaging in the HTA task could have influenced pain 
perception. As pain perception is subject to top-down modulation by attention 
(Villemure & Bushnell, 2002)—including attention to the body (Eccleston et al., 
1997)—it is possible that the heartbeat tracking task, directing attention to 
interoceptive bodily signals, affected the perception of painful stimuli after social 
exclusion. However, the results of Experiment 5 showed that the heartbeat 
tracking task likely did not affect pain ratings in Experiment 4, as Experiment 5 
indicated that the intensity and unpleasantness ratings did not significantly differ 
based on preceding task during anticipation.  
To conclude, Experiment 5 shows that in addition to increasing due to 
anxiety in a social setting such as public anticipation (as observed in Experiment 
1), interoceptive accuracy, as measured by HTA, can increase due to anticipation 
of a non-social stressor that elicits anxiety via physical threat. Potential changes in 
HTA might be important in subsequently modulating pain perception. It should be 
noted that pain is a highly subjective experience that is determined not only by 
bottom-up perceptual input, but that is also strongly conditional on top-down 
modulation by cognitive factors such as expectations and beliefs (see Atlas & 
Wager, 2012 for a review). Attention to the body has been suggested to mediate 
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the effect of pain anticipation on pain perception (Crombez et al., 2005). 
However, because an association was not observed between HTA in the high 
intensity shock anticipation condition and the pain ratings of high intensity 
shocks, it is not clear whether increased HTA during pain anticipation would have 
an effect on subsequent pain perception. Future studies should aim to investigate 
whether changes in interoceptive accuracy during pain anticipation affect 
subsequent pain perception by employing a trial-by-trial analysis design. It is 
possible that pain anticipation independently affects state cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy and pain ratings by means of dissociated mechanisms. Specifically, one 
of the mechanisms might involve pain anticipation increasing body vigilance, 
thereby enhancing bodily signal perception and heightening cardiac interoceptive 
accuracy, while the other mechanism might affect the interpretation of the 
perceived bodily signals, as painful or not. The relationship between these two 
could, of course, vary as a function of prior pain expectancies, fear of pain, and 
learned pain-related behaviours, which vary both between and within healthy and 
clinical populations (Feuerstein & Beattie, 1995, Pincus, Smeets, Simmonds, & 
Sullivan, 2010), and while HTA was not associated with pain ratings in the 
current healthy sample, the association might be observed in clinical pain 
samples. Future research should employ trial-by-trial analysis of heartbeat 
tracking accuracy and pain ratings in healthy and clinical samples to carefully 
investigate this research question. Additionally, as high interoceptive accuracy has 
been linked to enhanced ability to downregulate negative affect in socially painful 
situations (Pollatos, Matthias, & Keller, 2015; Werner, Kerschreiter et al., 2013), 
it is possible that enhanced interoceptive accuracy when anticipating a painful 
stimulus can help downregulate the anxiety and negative affect associated with 
the expectation of impending unpleasant and distressing physical stimulus. Future 
research is needed, however, to ascertain this hypothesis.  
 
 
173 
 
Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1 Summary of Background and Aims 
Past investigations of interoceptive accuracy in relation to emotional 
experience have predominantly focused on the way in which inter-individual 
differences in interoceptive accuracy predict aspects of emotion processing (e.g., 
Herbert, Pollatos, & Schandry, 2007; Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007; Pollatos et al., 
2005; Pollatos, Traut-Mattausch et al., 2007). As interoceptive accuracy has been 
considered to be a stable, trait-like variable (Cameron, 2001; Schandry, 1981), 
state changes in interoceptive accuracy in response to emotional experience have 
been under examined. The current thesis addressed this gap in the literature, 
testing the hypothesis that in addition to being a trait variable, interoceptive 
accuracy also functions as a state variable, which is affected by negative affective 
and self-focus manipulating contexts. The focus on negative affective experiences 
in the present thesis was based on the evidence suggesting that interoceptive 
accuracy might change according to the physiological state (e.g., increased 
cardiovascular activity (Antony et al., 1995), hunger (Herbert, Herbert et al., 
2012), the affective state (e.g., experience of stress (Schulz, Lass-Hennemann et 
al., 2013; Sturges & Goetsch, 1996)) and the cognitive state (e.g., degree of focus 
on one’s self (Ainley et al., 2012, 2013) of the individual. Consequently, the 
present thesis examined changes in interoceptive accuracy in response to negative 
affective experiences manipulating social and physical threat as well as self-focus. 
State changes in exteroceptive somatosensory perception were also examined 
alongside interoceptive accuracy in several experiments comprising the present 
thesis in order to establish whether state changes in interoceptive accuracy 
generalise to the exteroceptive somatosensory modality. To summarise, the main 
aims of the series of experiments in the current thesis were to investigate: 
1) Does interoceptive accuracy change as a state variable in negative 
affective situations? 
2) What kind of negative affective situations change state 
interoceptive accuracy (e.g., situations characterised by social 
threat or by physical threat)? 
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3) How general/specific is the effect of negative affective states on 
state interoceptive accuracy? Does it extend to exteroceptive 
somatosensory perception accuracy or is it restricted to 
interoceptive bodily signal processing? 
6.2 Summary of Results 
Experiment 1 examined the stability of interoceptive accuracy during a 
stressful negative affective situation that elicited social anxiety via a public 
speaking anticipation manipulation. Heartbeat tracking accuracy was assessed in 
participants in the experimental and control conditions two times: at baseline and 
during anticipation. Participants in the experimental condition, in which they 
anticipated giving a speech in front of a small audience, displayed a significant 
increase in heartbeat tracking accuracy from baseline to anticipation. Participants 
in the control condition, in which they anticipated sharing their thoughts about a 
reading task, displayed no significant difference in heartbeat tracking accuracy 
from baseline to anticipation. The effect of public speaking anticipation on 
heartbeat tracking accuracy was not moderated by baseline heartbeat tracking 
accuracy, nor by fear of negative evaluation. Interestingly, increases in heartbeat 
tracking accuracy from pre- to post-manipulation, in the experimental group, were 
not significantly associated with increases in self-reported anxious mood from 
pre- to post-manipulation. However, increases in heartbeat tracking accuracy from 
pre- to post-manipulation in the experimental group were significantly correlated 
with fear of negative evaluation. Overall, the results of Experiment 1 indicated 
that interoceptive accuracy can increase in response to a stressful negative 
affective experience of public speaking anticipation. In line with the cognitive 
theories of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995), it can be suggested public 
speaking anticipation increased anxiety (see Jakymin & Harris, 2012 for review) 
and heartbeat tracking accuracy (as suggested by Ainley et al., 2012) via 
heightened self-focused attention. 
Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that heartbeat tracking accuracy 
increases due to heightened social self-focus. In order to investigate whether the 
potential effect of social self-focus on interoceptive accuracy generalises to the 
 
 
175 
 
exteroceptive somatosensory modality, the effect of social self-focus on tactile 
perception accuracy was examined alongside heartbeat tracking accuracy. All 
participants completed the heartbeat tracking task and the Somatic Signal 
Detection Task (SSDT; Lloyd et al., 2008), measuring the detection accuracy of 
threshold intensity tactile stimuli, during the self-focus condition (video camera 
turned on and facing the participant) and the non-self-focus condition (video 
camera turned off and facing away from the participant). The results indicated that 
heartbeat tracking accuracy did not differ between the self-focus condition and the 
non-self-focus condition, although the self-focus condition was associated with 
higher sensitivity in detecting tactile stimuli of threshold intensity, as compared to 
the non-self-focus condition. Additionally, the results indicated that heartbeat 
tracking accuracy was not related to sensitivity in detecting tactile stimuli, 
although it was positively associated with false alarms, independently of self-
focus.  
Experiment 3 examined state interoceptive accuracy in an emotional 
context, which was distinct from anticipatory social anxiety (examined in 
Experiment 1), but which retained the negative affective quality and an explicit 
social evaluative component (as Experiment 1, but unlike Experiment 2). 
Heartbeat tracking accuracy was assessed in participants in the experimental and 
control conditions two times: before and after playing a computerised ball-
throwing game, Cyberball (Williams et al., 2000; Williams & Jarvis, 2006). 
Participants in the experimental condition, in which they were excluded during the 
Cyberball game, displayed a significant decrease in heartbeat tracking accuracy 
from pre- to post-Cyberball. Participants in the control condition, in which they 
were included during the Cyberball game, displayed no significant difference in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy from pre- to post-Cyberball. The effect of social 
exclusion on heartbeat tracking accuracy was not moderated by baseline heartbeat 
tracking accuracy. The decrease in heartbeat tracking accuracy from pre- to post-
exclusion was not significantly associated with self-reported mood post-exclusion.  
Because interoceptive accuracy has been implicated in pain processing 
(Pollatos et al., 2012) and social exclusion can affect pain perception—pain 
sensitising and pain numbing effects have been observed (DeWall & Baumeister, 
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2006; Eisenberger et al., 2006)—Experiment 4 examined whether the decrease in 
heartbeat tracking accuracy following social exclusion is accompanied by a 
change in pain perception. In Experiment 4, participants completed the heartbeat 
tracking accuracy task and the electrocutaneous pain assessment task both before 
and after being included (control condition) or excluded (experimental condition) 
during the Cyberball game. The results indicated no significant effect of social 
exclusion on heartbeat tracking accuracy or on pain perception. Heartbeat tracking 
accuracy was not significantly associated with pain thresholds or with pain 
intensity and unpleasantness ratings.  It was hypothesised that Experiment 4 might 
have failed to replicate the effect of social exclusion on heartbeat tracking 
accuracy, that was observed in Experiment 3, due to the salient pain measure 
being present. The pain assessment could have increased participants’ anxiety and 
body vigilance, consequently increasing participants’ interoceptive accuracy and 
cancelling out the effect of social exclusion. 
Experiment 5 examined the stability of interoceptive accuracy under the 
stressful negative affective experience of pain anticipation. The pain anticipation 
task manipulated negative affect via physical threat, rather than social threat, 
which was manipulated during public speaking anticipation (in Experiment 1) and 
social exclusion (in Experiments 3 and 4). In Experiment 5, all participants 
completed the heartbeat tracking task at baseline and during cued pain 
anticipation. During cued pain anticipation, participants completed the heartbeat 
tracking task while being visually cued to anticipate shocks of high intensity 
(painful), shocks of low intensity (non-painful) and shocks of uncertain intensity 
(either painful or non-painful). The results indicated that heartbeat tracking 
accuracy was the highest during anticipation of high intensity (painful) shocks. 
This effect was not moderated by baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy. Heartbeat 
tracking accuracy during the high shock anticipation condition was positively 
associated with retrospective reports of anxiety experienced in these trials. Mean 
heartbeat tracking accuracy scores were not significantly correlated with mean 
pain intensity and unpleasantness scores.  
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6.3 Interpretation 
The findings of the experiments comprising the present thesis indicate that 
interoceptive accuracy is not only a trait, but also a state variable, which fluctuates 
(increases and decreases) in response to negative affective experiences. Potential 
mechanisms of emotion-induced changes in interoceptive accuracy might operate 
on the neural, cognitive (attentional) and physiological level. Probable processes 
involve alterations to the representations of the interoceptive state of the body in 
the brain (Craig, 2002), changes to the strength of interoceptive signal (for 
example, stroke volume) and changes to attentional processes involved in 
interoceptive perception, such as sustained attention and selective attention to 
interoceptive signals (Schulz, 2015). Future studies should aim to delineate the 
mechanisms of changes in interoceptive accuracy due to stressful negative 
affective experiences and discriminate between the above possibilities. Of course, 
it has to be considered that neural, cognitive and physiological processes bringing 
about measurable changes in interoceptive accuracy might not operate 
exclusively. Instead, any of the above mechanisms might interact and be 
differentially affected by various types of stress and environmental demands. 
While the results from the present thesis do not provide evidence regarding which 
of these processes were affected by the experimental manipulation, the results of 
the experiments of the current thesis can be interpreted in the context of affective 
and social self-focus-evoked changes in interoceptive accuracy. 
6.3.1 The Effect of Self-Focus on Interoceptive Accuracy 
In the present thesis, heartbeat tracking accuracy increased in response to 
public speaking anticipation as well as pain anticipation and decreased in response 
to Cyberball exclusion—it should be noted that because Experiment 4 was not a 
direct replication of Experiment 3 and was likely confounded by the introduction 
of the pain measure (as indicated by the results of Experiment 5), the effect of 
social exclusion on interoceptive accuracy is discussed in the context of 
Experiment 3, rather than Experiment 4. In the present thesis, it was observed that 
self-focus, manipulated using a video camera (in Experiment 2) did not affect 
interoceptive accuracy and enhanced only tactile perception accuracy. These 
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findings can be contrasted with the results of Ainley et al. (2012, 2013), indicating 
that self-focus manipulated via self-observation in a mirror as well as gazing at 
photographs of the self and self-referential words can increase heartbeat tracking 
accuracy in individuals with low baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy. The results 
of Experiment 2 of the present thesis and the results of Ainley et al. (2012, 2013) 
might seem contradictory, however, it must be considered that self-focus is not a 
unitary construct, instead consisting of various facets that differ according to the 
aspect of the self that is attended to, the valence of the self-focus and the context 
of the self-focus (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Distinct modes of self-focus direct 
attention to aspects of the self that are relevant to that specific mode (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981; Davies, 2005). For example, mirror, self-photograph and self-
referential word gazing manipulations can be interpreted as directing individuals’ 
attention to private aspects of the self, while video-camera manipulations can be 
interpreted as directing attention to external, observable to others, aspects of the 
self (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Davies, 2005). Consequently, the results of 
Experiment 2 and the results of Ainley et al. (2012, 2013) might be indicative of 
social self-focus enhancing outer (exteroceptive) somatosensory perception and 
private self-focus enhancing inner (interoceptive) somatosensory perception, 
respectively.  It has to be considered, however, that the manipulations used in 
Experiment 2 and the studies by Ainley et al. (2012, 2013) were affectively 
neutral and the effects of private and social self-focus might differ in situations 
that are of an affective nature.  
Negative affect has been associated with heightened self-focus (Mor & 
Winquist, 2002). Situations that elicit social anxiety (e.g., public speaking 
anticipation, Experiment 1) can be interpreted as increasing focus on the social 
aspects of the self (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Spurr & Stopa, 2002), 
whereas situations eliciting anxiety via physical threat (e.g., pain anticipation, 
Experiment 5) can be interpreted as increasing focus on the private bodily aspects 
of the self (Ferguson & Ahles, 1998; Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981). As 
Experiments 1 and 5 indicated that public speaking anticipation and pain 
anticipation, respectively, increased heartbeat tracking accuracy, it can be 
suggested that negative affective situations that are associated with heightened 
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self-focus increase interoceptive accuracy, regardless of the mode of self-focus 
that is evoked. However, an alternative explanation for the results must be 
considered. While social anxiety has been associated with heightened social self-
focus (Fenigstein et al., 1975), it has also been linked to private self-focus, 
although to a lesser extent (Hope & Heimberg, 1988; Monfries & Kafer, 1994). 
As in the public speaking anticipation manipulation employed in Experiment 1, 
participants’ heartbeat tracking accuracy was measured following speech 
preparation and during speech anticipation, rather than during speech delivery, it 
is possible that participants, at that time, in addition to experiencing social self-
focus—involving focus on the self as an object of others’ evaluation—also 
experienced a high level of private self-focus, which involved focus on the self as 
an agent. Consequently, it is possible that social self-focus did not affect 
interoceptive accuracy in Experiment 1, which increased during speech 
anticipation as a result of heightened private self-focus. 
Results of Experiment 3 can also be interpreted in the context of self-focus 
effects on interoceptive accuracy. However, in contrast to public speaking 
anticipation and pain anticipation, manipulated in Experiments 1 and 5, social 
exclusion, manipulated in Experiment 3, most likely decreased self-focus and 
increased other-focus. Even though being socially excluded is a negative affective 
experience involving undesirable social evaluation, which could be thought to 
increase self-focus, socially excluded individuals have been observed to show 
affiliative behaviours that rely on disengaging from the self and reengaging with 
others, such as increased mimicry of strangers (Lakin et al., 2008), reduced 
memory for self-related social behaviours and increased memory for other-related 
social behaviours (Hess & Pickett, 2010) following social exclusion. It has been 
suggested that decreased self-focus following social exclusion might protect 
individuals from the distress of social failure (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; 
Twenge et al., 2003), while freeing attentional resources that can be then allocated 
to the external world, facilitating affiliation and social reconnection (Hess & 
Pickett, 2010). Consequently, in Experiment 3, interoceptive accuracy might have 
been reduced following social exclusion via decrease in self-focus and increase in 
other-focus.  
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Taken together, the findings from Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 5, of the current 
thesis suggest that state interoceptive accuracy might increase and decrease in 
response to situations that affect self-focus. However, it should be considered that 
the majority of the experiments in the present thesis manipulated negative affect, 
with the exception of the video camera manipulation, which manipulated social 
self-focus in an affectively neutral context. Consequently, it is not clear whether 
positive affective situations would elicit similar changes in interoceptive accuracy. 
While some studies indicate that high arousal positive affective states (e.g., joy) 
elicit self-focus (Panayiotou, Brown, & Vrana, 2007), other studies have only 
found an effect of negative, but not positive affect on self-focus (Wood, Saltzberg, 
& Goldsamt, 1990) or have observed a self-focus decreasing effect of positive 
affect (Green, Sedikides, Saltzberg, Wood, & Forzano, 2010; Sedikides, 1992). 
Potential explanations for the disparate findings on the topic have included 
varying measures of self-focus (i.e., behavioural versus self-reported) (Silvia & 
Abele, 2002) as well as interacting effects of mood and situational factors on self-
focus (Abele, Silvia, & Zöller-Utz, 2005).  
6.3.2 The Effect of Negative Affect on Interoceptive Accuracy 
In the present thesis, heartbeat tracking accuracy was found to change due 
to negative affective experiences that manipulate social threat—i.e., public 
speaking anxiety (Experiment 1), social exclusion (Experiment 3)—and negative 
affective experiences that manipulate physical threat—i.e., pain anticipation 
(Experiment 5). As interoceptive accuracy was found to increase during 
anticipatory anxiety in a social threat and a physical threat context (Experiments 1 
and 5), it can be concluded that the effect of anticipatory anxiety on interoceptive 
accuracy spans across different types of anticipatory anxiety—characterised both 
by social and physical threat. The experience of anxiety in response to physical 
and socio-evaluative threat elevates cortisol levels (see Dickerson & Kemeny, 
2004 for a meta-analytic review), which, in turn, can amplify heartbeat evoked 
potentials (Schulz, Strelzyk et al., 2013), reflecting increased cortical processing 
of cardiovascular signals and higher cardiac interoceptive accuracy (Pollatos et 
al., 2005). Even though, evolutionarily, social exclusion constitutes a major threat 
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to the organism (Brewer, 2004) and experimental manipulations of social 
exclusion have been found to significantly affect mood and other psychological 
variables, such as the sense of belonging, control, meaningful existence and self-
esteem (see Williams, 2009 for a review), social exclusion does not elicit a classic 
stress response (Seidel et al., 2013). Heart rate deceleration (Gunther Moor et al., 
2010), in addition to acceleration (Iffland et al., 2014) as well as a drop in skin 
temperature (IJzerman et al., 2010) have been observed in response to 
experimental social exclusion. Moreover, social exclusion manipulations have not 
been found to affect cortisol levels (Geniole, Carré, & McCormick, 2011; Zöller, 
Maroof, Weik, & Deinzer, 2010; Zwolinski, 2012; Seidel et al., 2013), instead 
decreasing levels of testosterone in both genders and increasing the levels of 
progesterone in females (Seidel et al., 2013). Lower levels of testosterone and 
higher levels of progesterone have been linked to reduced power motivation and 
increased affiliation motivation (Schultheiss, Dargel, & Rohde, 2003; Wirth & 
Schultheiss, 2006), while the affiliation motive has been found to negatively 
predict cortisol reactions to psychosocial stress (Wegner, Schuler, & Budde, 
2014). Therefore, the lack of a classic stress response to social exclusion might be 
linked to the increase in the motivation to affiliate following exclusion that has 
been observed on a behavioural level (Hess & Pickett, 2010; Lakin et al., 2008; 
Slabbinck, De Houwer, & Van Kenhove, 2012).  
Average heart rate was not affected by any of the experimental 
manipulations employed in the present thesis. Because there is evidence 
indicating discordance of subjective and objective measures of emotional 
experience (Mauss et al., 2005; Mauss, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2004) and because 
significant effects of the experimental manipulations on self-reported and 
behavioural measures were observed in the current thesis, the manipulations have 
not been discounted as ineffective. Additionally, average heart rate during 
completion of the heartbeat tracking accuracy, by itself, is not a comprehensive 
measure of emotion-related physiological arousal (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). 
Consequently, future investigations of changes in state interoceptive accuracy in 
response to negative affective situations could employ measures of physiological 
reactivity in order to determine whether changes in state interoceptive accuracy 
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under emotional influences are associated with changes in physiological arousal. 
Cardiovascular indices of autonomic nervous system activation that should be 
investigated include blood pressure, total peripheral resistance, cardiac output, 
pre-ejection period and heart rate variability. A measure of particular interest is 
heart rate variability, as it reflects the body’s ability to shift between states of low 
and high physiological arousal, which is crucial for emotion regulation in 
response to stress (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006; Gross, 1998). Consequently, 
future investigations of the effects of various types of stressors on interoceptive 
accuracy and physiological arousal should also consider accompanying changes in 
heart rate variability.  
6.3.3 Relationship Between Interoceptive and Exteroceptive 
Somatosensory Perception 
The present thesis explored the association between interoceptive and 
exteroceptive somatosensory perception. Neural pathways processing 
interoceptive and exteroceptive signals are highly interconnected (Simmons et al., 
2013), yet distinct from one another (e.g., Farb et al., 2013; Hurliman et al., 
2005). Interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory signals jointly shape body 
perception and awareness (Adler et al., 2014; Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 
2013), however, the way in which interoceptive somatosensory signal perception 
is related to exteroceptive somatosensory signal perception is not well understood. 
Experiments 2, 4 and 5 examined the relationship between interoceptive accuracy 
and exteroceptive perception as reflected by heartbeat tracking accuracy and 
tactile perception of neutral and noxious stimuli, respectively, aiming to 
distinguish between the following hypotheses: 1) acuity of somatosensory 
perception spans across interoceptive and exteroceptive modalities (Knapp et al., 
1997), rendering a positive correlation between indices of interoceptive and 
exteroceptive perception accuracy; 2) accuracy of interoceptive and exteroceptive 
somatosensory perception are inversely related due to a competition of internal 
and external signals for the attentional resources (Pennebaker & Lighter, 1980).  
Experiment 2 found that self-focus affected sensitivity of tactile perception 
but not interoceptive accuracy, which suggests that exteroceptive and 
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interoceptive perception might be independently affected by situational factors. 
Moreover, Experiment 2 failed to find a significant relationship between heartbeat 
tracking accuracy and measures of sensitivity and hit hate during the threshold 
tactile stimuli detection task. These results are contrary to the results of Knapp et 
al. (1997), who observed a positive correlation between the accuracy in detecting 
vibrotactile stimuli and heartbeat discrimination accuracy. A potential reason for 
varying results of Experiment 2 and the results of Knapp et al. might be the use of 
different measures of interoceptive accuracy. Knapp et al. employed the heartbeat 
discrimination accuracy task (which is more influenced by exteroceptive 
processing) whereas Experiment 2 of the present thesis used the heartbeat tracking 
method (which is primarily reliant on interoceptive signal monitoring), which 
could account for, respectively, larger and smaller correlations between heartbeat 
perception accuracy and exteroceptive tactile perception observed in the studies. 
The use of vibrotactile and electrocutneous stimulation to measure tactile 
processing by Knapp et al. and in Experiment 2, respectively, further complicates 
cross-study comparisons, as these distinct measurement modalities might tap into 
distinct aspects of exteroceptive tactile perception. 
The results of Experiment 2 did, however, indicate a negative relationship 
between heartbeat tracking accuracy and false alarm rate during the tactile 
perception task, independently of self-focus, which might be used as evidence 
contrary to the hypothesis that somatosensory perception accuracy spans across 
the interoceptive and exteroceptive modalities, instead partially supporting the 
competition of internal and external cues hypothesis (Pennebaker & Lighter, 
1980). Specifically, it has been suggested that directing attention to interoceptive 
stimuli might contribute to the occurrence of false alarms by increasing sensory 
noise, consequently making it more difficult to distinguish between signal and 
noise (sensations originating outside and inside the body, respectively) when 
detecting a tactile stimulus (Mirams et al., 2013; Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). While 
the findings from Experiment 2 indicate that heartbeat tracking accuracy scores 
were negatively associated with tactile false alarms, the competition of cues 
hypothesis is not entirely supported by the results, as no significant relationship 
was found between heartbeat tracking accuracy scores and tactile sensitivity 
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scores, which provide a more direct measure of being able to distinguish sensory 
noise from signal than false alarms. Overall, further research is necessary to 
further examine the relationship between interoceptive accuracy and perception 
accuracy of threshold tactile stimuli and determine whether there is no significant 
relationship between interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory perception 
accuracy, whether the relationship between these two modes of body perception is 
negative, or whether the relationship varies based on specific sub-modalities of 
interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensation.  
In Experiment 4 and in Experiment 5, heartbeat tracking accuracy was not 
significantly associated with pain thresholds or with pain intensity and 
unpleasantness ratings. The lack of a relationship between heartbeat tracking 
accuracy and pain sensitivity observed in Experiments 4 and 5 is contrary to the 
results of Pollatos et al. (2012) who observed a significant inverse relationship 
between heartbeat tracking accuracy and pain thresholds and tolerance to pressure 
stimuli. However, it should be noted that an association between interoceptive 
accuracy and pain perception has not always been observed. For example, 
Werner, Duschek et al., (2009b) failed to observe a significant relationship 
between cardiac interoceptive accuracy and the perception of heat pain. A 
potential reason for the disparate results of the present study, of the results of 
Pollatos et al. and of the results of Werner, Duschek et al. might be the use of 
varying methods of pain assessment (electrocutaneous pain, pressure pain and 
heat pain, respectively). Even though it has been suggested that pain thresholds to 
different types of stimuli (i.e., heat, electric, pressure) measure the same 
phenomenon of general pain sensitivity (e.g., Neddermeyer et al., 2008), it might 
be the case that different pain modalities tap into distinct dimensions of 
nociception (Neziri et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, as Experiment 5 observed a positive association between 
cardiac interoceptive accuracy and fear of pain, which, in turn, was found to 
negatively correlate with pain thresholds, it might be the case that pain-related 
affect mediates the relationship between interoceptive accuracy and pain 
perception. Consequently, future research studies must investigate the association 
between interoceptive accuracy and the perception of noxious tactile stimuli not 
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only employing various modalities of pain measurement, but also taking into 
account potential mediators and moderators of the relationship such as pain 
related emotions and cognitions. 
Overall, the results of the present thesis suggest that bodily perception 
across interoceptive and exteroceptive sensory modalities is not directly related. 
These findings are in line with evidence of separate attentional systems processing 
interoceptive and exteroceptive information in the brain (e.g., Farb et al., 2013; 
Hurliman et al., 2005) as well as with the internal versus external cue competition 
model (Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980). Nevertheless, as that combined 
interoceptive-exteroceptive signals shape body awareness and perception (Adler 
et al., 2014; Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2013), future research should 
continue the investigation of the mechanisms through which somatosensory 
signals are integrated across interoceptive and exteroceptive modalities. 
6.4 Limitations  
6.4.1 Measurement of Interoceptive Accuracy 
The Schandry Mental Tracking Method (1981) is a widely used method of 
assessing interoceptive accuracy (e.g., Herbert & Pollatos, 2014; Ferri et al., 2013; 
Furman et al., 2013; Füstös et al., 2013; Koch & Pollatos, 2014; Krautwurst et al., 
2014; Michal et al., 2014; Penton et al., 2014; Pollatos, et al., 2008; Pollatos et al. 
2012; Schaefer et al., 2014) that involves internal monitoring of heartbeat 
sensations only and does not conflate interoceptive and exteroceptive processing, 
as the heartbeat discrimination task (Garfinkel et al., 2015). However, it has been 
suggested that individuals’ heartbeat tracking accuracy might be influenced by 
their beliefs about heart rate (Ring & Brener, 1996; Brener, Knapp, & Ring, 1995) 
as well as their expectancies with regard to how various activities (e.g., exercise) 
ought to affect their heart rate (Ring, Brener, Knapp, & Mailloux, 2015). 
Consequently, it has been suggested that heartbeat tracking tasks might lack in 
sensitivity to distinguish between individuals who are more accurate at detecting 
heartbeat sensations and individuals who merely have accurate beliefs about their 
heart rate (Brener et al., 1995).  
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It should be noted, however, that these criticisms are primarily based on 
studies showing that false heart rate feedback influences heartbeat tracking 
accuracy (e.g., Berner et al., 1995; Phillips et al., 1999; Ring et al., 2015). Heart 
rate feedback likely affects heartbeat tracking accuracy simply by priming 
individuals to count at a specific temporal frequency—if that temporal frequency 
is slower than their actual heart rate, individuals will show low heartbeat tracking 
accuracy, if that temporal frequency matches their heart rate, individuals will 
show increased heartbeat tracking accuracy (as was observed in the above 
studies). In order to address these issues, it must be ensured that individuals are 
not provided with feedback about their performance while completing the 
heartbeat tracking task—as was the case in the experiments comprising the 
present thesis. 
Additionally, it must be considered that most individuals do not have 
accurate beliefs about their heart rates and tend to underestimate their heart rates 
during the heartbeat tracking task (Ehlers et al., 1995; Kollenbaum, Dahme, 
Kirchner, Katenkamp, & Wagner, 1994)—even individuals with relatively high 
interoceptive accuracy (e.g., Michal et al., 2014). Moreover, heartbeat tracking 
accuracy has been found to correlate with perceptual sensitivity in the gastric 
interoceptive modality (Herbert, Muth et al., 2012), suggesting that it is a valid 
measure of interoceptive accuracy. Finally, it is extremely unlikely that the 
plethora of research correlating inter-individual variability in heartbeat tracking 
accuracy with aspects of cognitive-affective processing (e.g., Dunn et al., 2010; 
Garfinkel, Barrett et al., 2013; Garfinkel, Tiley et al., 2013; Werner, Schweitzer et 
al., 2013; Werner et al., 2010; Wiens, 2005; Wiens et al., 2000), with increased 
activation in the insula (Pollatos, Schandry et al., 2007) and with higher 
amplitudes of heartbeat evoked potentials (Pollatos & Schandry, 2004) constitutes 
a statistical artifact driven by individuals high in interoceptive accuracy simply 
having more accurate beliefs about their heart rates.  
While the critics of the heartbeat tracking method for assessing cardiac 
interoceptive accuracy recommend the use of heartbeat discrimination tasks, it 
should be noted heartbeat discrimination tasks are also characterised by several 
limitations and performance on these tasks is subject to several potentially 
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confounding factors. As heartbeat discrimination accuracy tasks require 
simultaneous processing and comparison of interoceptive and exteroceptive 
information, heartbeat discrimination accuracy is likely influenced by individuals’ 
cognitive processing fluency—specifically fluency in making simultaneity 
judgments across modalities (Knapp et al., 1997). Of course, it should be kept in 
mind that all attempts to operationalise interoceptive accuracy will be inherently 
subject to task-specific demands, consequently, being affected by factors 
pertaining to these task-specific demands. It is, nevertheless, possible that 
interoceptive accuracy, as measured with heartbeat discrimination accuracy, might 
be differentially affected by situational factors than performance on the heartbeat 
tracking accuracy tasks. Sturges and Goetsch (1996) observed that mental 
arithmetic stress increased in heartbeat tracking accuracy in females high in 
anxiety sensitivity, while Fairclough and Goodwin (2007) found that mental 
arithmetic stress decreased heartbeat discrimination accuracy in females. 
Additionally, Schulz, Lass-Hennemann et al. (2013) observed that physical stress, 
induced using the cold stressor task increased heartbeat tracking accuracy, but 
decreased heartbeat discrimination accuracy. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the way in which stressful 
negative affective experiences affect interoceptive accuracy might depend on the 
measurement method. The discrepancy in the effects of stress on heartbeat 
tracking and discrimination accuracy can be potentially due to stress enhancing 
the perception of interoceptive sensations (measured by the heartbeat tracking 
task), but impairing the ability to simultaneously process and integrate 
interoceptive and exteroceptive signals (required during the heartbeat 
discrimination task). Future research could investigate whether the way in which 
interoceptive accuracy is affected by public speaking anticipation; social self-
focus, social exclusion and pain anticipation is dependent on the method of 
interoceptive accuracy assessment. Importantly, state changes in interoceptive 
accuracy in response to emotional and self-focus situations should be investigated 
using a multi-method approach utilising both behavioural and neuroimaging 
methods of assessing interoception. Measuring of changes in heartbeat tracking 
accuracy, heartbeat discrimination accuracy, insula activity and the amplitude of 
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heartbeat evoked potentials in response to experimental manipulations of affect 
and self-focus can help circumvent the limitations associated with individual 
methods of assessing interception, while at the same time providing a more 
detailed account of the way in which interoception fluctuates in various socio-
affective contexts. 
6.4.2 Generalisability of Results to Other Interoceptive Modalities 
Interoceptive modalities include all sensations that originate within the 
body, such as cardiac, respiratory, genital, urinary, gastric, intestinal sensations. 
Because in the present thesis only cardiac signal perception was examined, it 
cannot be assumed that the results generalise to interoceptive modalities other 
than the cardiac modality. However, considering a class of afferent fibres has been 
found to monitor the condition of all internal organs of the body, converging in 
the insula (Craig, 2002, 2009), which, in turn, is activated by a range of visceral 
sensations (see Craig, 2009 for a review), it is likely that accuracy in perceiving 
interoceptive signals covaries across interoceptive modalities. Whitehead and 
Drescher (1980) found that heartbeat discrimination accuracy was significantly 
associated with the ability to accurately detect gastrointestinal signals (stomach 
contractions), while Herbert, Muth et al. (2012) observed that individuals with 
higher heartbeat tracking accuracy ingested lesser volumes of water during the 
Water Load Test, despite similar subjective levels of fullness or nausea—likely 
due to stronger perception of the interoceptive cues signalling fullness. Overall, it 
can be concluded that cardiac and gastrointestinal perception accuracy correspond 
to one another within individuals, which is in line with the evidence that the 
anterior insula supports the perception of cardiac signals (Critchley et al., 2004; 
Pollatos, Schandry et al., 2007) as well as the perception of gastrointestinal 
signals arising in the rectum, stomach, and oesophagus (Aziz et al., 2000; Moisset 
et al., 2010; Craig, 2009).  
On the contrary, Steptoe & Noll (1997) found a lack of correspondence 
between perception of heartbeats, breathing, and sweating in response to 
emotional experience. Additionally, the physiological responses of different 
visceral systems (during emotional experience, for example) have been found to 
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be only modestly associated with one another (Mauss et al., 2005). Consequently, 
it is possible that perception of signals in different interoceptive modalities is 
differentially affected by emotion-eliciting contexts, such as ones manipulated in 
the present thesis (i.e., situations eliciting negative affect through social and 
physical threat). For example, meditators have been found to have increased 
respiratory perception accuracy, as indicated by superior ability to detect and 
discriminate resistive respiratory loads, in comparison to non-meditators, despite 
not having superior cardiac perception accuracy (Daubenmier, Sze, Kerr, 
Kemeny, & Mehling, 2013), consequently suggesting that meditation training 
might selectively increase respiratory interoceptive accuracy, rather than 
interoceptive accuracy in all modalities. Nevertheless, before future research can 
ascertain the cross-correlation of interoceptive accuracy across modalities both at 
baseline, and in response to situational factors, standardised objective cross-modal 
interoceptive accuracy tests that are both valid and reliable must be developed.   
6.4.4 Moderating Variables 
In the present thesis, several factors potentially affecting the experimental 
effects on state interoceptive accuracy were considered, including sex, baseline 
heartbeat tracking accuracy as well as inter-individual difference variables, which 
could affect the effectiveness of the manipulation, such as fear of negative 
evaluation and fear of pain. No effects of sex or baseline interoceptive accuracy 
were observed throughout the experiments. While past research indicates that sex, 
BMI and age might influence interoceptive accuracy (Cameron, 2001), in the 
present thesis no sex differences were found in heartbeat tracking accuracy scores, 
while BMI and age effects were not investigated. It has to be considered that the 
samples investigated in the present studies could have been not large enough to 
provide sufficient statistical power to detect sex differences and perhaps all 
female samples (due to the low availability of male participants) could have been 
recruited instead. The effects of BMI and age on interoceptive accuracy were not 
investigated, as the experimental samples in the present thesis were rather small 
and comprised of young and healthy adults, not yielding themselves to 
investigations of BMI and age effects, which would require larger samples with a 
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varied distribution on these variables. Additionally, it should be noted that not all 
past research has observed sex or BMI differences in interoceptive accuracy (e.g., 
Khalsa, Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009).  
The studies reported in the current thesis investigated young adults; 
consequently, the results obtained may not be generalisable to individuals of all 
ages. This is a considerable limitation, as it has been suggested that interoceptive 
accuracy might decline with age (Allen, Vassallo, & Khattab, 2009; Khalsa, 
Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009), as part of a general age-related decline in processing of 
bodily signals (Brodoehl, Klingner, Stieglitz, & Witte, 2013; Shaffer & Harrison, 
2007). Of course, it should be considered that older individuals’ performance on 
tasks assessing bodily signal processing might be impaired due to general declines 
in cognitive processing affecting working memory (see Salthouse, 1990 for a 
review) and processing speed (Bashore, Ridderinkhof, & van der Molen, 1997). 
This might be especially true for tasks assessing heartbeat discrimination accuracy 
as these require individuals to simultaneously process both interoceptive and 
exteroceptive signals, and simultaneously compare them—a complex task that 
might be more difficult for older, than younger individuals, due to potential 
differences in interoceptive and exteroceptive signal integration between younger 
and older individuals. Even though age-related changes in heartbeat tracking 
accuracy have not been directly examined, it is possible that heartbeat tracking 
accuracy is also lower in older individuals than younger individuals. Future 
research should assess age-related changes in heartbeat tracking accuracy, as well 
as other interoceptive modalities, also investigating how perception of 
interoceptive somatosensory signals is associated with the perception of 
exteroceptive somatosensory signals in older adults—both at baseline, and in 
response to emotion-eliciting manipulations. 
6.5 Future Research Directions 
Overall, further research is necessary to examine the mechanisms through 
which negative affective experiences impact state interoceptive accuracy. It is 
likely that state changes in interoceptive accuracy in response to negative affective 
experiences and self-focus are associated with increased neural activity in brain 
 
 
191 
 
regions associated with interoception, such as the insula, as well as with higher 
amplitudes of heartbeat evoked potentials in these socio-affective contexts. This is 
based on the research observing that anticipation of physically and emotionally 
aversive stimuli increases insula activity (Chua et al., 1999; Ploghaus et al., 1999; 
Simmons et al., 2004; Simmons et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2006) as well as 
evidence from the experiments described in the present thesis, which show that 
anticipation of physically and emotionally aversive events (i.e., pain anticipation 
and public speaking anticipation) increases interoceptive accuracy. However, in 
order to ascertain the neural mechanisms of state changes in interoceptive 
accuracy, research studies investigating interoceptive accuracy and brain activity 
in socio-affective contexts simultaneously are needed. Furthermore, more research 
is necessary to determine whether state changes in interoceptive accuracy in 
response to affective contexts are driven by attentional mechanisms (e.g., changes 
in self-focus) or by physiological arousal (e.g., changes in cardiac activity) 
associated with affective states. This research question can be approached by 
investigating changes in state interoceptive accuracy in response to affective 
situations that vary in arousal, valence and mode of self-focus elicited, while 
employing multiple measures of physiological reactivity. 
Future investigations should additionally examine state changes in 
multiple modalities and facets of interoception and their relationship with various 
modes of exteroceptive somatosensory perception, while taking into account a 
range of potential moderating variables, such as age, clinical status and culture. 
Both depressed and anxious individuals are likely to respond to experimental 
manipulations of negative affect and self-focus differently to healthy subjects. 
Individuals impacted by clinical depression are characterized by reduced 
emotional reactivity (self-reported emotional experience as well as physiological 
reactivity) to positive and negative stimuli (see Bylsma, Morris, & Rottenberg, 
2008 for a meta-analytic review). Anxious individuals, on the other hand, are 
generally characterized by amplified emotional reactivity to negative affective 
stimuli (e.g., Goldin, Manber, Hakimi, Canli, & Gross, 2009; Macatee & Cougle, 
2013). Consequently, future research should investigate the way in which negative 
affective and self-focus manipulations employed in the present thesis affect state 
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interoceptive accuracy in clinical samples of depressed and anxious individuals. 
Future research could further consider potential cultural differences in 
interoceptive accuracy, in emotional experience, and in the effect of emotional 
experience on state interoceptive accuracy. Ma-Kellams (2014) proposes that 
there might be differences between individuals born and raised in Western 
societies (e.g., North America) and individuals born and raised in non-Western 
societies (e.g., East Asia) in their levels of interoceptive accuracy, as well as the 
subjective facets of interoception, such as interoceptive sensibility, measuring 
individuals’ self-reported tendency to be interoceptively cognisant (Garfinkel et 
al., 2015). Importantly, it is possibile that the modulation of interoceptive 
accuracy by contextual factors might be culture dependent. Even though Maister 
and Tsakiris (2014) did not observe differences in baseline heartbeat tracking 
accuracy in East Asian individuals and Western individuals, they did find that 
East Asian individuals did not improve in heartbeat tracking accuracy as a result 
of a self-focus manipulation, as opposed to Western individuals (with lower 
baseline heartbeat tracking accuracy) who displayed an increase in heartbeat 
tracking accuracy due to heightened self-focus, as manipulated with a self-
photograph displayed during the heartbeat tracking task. Consequently, future 
research should explore the possibility that interoceptive accuracy (perhaps also 
interoceptive awareness and interoceptive sensibility) is modulated by situational 
factors, such as negative affect and self-focus, in a culturally-dependent manner.  
6.6 Conclusion 
Interoceptive accuracy has been observed to have high test-retest 
reliability (Mussgay et al., 1999), suggesting that it is a trait variable. However, 
taken together, the results of the current thesis indicate that interoceptive accuracy 
functions not only as a trait, but also as a state variable that fluctuates in response 
to environmental demands. Interoceptive accuracy has been observed to increase 
in response to negative affective situations that are traditionally associated with 
the classic stress response and increase self-focus (evoked by both psychosocial 
and physical threat—public speaking anticipation and pain anticipation, 
respectively). Interoceptive accuracy, however, has been observed to decrease in 
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response to a negative affective situation that is not traditionally associated with 
the classic stress response and decreases self-focus (social exclusion). The results 
of the present thesis suggest that changes in interoceptive accuracy span across 
contexts that are both social (i.e., public speaking anticipation) and non-social 
(i.e., pain anticipation), however, more research is necessary to determine whether 
changes in state interoceptive accuracy are restricted to negative affective 
situations, or whether they also characterise positive affective situations. The 
results of the present thesis indicated that changes in state interoceptive accuracy 
are not limited to individuals with low baseline interoceptive accuracy and can 
occur in individuals both low and high in baseline interoceptive accuracy. It has to 
be considered that the observed changes in interoceptive accuracy in the 
experiments comprising this thesis were characterised by small effect sizes, 
representing changes in interoceptive accuracy that were of a small degree. For 
example, interoceptive accuracy of individuals with low baseline can increase as a 
result of a manipulation, but, most likely, it will not increase to an extent large 
enough that would warrant re-classification of the individual as high in 
interoceptive accuracy. Additionally, while the duration of the effects was not 
investigated in the present thesis, changes in interoceptive accuracy are likely to 
be of a very brief duration that is time-locked to the exposure to the emotion-
inducing stimulus or environment (e.g., pain stimulus, public speaking 
anticipation) and that does not last beyond that point. Future research should 
investigate the duration of changes in interoceptive accuracy. Exteroceptive 
somatosensory perception involving neutral and noxious tactile stimuli has largely 
been found to be unrelated to interoceptive accuracy, with the exception of false 
reports of threshold tactile stimuli being inversely related to interoceptive 
accuracy. Overall, the results of the present thesis suggest that changes in 
interoceptive accuracy do not generalise to the exteroceptive somatosensory 
modality. 
6.6.1 Implications and Applications 
The findings of the experiments comprising the present thesis further the 
current understanding of the way in which cardiac interoceptive perception 
functions as a state variable that is subject to modulation by social and affective 
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contexts. The experimental findings encompassed by the chapters are novel in that 
they provide evidence for the existence of a bi-directional relationship between 
interoception and emotion, in which in addition to interoceptive accuracy 
influencing emotional experience in a trait-like manner, emotional experience also 
influences interoceptive accuracy as a state-variable. Importantly, the studies 
furthered the understanding of the way in which cardiac interoceptive perception 
accuracy is related to other modes of body perception, such as noxious and neutral 
tactile perception.  
While it is possible that changes in interoceptive accuracy in stressful 
negative affective experiences are non-functional consequences of the application 
of the stressor, it is likely that that changes to the perception of bodily signals are 
of benefit to the organism. The potential effect of altered interoceptive accuracy 
on cognitive and affective processes is highlighted by copious evidence 
implicating interoception in emotional experience (Wiens, 2005). Even though the 
results of the experiments of the current thesis indicated that changes in 
interoceptive accuracy were not associated with changes in mood, it is likely that 
mood measures in the present studies lacked sensitivity. Consequently, the results 
of the thesis should not be interpreted as contrary to the James-Lange (1884, 
1887) peripheralist model of emotion and supportive of the Cannon (1929) view 
that emotion does not require afferent bodily feedback. Moreover, recall that 
interoceptive accuracy has been found to influence cognitive processes such as 
memory (e.g., Garfinkel, Barrett et al., 2013; Werner et al., 2010) and decision-
making (e.g., Dunn et al., 2010; Werner, Schweitzer et al., 2013). Additionally, 
altered interoceptive processing has been implicated in psychopathology, 
including anxiety (see Domschke et al., 2010 for a comprehensive review) and 
depression (Dunn et al., 2007), which have been associated with impairments in 
memory (e.g., Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Kizilbash, Vanderploeg, & 
Curtiss, 2002) as well as impairments in social and financial decision-making 
(e.g., Miu, Heilman, & Houser, 2008; Wang et al., 2014). Consequently, the 
findings of the present thesis can function as a platform for future research on the 
role of interoception in influencing cognitive information processing in healthy 
and clinical samples, which can aim to determine whether state changes in 
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interoceptive accuracy in affective and self-focus inducing contexts influence 
subsequent cognitive-affective processing.  
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Appendix  
7.1 A List of Pros and Cons of Animal Use in Research That Was 
Provided to Participants in the Control Group in Experiment 1 
PROS of Animal Use 
 in Medical Research 
CONS of Animal Use 
 in Medical Research 
• The benefits of using animal in 
research outweigh the harm done to 
animals. 
 
• The use of animals in research is 
prevalent because they share at least 
200 common illnesses and diseases 
with humans. 
 
• It allows for research design that 
could not be used on humans.  
 
• Using animals in research affords the 
scientist to monitor reactions to 
stimuli and other variables in 
complex organs and tissue, while 
allowing the scientist to minimize 
environmental variables. 
 
• Animals are used in scientific 
research to further science. They are 
used most often in: 
I. Disease Treatment 
II. Prevention 
III. Treatment of Injuries 
IV. Basic Medical Testing 
V. Medical Diagnosis 
 
• Animal studies are conducted to help 
decide whether a particular drug 
should be tested on people, and to 
eliminate potential ineffective or 
dangerous from being used with 
human beings. If a drug passes the 
animal test it's then tested on a small 
human group before large scale 
clinical trials. 
• It causes suffering to animals 
 
• Level of suffering and the 
number of animals involved are 
both so high that the benefits to 
humanity don't provide moral 
justification. 
 
• If an experiment violates the 
rights of an animal, then it is 
morally wrong, because it is 
wrong to violate rights.  
 
• The possible benefits to humanity 
of performing the experiment are 
completely irrelevant to the 
morality of the case, because 
rights should never be violated. 
 
• The benefits to human beings are 
not proven 
 
• The harm that will be done by the 
experiment is known beforehand, 
but the benefit is unknown. 
 
•  The harm that will be done to the 
animals is certain to happen if the 
experiment is carried out. The 
harm done to human beings by 
not doing the experiment is 
unknown because no-one knows 
how likely the experiment is to 
succeed or what benefits it might 
produce if it did succeed. 
 
• Experimental drugs and 
treatments that have been found 
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• Animals in research have made 
possible many scientific 
breakthroughs that humans benefit 
from each day. 
I. Vaccinations 
II. Anesthesia 
III. Antibiotics 
IV. Numerous medical treatments 
for various diseases 
 
• Research on animals can be used to 
obtain knowledge that will help 
animals—e.g. breeding programs for 
endangered species, vaccines for cats 
and dogs etc.  
 
• 85 % of the animals used in research 
are rodents - rats and mice that have 
been bred for laboratory use 
 
• Most laboratory tests on animals are 
simple single type tests - change in 
diet, drawing a simple blood sample, 
administering a drug. 
 
• Suffering is minimised in all 
experiments. Animals are given 
anesthetics if a procedure is going to 
be invasive in any way. 
 
• Dogs, cats and non-human primates 
account for only 3 out of 1000 
subjects in experimentation. 
 
• Humans are still the largest group that 
is used for research and 
experimentation and beats out all 
other lab animals when it comes to 
testing. 
 
• Computer models can be of use when 
learning about a process or disease, 
but data for these models comes from 
animal studies. Also, computer 
effective on animal models will 
not necessarily work in people. 
 
• Animals and humans do not get 
the same diseases. As a result, 
animal research focuses on 
artificially inducing symptoms of 
human cancer and attempting to 
treat those symptoms. 
 
• Scientists use animals in 
biological and medical research 
more as a matter of tradition, not 
because animal research has 
proved particularly successful or 
better than other modes of 
experimentation. 
 
• There is growing awareness of 
the limitations of animal research 
and its inability to make reliable 
predictions about human health. 
 
• The biomedical research 
community and its affiliated trade 
associations routinely attempt to 
convince the general public, 
media, and government 
representatives that the current 
controversy over the use of 
animals is a life-and-death 
contest pitting defenders of 
human health and scientific 
advancement against hordes of 
anti-science, anti-human, 
emotional, irrational activists. 
Such a deliberate, simplistic 
dichotomy is not only false, but 
ignores the very real and well-
documented ethical and scientific 
problems associated with the use 
of animal experiments that 
characterize modern biomedical 
research, testing, and its 
associated industries.  
 
• Any benefits to human beings 
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models point to gaps for further study 
in living things.  
 
• In vitro experiments usually use 
tissues or cells taken from animals or 
humans, but scientists are not able to 
replicate the whole complexity of a 
living organism in test tube or a 
plastic dish.  Such research provides a 
knowledge base for further study 
using animals. 
 
 
that animal testing does provide 
could be produced in other ways.   
 
• Alternatives to animal research 
already exist. 
 
• The biomedical community 
would instead be better served by 
promoting increased funding and 
research efforts for the 
development of non-animal 
models that overcome the 
pressing ethical and scientific 
limitations of an increasingly 
archaic system of animal 
experimentation.  
 
 
Sources from which the above points were taken are as follows: 
• http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/animals/using/experiments_1.shtml 
• http://science.education.nih.gov/animalresearchfs06.pdf 
• http://www.experiment-resources.com/animals-in-research.html 
• http://whitecoatwelfare.org/aat-text.shtml 
• http://www.aavs.org/site/c.bkLTKfOSLhK6E/b.6456997/k.3D74/Problems_with_Animal_Re
search.htm 
